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Democratic societies are societies of law. Laws enable the peaceful coexistence 
of citizens under criminal codes, promote the well-being of economic activity by 
safeguarding property and exchanges, and ensure the proper functioning of 
governments through constitutions and administrative law. In addition, 
regulations help societies achieve environmental, ethical, and other objectives 
that are not easy to attain without their codification into law. In order for laws to 
maintain a healthy society, however, they must be successfully applied and 
respected by those whose behavior they limit or compel. For some laws, the state 
shares this responsibility, not only by respecting the procedural and constitutional 
laws that limit its authority, but also by putting in place monitoring and 
enforcement systems to ensure the correct application of laws by others. Entire 
administrative apparatuses are developed for this purpose.
The need for effective law application is no less important in the multilevel EU, 
where decisions made at the highest level in Brussels must be respected and 
applied by national legislatures, administrative authorities, subnational 
administrators (in many cases), economic actors, and citizens alike in 28 different 
countries each with their own political, administrative, and legal systems. Internal 
market policies ensure intra-EU trade on fair terms by harmonizing standards and 
removing technical barriers to trade. Environmental, health, and consumer 
protection policies similarly promote the achievement of non-market objectives 
without distorting competition. Other policies in the fields of justice and 
employment, for example, protect citizens’ rights and liberties. EU policies touch 
on many aspects of life in 28 countries, but their application and proper functioning 
depends on a complex and interdependent chain of implementation activities 
that only begins with the enactment of legislation. Policy outcomes (whether 
those intended or not) occur only after EU legislation is transposed into national 
law and that law is applied by national administrations and non-state actors alike.
Difficulties can and do arise at any moment in the implementation process, 
leading to a different application of law than what is unintended by policymakers. 
Starting with the transposition of directives, states often fail to enact transposing 
measures before their statutory deadlines. Although by November of 2012 less 
than 1% of the nearly 1500 internal market were not transposed in one or more 
states, transposition delays have climbed to almost ten months (European 
Commission, 2013). These aggregate figures mask significant internal variation 
and four states have failed to meet the 1% target. Additionally, transposition 
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measures may be incomplete or incorrect and thus fail to meet all the directive’s 
requirements. Countries may achieve timely transposition by enacting incomplete 
or incorrect transposing measures, as in Italy, which has reduced its transposition 
deficit from 2.4% to 0.8% but which has transposed 2.1% of directives incorrectly.
Complete and correct transposition is only a necessary first condition for the 
full application of EU laws. Following this stage, member states must successfully 
apply national laws so that their behavior, or that of economic actors, is in line 
with EU requirements. The 2013 Internal Market Scoreboard indicates that about 
50% of ongoing infringement proceedings concern the misapplication of EU 
laws.1 Whereas transposition has clear, identifiable outputs that can be assessed 
with relative ease (though assessing the conformity of measures presents some 
challenges), practical application in the Member States does not always have such 
easily observable compliant or non-compliant behavior. Most inspection and 
enforcement systems devised by Member States to ensure the compliance of 
economic actors with EU law are necessarily imperfect. From this imperfection 
arises the possibility that a large amount of devious behavior goes undetected. 
The European Commission itself lacks the resources to oversee and coordinate 
national administrations and to directly monitor firms’ behavior. Monitoring and 
inspection of national administration by the Commission takes place by regulatory 
authorities in some policy sectors, but like Member State systems, this too is 
imperfect. For some unmonitored policies, correct application relies only on 
empowering citizens and firms to take legal action within national or EU courts to 
secure their rights. For others, incorrect application is brought to the attention of 
the member state or the Commission only through complaints by harmed or 
otherwise interested parties. These difficulties apply to regulations as much as to 
directives. Although no transposition takes place in the former, implementing 
them often requires monitoring and enforcement carried out by Member States.
Because many EU policy objectives, like ensuring the fairness of competition 
and guaranteeing the equality of all citizens and economic actors before the law, 
depend in part on the uniform application of laws across the EU, this differential 
application threatens the legitimacy and effectiveness of the entire institution. 
This is particularly so for market regulation given that economic integration is a 
core element of European integration. Transposition and application processes in 
the Member States together can lead to diverging policy outputs and outcomes. 




have examined the interactions and dependencies between the two. Such an 
investigation could uncover the ways in which both phases together account for 
differences in implementation success across the EU. This thesis makes such an 
attempt through a cross-national comparison across 27 countries of the 
transposition and application of EU animal welfare legislation.
Scope of the project
Though the EU generates a considerable amount of distributive and 
redistributive policies, the bulk of its legislative efforts are directed towards 
regulation. While all policies involve implementation, studying regulatory 
implementation separate from the implementation of other kinds of policies is 
justified given their very different characteristics. Unlike distributive policies such 
as agricultural subsidies, the awarding of scientific research grants, or regional 
development programs, regulatory policies achieve their aims without allocating 
or reallocating resources (Lowi, 1964). The distribution of resources within or 
across sectors may change as a result of regulatory policy, but redistribution is not 
the policy instrument used. Instead, regulations compel their subjects (firms, 
farmers, members of a certain profession, etc.) to perform certain activities or 
prohibit them from engaging in others, and as such impose costs directly on 
regulated entities. The need for regulation suggests that subjects will not always 
willingly change their behavior and may instead attempt to avoid the costs of 
regulation through non-compliance. In order to reduce this non-compliance, 
states develop monitoring and enforcement systems and consequently share the 
direct costs of regulation with regulated entities. In addition to requirements for 
regulated entities, EU legislation may contain requirements for member states 
with respect to monitoring and enforcement. Nevertheless, regulatory 
enforcement traditions vary from one country to another. Because the costs of 
regulation are born by state and non-state actors alike, a study of regulatory 
implementation beyond legal transposition must consider both the activities of 
regulated entities in meeting requirements as well as those of the state to induce 
compliance.
In studying regulation in the EU, an important clarification of terms is necessary. 
Article 288 of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) specifies the legal instruments 
that the EU can promulgate: regulations, directives, decisions, recommendations 
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and opinions. The latter two (recommendations and opinions) are not binding, 
and decisions are binding only for those to whom they are addressed and as such 
are not used for generally applicable policies. The most important categories of 
legislation are regulations and directives. Regulations apply directly while 
directives are binding on Member States only with respect to their objectives. 
Application of directives requires transposition (the adoption of appropriate legal 
measures) into national law in each Member State. Although only one of these 
two types is called “regulations”, both can be regulatory policy. In the case of 
directives, Member States themselves adopt the necessary regulations or statutes 
to meet policy objectives. Hence studying regulation in the EU is not confined to 
studying EU regulations only.
The substantive aims of regulation cover a diverse set of economic activities 
but are typically justified for a limited number of reasons. In changing the behavior 
of market actors, regulations attempt to correct market failures by ensuring the 
supply of public goods, managing common pool resources, and internalizing 
externalities, among others. Regardless of the kind of market failure to be 
corrected, many are justified for protecting human health and safety from the 
harmful unintended side effects of production and consumption. Workplace 
safety regulations protect laborers from unsafe equipment and dangerous 
substances. Pharmaceutical regulations prevent the sale of drugs with harmful or 
unknown side effects. Environmental policy protects people from unsafe levels of 
pollution in the air, water, and land as well as the adverse effects of global climate 
change. Consumer protection legislation requires the provision of information to 
consumers about the potentially harmful effects of products. 
Not all regulations exist to protect people from harm, however. Others seek to 
advance the values of a society by ensuring that economic activity is carried out 
in ways that do not conflict with these values. Employment policies promote 
equality in the workplace. Animal welfare regulation, the subject of this thesis, 
promotes the ethical treatment of animals in food production processes and 
other economic activities. Ensuring animal welfare can have indirect effects on 
human health through promoting the rearing of healthy animals, but the primary 
objectives of such policies are not anthropocentric. Although the aims of 
regulations are diverse, they all share some basic characteristics (namely the 
modification of behavior and need for enforcement mechanisms) that make the 
insights generated in one regulatory policy area potentially applicable to 
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regulation in other areas.
Animal welfare policy is a particularly interesting case for a cross-national 
study of the implementation of EU regulatory policy. The requirements impinge 
on the activities of a heterogeneous set of market actors: small farmers, “big 
agribusiness”, transporters, and slaughterhouse operators. The impacts of 
regulation on each of these actors depend in part on national situations. EU 
animal welfare legislation varies from one policy to another in terms of the amount 
of flexibility member states are given to adapt the requirements to their national 
contexts. The existence of flexibility in this legislation may in part reflect the 
controversy it generates during EU decision-making, with different coalitions of 
member states promoting more or less stringent animal welfare standards 
(Franchino, 2004). Despite this controversy, providing an adequate level of animal 
welfare during food production is an important issue for the majority of the EU’s 
citizens, though this salience varies from country to country. The study of animal 
welfare policy in the EU is also a topical one. With the Netherlands voting in 2011 
to ban halal and kosher slaughtering in response to the demands of animal rights 
campaigners and an EU-wide ban on battery cages for laying hens coming into 
effect in the beginning of January 2012, now is an appropriate time to take stock 
of the achievements (or lack thereof ) in this area.
Conceptualizing implementation
The public policy process is generally conceived as and reduced to a series of 
stages, one following the other (see e.g. Anderson, 2011). Problems are identified, 
the policymaking agenda is set from among these problems, the agenda is 
formulated into policy proposals, and decision-making turns proposals into 
legislation. Once legislation is adopted, implementation begins as civil servants 
put in place and operate the administrative systems required by new legislation. 
While some policies are implemented through the courts as legal guarantees and 
protections for firms and individuals, many require active participation by 
administrative actors. In implementing policies, these actors make day-to-day 
“routine” decisions about individual cases: issuing permits, dispersing payments, 
investigating crimes, inspecting industrial processes, and issuing fines for 
violations. In the case of regulatory policy, the inspection of regulated entities and 
the enforcement of requirements through sanctions or cooperative problem-
17
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solving are important components of implementation. Implementation is then 
followed by policy evaluation, which in turn feeds back into policy reform or 
another cycle of the policy process.
The policy process in the EU follows the same basic outline with several 
important differences relevant for implementation. In the case of directives, an 
additional step between policy adoption and the “routine” activities of 
administrative actors occurs. Because directives do not directly apply, each 
member state must adopt their own national legislation (primary legislation 
involving the whole legislature or regulations decided by unelected bureaucrats) 
to meet requirements. This process is known as transposition, and most EU 
scholars consider it the first part of the implementation of EU policies. Member 
states then implement these transposing laws just as they do other domestic 
policies, but in doing so they are accountable not only to national law, but to EU 
law as well. Scholars refer to this post-transposition phase of implementation as 
application. Hence following this terminology, transposition and application are 
sequential sub-stages in the implementation phase of the policy process. 
Although EU regulations do not require transposition to be applicable, they are 
often applied by the same administrative actors responsible for applying domestic 
legislation that transposes directives.
The extent to which member states transpose directives on time and the 
degree to which they satisfactorily apply both directives and regulations are 
together referred to as compliance. If both the deadlines and requirements of an 
EU law are met, then a country is in compliance with that law. The EU has 
mechanisms to improve member state compliance: from soft tools like information 
sharing and collective problem-solving to more coercive measures like 
infringement proceedings that can eventually lead to court cases and fines. The 
study of compliance per se is largely concerned with enforcement activities by the 
European Commission to ensure compliance. I will generally refer to these 
activities as “compliance-related” to avoid confusion with the domestic 
enforcement of EU policies that forms an important part of the implementation 
process studied here.
Research puzzle
The EU’s ambitious policy objectives in the field of animal welfare have been 
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met with variable success across the Member States.2 Directives adopted for the 
protection of animal welfare on the farm, in slaughterhouses and during transport 
have slowly been transposed over the last twenty years. In seven major directives 
in this field, correct transposition was achieved on average 1.5 years after their 
statutory deadlines, but delays of 4-6 years are not uncommon. Some directives 
remain incorrectly transposed in both new member states and old, and 
infringement proceedings have been launched against some countries for 
disrespecting deadlines and recommendations for correct application. On the 
other hand, timely transposition occurred in 40% of cases, and four countries (all 
new member states3) transposed all directives on time. Because correct 
transposition is a necessary first condition for satisfactory application, variation in 
timely transposition sets a minimum level of variability in successful application 
and this variation in turn prevents the harmonization of requirements across the 
EU.
The major research puzzle here is the large variability in policy application that 
exists (to the extent that it is observable) across many policy fields and countries. 
Because of the difficulty of collecting data about this phase of the policy process, 
any investigation necessarily must limit itself to a small number of cases. As with 
timely transposition, a large degree of variation in application exists across the EU 
with regard to animal welfare policy. Each year the Food and Veterinary Office (the 
unit within the Commission’s DG Health and Consumers responsible for overseeing 
the implementation of EU animal welfare policy, among others) audits a selection 
of Member States for their compliance with animal welfare legislation (both 
directives and regulations) and discovers problems of application in nearly every 
country it visits. Some – like inadequately maintained facilities and equipment for 
slaughter going undetected or unpunished – cause significant hardships and 
suffering for farm animals in these countries. At the same time, these countries 
avoid the relatively higher costs of ensuring animal welfare and can thus pass on 
these savings to consumers, resulting in market distortions. The FVO issues 
recommendations to the Member States to fix the problems, but sometimes these 
recommendations are not quickly taken and significant welfare problems persist. 
In some cases the Commission initiates infringement proceedings for incorrect 
application. On the other hand, some directives are implemented with relative 
2 The EU’s newest member, Croatia, is not included within the scope of this project.
3 “New member states” refer to the countries that acceded to the EU in 2004 and 2007. These are Bulgaria, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.
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ease by one or more member states. This variability in application is the core 
puzzle addressed in this thesis.
Research question
Given the above empirical puzzle, the central research question of this thesis 
is: why do some EU Member States successfully implement regulatory policies 
while others do not? Because implementation only begins with transposition, a 
number of interesting sub-questions emerge when the different phases of 
implementation are considered. Firstly, a set of questions can be posed with 
respect to transposition. Why do some Member States adopt correct transposition 
measures in a timely manner while others delay?
Answers to this first set of questions will be discussed in the next chapter which 
reviews the transposition and implementation literatures. Many such answers 
have been proposed and tested in other contexts and may provide partial answers 
to a second set of questions concerned with the post-transposition life of EU 
legislation in the Member States. Rather than attempting to answer this first set of 
questions, the crux of this dissertation will be to apply the lessons learned from 
the transposition phase in order to answer questions about post-transposition 
application. Why are some Member States more successful than others in applying 
transposed regulations? Why do some pieces of legislation present difficulties for 
Member States while others do not? What is the relationship between variability 
in transposition (in terms of timeliness, correctness, and exercised discretionary 
authority) and variability in application? 
Approach, theory, and research design
To answer these questions, this study engages in a cross-national comparison 
of the implementation of animal welfare policies across 27 EU member states. 
Three EU animal welfare policies (welfare on the farm, during transport, and at 
slaughter) covering the life cycle of farm animals and comprising the most 
important EU legislation in this field will be investigated over a ten year period. 
Some policies can be further divided by topic (laying hens, calves, or pigs) or by 
time (pre- and post-reform). Thus although on the surface this appears as a case 
study of a single policy field, it is in fact a set of three or even six policy case studies. 
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Because each policy is implemented in multiple countries and evolves over time, 
the basic unit of analysis is lower and more numerous than either the number of 
policies or the number of countries.
From the transposition and implementation literatures I narrow my theoretical 
approach to a small set of factors and derive a set of hypotheses about post-
transposition application. First, the transposition literature focuses on the role of 
“policy misfit” or “adaptation pressure” in delaying transposition (e.g. Knill & 
Lenschow, 2001). Policies that require significant adaptations will face greater 
delays as a result of differences between national policies in place (or a lack 
thereof ) and the EU policy to be implemented. These pressures are likely to make 
application itself more difficult as well, and I reconceptualize adaptation pressure 
as a dynamic concept. As part of this reconceptualization, I consider several 
important top-down sources of dynamic adaptation pressure. Second, I draw on 
the veto player approach (e.g. Tsebelis, 1995) to posit that institutional factors 
(and the degree of centralization within national administrations in particular) 
influence implementation quality. Finally, I draw inspiration from the growing 
literature on the importance of discretionary authority to hypothesize that the 
presence of such authority enables countries to better cope with the adaptation 
pressures introduced by EU requirements (Franchino, 2000).
To test these hypotheses, I follow a mixed methods research design. The 
advantages of this approach are threefold. First, the case studies enable a 
robustness check on the measurement of the dependent variable – the quality of 
implementation. Chapter 5 describes the measurement strategy for this variable 
and it is observed in greater detail for a set of cases in the case study chapters 
(Chapters 6-8). Second, the case studies work as plausibility probes for the 
hypotheses and the mechanisms that underlie them. The plausibility probes work 
in conjunction with the formal hypothesis tests of the quantitative analyses 
chapters (Chapters 9-10): demonstrating the plausibility of a hypothesis using 
closely observed qualitative evidence helps to distinguish statistical artifact from 
a valid statistical test. Finally, the quantitative analyses test the hypotheses in a 
way that the case studies cannot, and demonstrate the generalizability of the 
mechanisms across many observations. Namely, they test each hypothesis while 
simultaneously controlling for confounding factors. Statistical control is much 




The policy-making process of the EU receives considerable attention by social 
scientists (political scientists, sociologists, and public administration scholars 
alike), but scholarly attention trails off as policies move from adoption through 
implementation and evaluation. Following the decision-making stage at the EU 
level, a large and growing literature has examined the legal transposition of EU 
Directives, in some cases relying on vast datasets to make general statements 
about this process as it occurs across policy areas, member states, and through 
time. These studies have greatly advanced our understanding of the functioning 
of EU policies once they leave Brussels, but most close their eyes to the policy 
process that occurs after a member state notifies the Commission that 
implementing legislation has been adopted. Whether this legislation faithfully 
adapts EU requirements to national law and further whether such legislation is 
successfully applied and enforced remains largely outside their focus.
In parallel to the transposition literature, a large number of qualitative case 
studies of single policies implemented in a handful of member states have 
provided valuable insights into the later stages of the policy process. Rich in 
contextual detail, implementation studies uncover key causal mechanisms that 
operate as national administrations interpret their European mandates. Given 
their attention to the specific features of individual policies and member states, 
these studies necessarily have limited generalizability. Aside from the tremendous 
time and resources required for implementation studies conducted across many 
policies, generalizations are not revealed (and often not even sought) because 
these works take as their starting point the goals of obtaining a deep understanding 
and full explanation of cases of successful (but more commonly unsuccessful) 
implementation. 
One approach to advancing our knowledge on this topic is to integrate the 
transposition and implementation literatures by applying general theories 
derived from the former to the processes of concern to the latter. Theories that 
seek to explain transposition have implications for implementation from which 
testable hypotheses can be derived. Moreover, because of the sequential nature 
of the policy process, activities in one stage are likely to affect subsequent stages. 
Hence the duration and outcomes of transposition will influence implementation 
in predictable ways. Although the transposition literature can bring us partway to 
generalizable knowledge about implementation, the immense possibility for 
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variation in member state application of EU law means that additional explanatory 
factors will be necessary. One key element largely missing from the literature on 
both implementation and transposition (though found as one dependent variable 
in the decision-making literature) is the discretionary authority granted to 
member states and their administrations to adapt EU policy to their own national 
circumstances. The size of discretionary authority granted and the way in which it 
is exercised by member states during transposition may affect application and 
hence link the two literatures that this thesis addresses. A second key element is 
the organization of administration. While demonstrated to have some impact on 
transposition, the organization of the administration of regulation likely has more 
direct and greater influence on the variability of post-transposition application. 
Both of these elements will form part of the theoretical core of this thesis.
Societal relevance
The analysis presented here has relevance beyond its potential contributions 
to social science. The industrial farming that has arisen in the latter half of the 
twentieth century has produced significant backlash among some segments of 
the population. Citizens have become increasingly concerned that the intensive 
raising of animals for food has many potentially negative implications for human 
health. Additionally, a growing part of the population questions the ethics of 
rearing animals in production systems in which these animals experience 
considerable suffering. The growing availability of and demand for “free-range” 
eggs and meat is one indication of this trend. Calls for “animal friendly” products 
labeling have been voiced (though unanswered). Although the EU has responded 
to demands for increased welfare standards, these standards have limited value if 
they are not respected in the member states. Revealing the cross-national 
variation in implementation success and failure will allow concerned citizens or 
their representatives to pressure their governments to reach further compliance. 
With product origin labeling and cross-national information about animal welfare 
implementation, concerned citizens can make more informed decisions about 
what they put on their plates. As a result of these pressures, farm animals may live 
more comfortable lives.
The relevance of this study is not restricted to animal welfare alone. Because 
the analysis is ultimately concerned with understanding regulatory policy 
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implementation in the EU, such an in-depth investigation in one policy area may 
provide policy recommendations that are applicable to others. Given the range of 
potential explanations that will be tested, recommendations could be made with 
respect to improving both the design of regulatory policies at the EU level and 
their administration in the member states. 
Plan of the book
The plan of the book is as follows. The second chapter surveys and critiques EU 
implementation literature generally, focusing in particular on the broad 
transposition literature. The third chapter presents the theories to be tested and 
from which hypotheses will be derived. A fourth chapter provides an overview of 
animal welfare policy in the EU and describes in greater detail the individual 
policies that are the subject of this book. The fifth chapter introduces the 
methodology for the case studies that follow as well as the strategy for measuring 
the adequacy of implementation in both empirical parts of the thesis. Chapters 
six through eight consider animal welfare on the farm, during transport, and at 
slaughter separately in a series of qualitative case studies. Chapters nine and ten 
present quantitative analyses of the variability in application observed both 
across policies and countries. The final chapter summarizes the gathered insights 






Implementation became a phenomenon worthy of investigation by social 
scientists beginning in the US in the latter half of the twentieth century. Classic 
works on implementation searched for explanations as to why seemingly well-
formulated and well-intentioned policies failed to achieve their goals or had other 
undesired effects (Bardach, 1977; Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973). The story that 
emerged was one of complexity in which policies are delayed and altered as each 
of the many actors involved in their administration play out their parts. From 
these foundational studies, a myriad of approaches to studying implementation 
have emerged. Some attempt to develop theories to explain implementation 
generally, while others restrict themselves to particular geographic or policy 
areas. A whole range of implementation studies within fields as diverse as welfare 
distribution and environmental regulation have been undertaken. Rather than 
trying to understand implementation as a phenomenon in its own right, these 
policy studies often have as their aim the improvement of particular policies. 
The literature review presented in this chapter focuses on developments 
(empirically and theoretically) in the study of EU transposition and post-
transposition application. Theoretical advances in the broader field of 
implementation research inspire some of the work discussed below, but the 
majority of the works discussed are in dialogue with each other rather than the 
more general literature. I review the selected literature to inform the theoretical 
approach taken in the next chapter and to derive hypotheses that are appropriate 
for the empirical content while attempting to be a part of this conversation. For 
background in the more general developments (that are not examined in the EU 
context), a number of critical reviews and textbooks are available (e.g., Hill & Hupe, 
2008; O’Toole, 2000; Saetren, 2005; Winter, 2003). While I review several single 
case studies of implementation and a subset of the qualitative empirical work 
(primarily by examining the insights generated in these studies), the majority of 
the empirical material is rooted in quantitative studies aimed at testing one or 
more hypotheses. Examining the plethora of single case studies of implementation 
generated in academic research as well as those conducted by NGOs, think tanks, 
government agencies, and other actors lies outside the scope of this review. 
EU implementation research
Research into the implementation of and compliance with EU policy began 
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with unconnected studies comprising what one reviewer of this literature calls an 
“eclectic start” (Mastenbroek, 2005). These studies considered a variety of factors, 
including issues of political and administrative culture, characteristics of policies 
to be implemented and political opposition. Together they offered few wide-
ranging conclusions about implementation or compliance, but instead served as 
inspiration for much of the work that followed by supplying a number of testable 
hypotheses and interesting ideas. With the publication of Siedentopf and Ziller’s 
two volume comparison of seventeen directives covering a large number of 
sectors and countries, EU implementation research firmly entered the political 
science research agenda (1988).
In discussing the EU implementation literature, it is important to keep in mind 
that many related concepts (transposition, application, compliance, etc.) 
sometimes appear in the same study and that different conceptualizations of 
implementation appear across different studies. The particular nature of the 
policy process in the EU (described briefly in the previous chapter) is partly 
responsible for this complexity, but some of the responsibility lies in inadequate 
conceptual clarity on the part of scholars. Thus some studies consider 
implementation generally or transposition in particular as their principal focus 
but use observations on compliance as their sole source of evidence (see Knill & 
Tosun, 2009; Lampinen & Uusikylä, 1998 for this critique). While most agree that 
transposition is an integral (though by no means exclusive) part of implementation, 
another perspective cautions against seeing implementation as anything other 
than law in action or application (Versluis, 2007).
While the concept of transposition is generally unambiguous, a variety of 
operationalizations of “transposition success” exist in the literature. Much of the 
work focuses on transposition delays, or the time between a directive’s 
transposition deadline and a country’s notification of implementation measures 
(Berglund, Gange, & van Waarden, 2006; Mastenbroek, 2003). The actual 
operationalization may be the number of days or some categorization of “on time”, 
“short delay”, or “long delay” (Kaeding, 2008; König & Luetgert, 2009). Recognizing 
that the first measure that a country adopts to transpose a directive may not be 
the correct and final one, at least one study considers the “correctness” of 
transposition by assessing the time it takes a country to reach “essentially” and 
subsequently “complete” correct transposition (Falkner, Hartlapp, & Treib, 2007). 
Another approach to the content of transposition measures looks at whether a 
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country literally transposes a directive or makes adaptations (Steunenberg, 2007).
Studies of application have an even greater array of possibilities for 
conceptualization. Given the particular characteristics of any given policy, it is as 
if no two analyses can study this phase of implementation the same way. Even 
within the same policy, differing emphases in scope are possible. Within all these 
possibilities, two distinctions can be made. First, while most focus on policy 
outputs (the implementation activities of state and non-state actors), some focus 
on policy outcomes (Bailey, 2002). The latter approach is possible in those limited 
cases where outcomes can be easily observed (though never perfectly). Second, 
when considering activities and outcomes alike, some choose to evaluate 
implementation with strict reference to the stated objectives of legislation. 
Others, on the other hand, take a broader view that includes intended and 
unintended (negative and positive) policy effects. 
The variety of approaches to studying both transposition and implementation, 
although sometimes indicative of a lack of conceptual clarity and theoretical 
focus, is more generally a testament to the many interesting research puzzles that 
scholars have attempted to solve in the subfield and the many tools (theoretical 
and methodological) employed in this pursuit. At times developing in parallel, 
these studies have nevertheless coalesced into a small number of theoretical 
approaches, sometimes in dialogue with one another and at other times talking 
past each other. Several of these approaches (and their interrelationships), which 
will inform the theoretical chapter that follows, will be considered in the remainder 
of this chapter. 
Goodness-of-fit
Beginning in the late 1990s a focused research agenda emerged as several 
studies developed, expanded, and tested a particular kind of explanation for the 
differences in implementation among Member States and policies (Duina, 1997; 
Knill, 1998; Knill & Lenschow, 1998). The explanation focused attention on the 
degree to which new EU policies to be implemented fit with existing domestic 
policies. Such a “goodness-of-fit”, “mismatch” or “adaptation pressure” explanation 
of EU policy implementation begins with the basic assumption that implementation 
of European policies requires some degree of adaptation by the Member States. 
In the simplest and most underspecified statement of this explanation, the more 
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difficult the required adaptations are (e.g., the greater the “mismatch” or the lower 
the “fit”), the lower the chances of successful implementation, but variations, 
qualifications, and specifications of the dimensions of adaptation pressure have 
all been proposed as improvements to this basic argument. The idea has its origins 
in Héritier’s “uploading” theory of EU policymaking, in which Member States, in 
order to lower the costs of adapting to EU policy, attempt to “upload” their own 
policy approaches and styles to the European level (1995). These adaptation costs 
then become the key independent variable for “goodness-of-fit” explanations.
Expanding on the original ideas of Héritier, theorizing along these lines focused 
initially on administrative arrangements in the member states, particularly the 
interactions among administrative actors, interested non-state actors, and the 
differences between existing regulatory forms and those required by new 
European policies (Duina, 1997; Knill, 1998; Knill & Lenschow, 1998). One early set 
of applications of the “goodness-of-fit” concept considered only the institutional 
structures and their likelihood of creating mismatch (Duina, 1997; Duina & Blithe, 
1999). Their “cost hypothesis” posited that directives which may transform the 
organization of interests in a particular policy field or which may threaten the 
policy legacy (the existing legal and administrative traditions) incur high costs 
and are thus difficult to implement. The characteristics of these institutions in 
each country and policy field are historically determined, following the insights of 
historical institutionalism (Steinmo, Thelen, & Longstreth, 1992). Policy actors 
exist only to the extent that their distribution and organization in part define 
these structures. The absence of any explanatory power attributable to individuals 
and the assumed fixed nature of the key institutions (a criticism of many 
applications of historical institutionalism) both lead to a static conceptualization 
of misfit and a country’s response to it. Such a static notion fails to account for 
cases in which implementation succeeds despite some misfit.
In part remedying the shortcomings of this “actor-less” static approach, a 
second set of scholars developed a dynamic theory of implementation that 
combines adaptation pressure, political and administrative actors with agency, 
and change (Knill, 1998; Knill & Lenschow, 1998, 2001). When new policies threaten 
to change the “core” of the administrative and political tradition for a policy field 
within a country, or those elements of existing policies that are institutionally 
“embedded”, then adaptation pressure is too great, and implementation suffers. 
The concepts of institutional embeddedness and policy “core” come from the 
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“logic of appropriateness” and other constructivist concepts and mechanisms 
that have their roots in sociological and historical institutionalisms (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983; March & Olsen, 1989; Powell & DiMaggio, 1991; Thelen, 1999). The 
demands of new policies are seen only in the light of existing frames of reference, 
rules, and procedures. In contrast, policies that bring fewer changes are easily 
implemented (low adaptation pressure), but the success of policies exerting 
moderate adaptation pressure is contingent upon the policy context, here 
understood as the number of actors with the ability to block reforms (veto points, 
following Immergut, 1992). The more numerous the veto points, the lower the 
chances of successful implementation under conditions of moderate adaptation 
pressure. 
In this approach, no consideration is given here to the preferences of actors, 
but this “modified actor-centered institutionalist model for domestic adaptation” 
(Knill & Lenschow, 2001; modifying Mayntz & Scharpf, 1995) is one of the clearest, 
most falsifiable statement of the “goodness-of-fit” hypothesis. Other well-
developed theories of “goodness-of-fit” include Héritier’s “differential impact” of 
Europeanization on domestic change (which combines adaptation pressure, 
political support, and administrative capacity as individually necessary and jointly 
sufficient conditions for domestic change of the kind leading to successful 
implementation) and Börzel’s “push-and-pull” model (in which domestic 
supporters of policy change pull from below and the Commission pushes from 
above with the threat of infringement proceedings) (Börzel, 2001; Héritier et al., 
2001). A later adaptation sees different implementation outcomes occurring, 
depending on the degree of misfit and the existence of facilitating factors (either 
formal institutions if rationalist institutionalist logic is correct, or informal “policy 
entrepreneurs” if sociological institutionalist logic is correct) (Börzel & Risse, 2003). 
In a similar vein, a study of Norwegian adaptation to internal market requirements 
describes the process of adaptation in cases of low policy fit, whereby actors, 
given institutional constraints, reevaluate their interests and reformulate their 
approaches to policy problem-solving (Claes, 2002). Later studies, with some 
exceptions, took the idea only at its most basic and subjected it to a variety of 
empirical tests (see below). 
A “goodness-of-fit”, “mismatch”, or “adaptation pressure” explanation requires 
some definition of the key elements of existing policy that may be incompatible 
with new policy in order to be analytically tractable. Knill (1998) offers a well-
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defined, if broad conceptualization of the administrative arrangements that face 
adaptation pressures: regulatory style (modes of state intervention and interest 
intermediation) and regulatory structure (centralization vs. decentralization and 
concentration vs. fragmentation of authority). The sources of adaptation pressure 
can be so numerous (and in some cases so ill-defined) as to strip the concept of 
any explanatory leverage. Thus scholars looking to explain implementation 
patterns by way of “goodness-of-fit” have a whole arsenal of static political, legal 
and administrative institutions that may or may not match with EU policies, as 
well as adaptation pressures produced by policymakers, administrators, and 
interest groups (Bursens, 2002).
More recently, others have pared down aspects of mismatch to a few key 
elements and offer well-theorized mechanisms underlying their operation in 
influencing implementation patterns. Drawing from international relations 
theory, Dimitrova and Rhinard outline a “norm-based explanatory framework for 
studying the transposition of European directives” (2005). Distancing themselves 
from “fit-based” explanations, their approach focuses on the compatibility of new 
EU norms with existing domestic norms that themselves can change as a result of 
their interaction. These norms exist within a hierarchy, and their pliability depends 
on their location in that hierarchy. The plausibility of this approach is demonstrated 
by process-tracing case studies of Slovakian transposition of two non-
discrimination directives, but the framework has thus far faced no additional 
empirical scrutiny.
A related revitalization of the “fit” explanation (though again distinguishing 
itself from that approach by singling out one component from the otherwise 
entangled semantic field) takes a directive’s misfit with a country’s existing legal 
order as an obstacle to its transposition (Steunenberg & Toshkov, 2009). The focus 
is again on legal norms and the centrality of those incompatible norms to a 
country’s legal architecture. The norm hierarchy and norm centrality concepts of 
these two works have their parallels with the “institutional embeddedness” of 
earlier “goodness-of-fit” explanations (Knill & Lenschow, 1998), but here they 
direct attention to those elements of EU legislation and their corresponding 
preexisting domestic policies, elements that are more suitable for a one-to-one 
comparison and incompatibility test. Incompatible norms are easier to detect 
than a misfit of EU policy with existing domestic institutions more generally 




Another recent recast of the “goodness-of-fit” explanation considers “frame 
misfit” where frames consist of “common sets of beliefs and ideas” (Di Lucia & 
Kronsell, 2010). Although valuable for introducing framing effects to the 
implementation literature, the study provides little guidance for identifying the 
relevant empirical content of a policy frame. In the qualitative comparative 
analysis (QCA) methodology employed, the authors do not describe in a 
transparent and replicable way how they code individual cases for “frame misfit”.
As with many explanations proposed for implementation patterns, the 
empirical record for “goodness-of-fit” is mixed. The mixed results can largely be 
explained by the variety of cases subject to testing and the ways in which 
“goodness-of-fit” is operationalized. The initial case study tests were carried out 
on a selection of environmental directives (Duina & Blithe, 1999; Knill & Lenschow, 
1998). Although the case study approach allowed the testing of more nuanced 
versions of the theory, it made replication and generalizability difficult (though 
see Haverland, 2000). Scholars determined the degree of misfit without clear 
reproducible criteria. Recognizing this shortcoming, a later qualitative approach 
classified countries’ misfit with particular directives by identifying and scoring its 
three components (Falkner, Treib, Hartlapp, & Leiber, 2005). Thus they scored legal 
misfit by comparing existing member state legislation with EU directives, politico-
administrative misfit by considering the differences between new and old public-
private interactions and administrative routines, and the costs of new legislation 
by interviewing key policy actors. Such an approach has high validity but is too 
costly to apply on a scale large enough to test its generalizability.
The quantitative turn in implementation research tested the “goodness-of-fit” 
approach (often alongside several other alternative explanations) with rougher 
measures and simpler theoretical specifications. Much of the transposition 
literature assumed that where countries modify existing domestic legislation, the 
degree of fit is higher than when entirely new legislation is needed (Kaeding, 
2006; Linos, 2007; Mastenbroek, 2003; Thomson, 2007). Other specifications 
regarded the complexity of a directive for a country (as measured by the number 
of measures needed for its transposition) as an indicator of its misfit (König & 
Luetgert, 2009) or some combination of legislative novelty, number of 
implementing measures, and their order (legislation vs. administrative act) 
(Steunenberg & Toshkov, 2009). Although these measures are easily generated 
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and replicated, some challenges pose a threat to their validity. The choice between 
legislation and administrative acts is sensitive to national legal order and political 
factors (which should be regarded as independent of fit). Modifications of existing 
legislation can be major enough to represent a high degree of misfit, and in many 
cases the creation of what seems like entirely new legislation at first glance is 
actually a recast and replacement of existing legislation with only minor 
modifications. In ten quantitative studies of implementation utilizing some aspect 
of misfit or adaptation pressure, these factors had a significant effect in the 
expected direction in only half (Toshkov, 2010, n. d.). 
Institutions and implementation
Inspired in part by the indeterminate results of the “goodness-of-fit” approach 
but also developing independently, another strand of EU implementation 
literature examines the politics underlying adaptation to EU requirements and 
the influence of institutions on these politics. Two distinct though sometimes 
overlapping sets of explanations and analyses explore the politics of 
implementation. One focuses on the influences of the politics of EU policymaking 
on its later application, and the other considers the politics of domestic 
policymaking or adaptation. In the discussion that follows I consider both these 
sub-literatures, which are grounded in a diverse set of theoretical antecedents, 
including historical institutionalism, international relations theories, and the 
institutional tradition of Lijphart (1984), as a body of literature apart from the 
more formal work that considers the politics of implementation from a rational 
choice institutionalism perspective. I discuss this literature later in this chapter.
Following a typical pattern in the study of EU implementation, the theoretical 
insights in this body of literature emerge from a set of case studies (too often 
selected from the environmental policy sector) and are later subjected to empirical 
testing over a large number of cases. In a very theoretically rigorous application of 
historical institutionalism and its path dependency theory in particular, a case 
study of the implementation of the Bathing Water Directive reveals how 
institutions locked in at one point in time to solve policy problems in the water 
sector constrain political actors and their scope for decisions later (Jordan, 1999). 
This institutional “lock in” makes flexibility and adaptation to new EU requirements 
and new policy problems difficult. Scholars using a historical institutionalist 
34
Chapter 2
approach tend to stress the negative aspects of “lock in” and thereby focus on 
implementation failure, but it is not a foregone conclusion that such a mechanism 
always works against successful implementation. Applying path dependency to 
understand a particular case of implementation failure, while helping to establish 
the empirical plausibility of a concept central to historical institutionalism, does 
not exhaust the possible ways that politics influence implementation. 
A more generalizable approach to understanding the politics of implementation 
by way of political institutions looks at how institutions shape decision making by 
providing actors with opportunities to shape decisions that affect both 
transposition and application. In a direct reaction to the “goodness-of-fit” theory 
of Knill and Lenschow, Haverland counters that the presence of institutional veto 
points explains implementation success and failure regardless of “fit”(Haverland, 
2000). Institutional veto points here refer to particular stages in the policy process 
where “agreement is legally required for a policy change” (Haverland, 2000, p. 85) 
and harkens back to the “decision points” of classic implementation research 
(Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973). Together these veto points define the “institutional 
opportunity structure” and can endow administrative, political, and societal actors 
with the power to block decisions (adapting Kitschelt, 1986). According to him, 
adaptation pressure as understood by Knill and Lenschow can activate domestic 
opposition but this opposition has no effect on implementation without the 
opportunity provided by a veto point. He then demonstrates this explanation 
using the same cases as Knill and Lenschow. Bailey criticizes his falsification for 
adopting a narrow conceptualization of policy implementation (2002). By leaving 
out post-transposition application, Haverland (according to Bailey), underestimates 
the importance of policy misfit (and overestimates the significance of veto points) 
for shaping the implementation of the Packaging Waste Directive, which ultimately 
aimed to improve environmental conditions in the member states. 
The institutional veto point approach requires policy- and country-specific 
context in order to identify those decision points where vetoes can be exercised. 
An approach that employs institutional characteristics without the need to 
identify all possible decision stages (and again without reference to actors’ 
preferences) relies on the shortcut of institutional types developed and used 
widely in comparative politics (Lijphart, 1984, 1999). These define the general 
decision-making traditions and styles in a country as embodied in their 
policymaking institutions. The major distinction is between majoritarian 
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institutions (such as “first-past-the-post” voting rules) that concentrate decision-
making authority in a few actors and consensual institutions (such as proportional 
representation systems) in which authority is more widely spread. Consensual 
institutions better incorporate the full range of interests affected by a policy into 
decision-making and implementation, thereby making policies more favorable to 
all those affected. 
The availability of cross-national time series datasets that score countries’ 
institutions on a majoritarian-consensual dimension allows for a straightforward 
application of this explanation in quantitative analyses of implementation. Thus 
in an analysis of the implementation of the acquis communitaire by new member 
states, Hille and Knill found strong support for this kind of institutional effect (Hille 
& Knill, 2006). Similarly, a study of transposition by 15 Member States of directives 
between 1986 and 2002 showed that both pluralist and federalist (the federal-
unitary institutional dimension comes from the same tradition, Lijphart, 1999) 
institutions delayed transposition (König & Luetgert, 2009). Support for this 
notion comes also from a mixed method comparison of Greece and Spain (Linos, 
2007) in which actors’ preferences were considered but found not to matter once 
institutional characteristics were controlled for. On the other hand, the validity of 
the underlying mechanism is challenged by a study revealing that mechanisms 
for implementation oversight that include diverse interest groups actually hinder 
success relative to oversight mechanisms that concentrate authority (Jensen, 
2007).
The mere presence or number of institutional veto points in the implementation 
phase, or macro-institutional factors, however, cannot fully explain implementation 
success or failure without reference to the preferences of actors who exercise veto 
power or make decisions within these institutional frameworks. After all, veto 
points only admit the possibility of opposition to policies. If all actors generally 
support a policy, then veto points or concentrated decision-making will not 
present obstacles for policy application. To address this shortcoming, the concept 
of “institutional veto points” has been superseded by preference-endowed “veto 
players” (Tsebelis, 1995), a concept developed first within a rational choice 
institutional framework, subsequently more generally applied to implementation 
analysis.
One early application of veto players to EU implementation research is a formal 
model that centers on the preferences of national policy actors who act as 
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“informal” veto players during transposition (Dimitrova & Steunenberg, 2000). 
Veto players are those actors (such as the government, the opposition, interest 
groups, and subnational authorities) whose cooperation is needed for successful 
transposition and implementation, and their veto player status is institutionally 
determined. Each has an ideal point representing their preferences with respect 
to a particular policy, and the ideal points together define the preference 
configuration. The shape of this preference configuration, together with the 
possibility of enforcement action by the Commission should transposition stray 
too far from EU requirements, determines the range of “veto-proof” proposals for 
transposing the policy. Exercising an “informal” veto can lead to partial 
implementation (as opposed to full implementation), provided this partial 
implementation will not elicit an enforcement response from the Commission. 
Another coordination-based formal model of transposition considers the 
preference configuration among “higher” political (formal) veto players and 
“lower” administrative (formal) veto players (Steunenberg, 2006). A third model 
shows transposition as a process that can lead to either literal transposition or 
non-literal adaptation depending on the preferences of domestic policy-specific 
veto players (Steunenberg, 2007). The choice of policy instrument to transpose EU 
law is a political one, as hypothesized earlier (Dimitrakopoulos, 2001b). In each of 
these models, the actual preference configuration of veto players needs to be 
determined a priori in order for the model to generate testable hypotheses. As a 
result, each model has been applied to only a small number of cases.
Applying the veto player concept outside its formal model roots has allowed 
tests of the generalizability of the explanatory approach but has sacrificed some 
of its theoretical sophistication. In parallel to the macro-institutional factors 
discussed above, datasets have been developed in comparative politics to 
measure the number of veto players present in a country at a particular time (such 
as Schmidt, 1996). The general approach taken is then to hypothesize that 
additional veto players slow the transposition process by blocking unfavorable 
transposing measures and this in turn hinders compliance and implementation 
(though implementation outside of timely transposition and lack of infringement 
proceedings is not generally considered). Even attempts to shift our attention 
towards the congruence of veto players’ preferences and their internal cohesion 
rely on the same simple veto player numbers game (Hille & Knill, 2006). The results 
are mixed: the number of veto players seems to have little effect on infringements 
37
Literature review
(Jensen, 2007; Mbaye, 2001) but their effect on transposition timeliness is sensitive 
to the countries, time period, or policy sectors considered (Kaeding, 2006; Linos, 
2007; Toshkov, 2007b).
Although veto players other than legislative actors can influence 
implementation, these datasets (and hence any applications that use them) rely 
almost exclusively on partisan veto players. Administrative veto players are 
overlooked and the actual preferences of veto players are largely ignored. One 
exception to the exclusive reliance on partisan veto players is a study that 
considers the effect of interministerial coordination problems (measured 
imperfectly as the number of ministries involved in transposition) on timely 
transposition and finds some evidence for such an effect (Mastenbroek, 2003). 
Another exception employs a “procedural veto player index” that emphasizes the 
extent to which veto players across ministries and other relevant actors (and 
specific to a particular transposition process in a country and policy area) may 
impede successful transposition (Steunenberg & Rhinard, 2010). An additional 
improvement (though still relying exclusively on partisan veto players) 
incorporates actors preferences from party manifestos data (König & Luetgert, 
2009). The presence of parties with diverging preferences with respect to some 
sector hinders transposition in that sector, according to their analysis. This 
approach comes closer to testing the preference-based explanations derived 
from formal models but is still oversimplifying.
Explanations for EU implementation that rely on the veto players of domestic 
politics are not the only kind to have originated in rational choice institutionalism 
and formal models before shaking loose these foundations. Viewing EU 
policymaking as a problem of interstate bargaining, some have seen a failure to 
implement policies as a deliberate decision by countries following unfavorable 
negotiations, an insight derived from formal models in international relations 
(Fearon, 1998). By this reasoning, states with lower bargaining power (as measured, 
for example, by a country’s number of votes in the Council) during policy formation 
should have poorer implementation records, because states with lower bargaining 
power are less able to achieve their policy goals during decision making. An early 
analysis of compliance revealed some support for this notion (Mbaye, 2001), but 
a later compliance analysis found no effect (Sverdrup, 2004).
Those explanations that seek a link between states’ bargaining power and 
compliance patterns may find inconclusive evidence because less ability to 
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influence decision-making outcomes is only indirectly related to achieving goals 
during policy formulation. Recent attempts have been made to link Member 
States’ preferences during policymaking to transposition outcomes. One approach 
measures for each directive a states’ “preference-based incentive to deviate” as the 
distance between a states’ desired policy outcome for that directive and the 
adopted legislative text (Thomson, Torenvlied, & Arregui, 2007). The larger the 
distance, the poorer the implementation performance, though this effect is 
stronger when directives grant states little discretion to adapt policies to national 
circumstances. Discretion itself may be determined through conflict during 
policymaking (see e.g. Franchino, 2007) so that the degree of conflict during 
decision-making may speed up transposition (Zhelyazkova & Torenvlied, 2009). 
States’ preferences are determined through expert interviews. A later modification 
of the explanation incorporates the ability of the Commission to shape 
implementation through enforcement (Thomson, 2010).
A second perspective on the effects of Member State opposition to a policy on 
its implementation considers only the preferences of the government in power. In 
contrast to an approach relying on preference-endowed veto players, this 
perspective treats Member States as unitary actors with the same preferences as 
the governments who rule. Among a laundry list of factors thought to affect 
transposition, one author includes a country’s opposition to the policy being 
implemented, and then demonstrates this with the case of Greece being reluctant 
to transpose and apply certain elements of its Treaty of Accession, namely the 
public procurement policies viewed unfavorably by the Socialist government 
(Dimitrakopoulos, 2001a, 2001b). One quantitative analysis finds no empirical 
support for the hypothesis that government preferences along a left-right 
continuum (as determined by manifestos data) have an effect on successful 
transposition of social policy directives (the policy sector most relevant for this 
well-established ideological dimension) in new member states (Toshkov, 2007b). 
On the other hand, some support is found for a positive relationship between a 
governments’ support for European integration and the timeliness of its 
transposition in the same countries though across a broader policy spectrum 
(Toshkov, 2008). Another study of transposition timeliness in all Member States 
finds no support for either of these hypotheses (Linos, 2007). Although each of 
these analyses controls for the number of veto players, they do not include 





In contrast to the literature that sees late transposition and incorrect application 
as a deliberate choice, another set of explanations see EU implementation failure 
as a result of low administrative capacity. Often referred to as the “management” 
approach, these explanations are derived from international relations theories 
that see the world differently from those that produce the “deliberate” non-
compliance accounts above (Chayes & Chayes, 1993). Budgetary resources, 
personnel, and expertise are some of the resources that comprise administrative 
or organizational capacity. Administrative capacity is assumed to have a direct 
effect on implementation, but a more nuanced explanation posits that 
administrative capacity leads to successful implementation only when combined 
with a favorable political climate (though this interactive effect is inadequately 
tested) (Lampinen & Uusikylä, 1998). Largely using aggregate measures of 
“governmental effectiveness”, several studies have found support for this 
argument (Berglund, et al., 2006; Linos, 2007; Mbaye, 2001). Administrative 
capabilities may be particularly important for the new member states (Toshkov, 
2007b, 2008). Separating government effectiveness from resources, another study 
of implementation in candidate countries supports this argument (Hille & Knill, 
2006).
Some criticism has been leveled against the use of aggregate measures of 
organizational effectiveness, however (Jensen, 2007). On the one hand, these 
aggregate measures offer little guidance for policymakers without being 
separated into their constituent components. On the other hand, because 
aggregate measures rely on expert opinion, they probably suffer from endogeneity 
problems. Experts who observe poor implementation performance are likely to 
identify that as part and parcel of low government capacity. Thus some studies 
eschew these aggregate measures of capacity (or lack thereof ) in favor of variables 
that capture more specific mechanisms. One finds that corruption negatively 
impacts transposition, though the mere existence of corruption is an inadequate 
test of the actual explanatory mechanism proposed (Kaeding, 2006). Others look 
closely at bureaucratic capacity that is specific to transposition, relying on 
independent assessments of a country’s coordination capacity for EU issues 
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(Dimitrova & Toshkov, 2009) or the years of experience an agency has in transposing 
EU legislation (Steunenberg & Kaeding, 2009), and generally find support for this 
argument in a selected number of directives or a single policy sector.
Culture of compliance
One of the most influential works on EU implementation research in the last 
ten years proposed a novel political cultural explanation for cross-national 
variation in implementation patterns (Falkner, et al., 2005). Testing many of the 
alternative explanations described in the rest of this review through in-depth case 
studies of the transposition of six social policy directives in all EU-15 countries 
(and also observing, though less systematically, their compliance and application), 
the authors found support for very few of these explanations. What they saw 
instead was the division of the EU into three different “compliance cultures” or 
“worlds of compliance”: a world of law observance, a world of domestic politics, 
and a world of neglect. The Nordic countries comprise the world of law observance 
in which compliance as a goal overrides other concerns and implementation is 
generally successful. In the world of neglect (Greece, Portugal, Italy, Ireland, 
France, and Luxembourg), a lack of both political and administrative will or 
capacity leads to frequent implementation failures. Domestic political interests 
dominate the world of domestic politics so that successful implementation occurs 
provided major political actors support it or it is in national self-interest to do so. 
A later replication of the analysis in Poland suggests that no separate “world of 
compliance East” exists for the new member states (Leiber, 2007).
Cultural explanations are not entirely new to the EU implementation literature. 
Some of the earliest work suggested the existence of a “southern problem” in 
which Portugal, Italy, Greece, and Spain have poor compliance records as a result 
of the underdevelopment of civil society in these countries and its effects on 
public goods provisioning (Lampinen & Uusikylä, 1998). On the other hand, 
performance in these countries could reflect a high degree of misfit and low level 
of political mobilization for change (Börzel, 2001). Three of these countries fall 
into the “world of neglect”, but the presence of Spain in the world of “domestic 
politics” suggests that the Southern states should not be viewed so homogenously 
and that “goodness-of-fit” explanations do not explain this heterogeneity as well 
as the cultural explanation offered in the “worlds of compliance” (Hartlapp & 
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Leiber, 2010). In a similar cultural vein, one study found that the more consensual 
decision-making style of the Nordic states (as opposed to the more confrontational 
style in Anglo-Saxon countries) explains their relatively high implementation 
performance (Sverdrup, 2004). This finding of “Nordic exceptionalism” is largely in 
line with the “world of compliance” typology that places three of these countries 
into the “world of law observance”.
One problem with such cultural explanations, and with cultural explanations 
more generally, is that the precise mechanisms linking a country’s “compliance 
culture” with implementation patterns are not clearly specified. Another problem 
is that objective criteria do not exist for placing each country into one or another 
“world”. The placement arose from the original study inductively but no effort was 
made to identify precisely those factors that define culture. The level of “law 
abidingness” (respect for laws) among the citizenry might in part determine or at 
least be some indication of compliance culture, but studies linking this variable 
with transposition find little support for such a relationship (Berglund, et al., 2006; 
Toshkov, 2007a). In an attempt to unravel the determinants of compliance culture 
through an investigation of mass political attitudes, one study finds that the level 
of trust in EU institutions, law abidingness, rule-following, and law observance do 
not adequately distinguish countries according to this typology, but the level of 
social trust in general does (Toshkov, 2007b). Even if a correlation can be found 
between mass attitudes and an aggregate concept like national culture it still 
begs the question as to what links mass attitudes to elite behavior. No attempts 
have been made as yet to link elite attitudes with variation in compliance culture. 
Another problem with cultural explanations is that culture is generally seen as a 
fixed attribute that varies only cross-nationally, while many implementation 
outcomes vary within countries (across different policies) and across time as 
countries adapt to the demands of EU legislation.
Subsequent quantitative analyses have found at best mixed evidence for the 
“worlds of compliance” approach. A quantitative analysis of transposition delay in 
the new member states found that these “worlds” provided little explanatory 
power when considering transposition over a large number of directives and 
even when looking specifically at the directives used in the original study (Toshkov, 
2007b). Contrary to expectations, non-transposition rates were no more variable 
in countries of the “world of domestic politics” than in the other two worlds. 
Another analysis examining the same six directives as the original study came to 
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the same conclusion once controlling for a different set of variables (Thomson, et 
al., 2007). They found significant effects for variables (such as policy misfit) that 
Falkner et al. regarded as inconsequential, arguing that the bivariate tests used in 
the original study were inadequate to test competing hypotheses.
Top-down policy approaches
Several studies have found support for the effects of top-down features of 
policies on their implementation. Some have their roots directly in the decision-
making process that produced a piece of legislation while others are influenced 
by the content of the legislation. With regard to the former, a few scholars have 
highlighted the importance of the decision-making procedure (Kaeding, 2006; 
König & Luetgert, 2009; Zhelyazkova & Torenvlied, 2009). The procedure used 
determines the relative bargaining power of states and this in turn influences 
their implementation (in line with the bargaining power-based explanations 
considered earlier).
More common are explanations that rely on characteristics of the policy or 
legislation as a basis for mechanisms that influence implementation. Many of 
these characteristics, it is argued, are in part determined by politics and procedures 
during the EU decision-making phase. Thus among the many possible factors he 
suggests as relevant, Dimatrakopolous points towards the vague content of 
directives that results from political compromises during policy formulation 
(Dimitrakopoulos, 2001b). Following developments in the American literature, 
some have indeed found evidence for a link between decision-making features 
and the degree of ambiguity (or more favorably, the amount of discretion granted 
to member states for implementation) in directives (Franchino, 2007). With respect 
to the influences of discretion, some have found that the discretion in directives 
enhances the timeliness of transposition (Kaeding, 2008; Steunenberg & Toshkov, 
2009; Thomson, 2007). Taking it one step further, one study finds that the 
interaction of member states’ preferences (the degree of disagreement with a 
directive) and discretion is significant, but that discretion delays transposition 
(Thomson, et al., 2007).
Additional features of a policy appear in other studies. The complexity of a 
directive is thought to lead to delays in transposition and problems in 
implementation (König & Luetgert, 2009). Some studies use the number of legal 
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instruments required for transposition as an indicator of complexity. Another 
study uses the presence of annexes as a measure of technical complexity 
(Steunenberg & Kaeding, 2009). Similarly, the “detail” of a directive (as measured 
by the number recitals appearing at the beginning) is believed to influence 
implementation (Kaeding, 2006). In one study, recitals are also used to measure 
the extent to which an attempt is made to placate opposing interests (Steunenberg 
& Kaeding, 2009). The use of recitals as indicator for both these very different 
concepts suggests the difficulty inherent in obtaining reliable measures for policy 
characteristics that are easily observed across many pieces of legislation. Still 
other features of legislation: new vs. amending, number of articles, time given for 
transposition, etc. have been applied with mixed success (Haverland, Steunenberg, 
& Van Waarden, 2011; Kaeding, 2006).
Conclusion
From its early eclectic beginnings, research into the implementation of EU 
policy has developed into a focused research agenda with several alternative 
explanations but few well-supported generalizations. Explanations have made 
use of a variety of political, administrative, national contextual, and policy 
characteristics to explain implementation successes and failures. In the last ten 
years, quantitative analyses of transposition have come to dominate the subfield. 
Ever-improving datasets and increasingly complex model specifications have 
been applied and a whole range of factors have been considered. Despite the 
plethora of transposition analyses, few have taken on post-transposition 
application as a relevant topic and even fewer connect transposition to application. 
Post-transposition implementation studies were present in the beginning of EU 
implementation research but have nearly always been limited to a small number 
of policy fields (particularly environmental and social policies) and have relied 
primarily on qualitative information. This work on application is largely divorced 
from the expansive transposition literature that has mostly replaced it. Hence this 
study attempts to bridge the two literatures by offering an analysis of 
implementation that analyzes both transposition and application using qualitative 







From the literature reviewed in the previous chapter, it is clear that a wide 
variety of factors have been used more or less successfully in attempts to explain 
differences in transposition and application across policies and Member States of 
the EU. While some of the insights gained from qualitative case studies of post-
transposition application have been used to inform the transposition literature, 
which is predominantly quantitative in nature, little effort has been made to apply 
the insights from the study of transposition to the subsequent stages of 
implementation. Using the literature reviewed in the prior chapter as a starting 
point, the current chapter adapts several of the major theoretical approaches 
from the study of transposition in order to derive testable hypotheses to explain 
differences in the post-transposition application of EU regulatory policies. Thus I 
will derive hypotheses related to adaptation pressure, legislative discretion, 
implementing institutions, and transposition delay. Evidence for these hypotheses 
will be illuminated in the three case study chapters that follow, and later chapters 
will subject them to quantitative analysis. These analyses will also include control 
variables that draw on established hypotheses from the transposition and 
implementation literatures, but I will discuss these as they appear in the analyses.
Interrelated perspectives on implementation in the EU
The literature review of the preceding chapter identified five major approaches 
that scholars have used to explain success and failure in transposition and post-
transposition application of policy in the EU: goodness-of-fit, implementing 
institutions (including veto players, with and without formal models), 
administrative capacity, cultural approaches, and the importance of top-down 
factors (such as characteristics of the decision-making process that gave rise to 
the policy to be implemented, policy complexity, and the discretion available to 
national decision-makers and implementing actors). While in some cases scholars 
have pitted their pet theory against the others, the majority of the works reviewed 
within each of these frameworks acknowledges the contributions that each 
approach makes towards a fuller understanding of this phenomenon. The 
approach taken here follows along in this spirit by incorporating the most 
illuminating elements from several of these frameworks, making innovations in 
these that are suitable to the particular puzzle at hand, and leaving aside others 
that are less useful for this study.
47
Theorizing post-transposition application
From the literature review, it is clear that the goodness-of-fit and institutional 
approaches offer the clearest set of causal mechanisms and intuitively compelling 
hypotheses. Although the empirical record is mixed for both (as it is nearly 
everywhere in implementation research), some of this variability in empirical 
success can be attributed to different approaches to conceptualization and 
operationalization. The approaches (as the word “approach” in place of “theory” 
suggests) lend themselves to a diversity of hypotheses that still fall within the 
framework. Many of these differences were described in the last chapter; what is 
at stake here is the choice of these approaches for this study in place of others.
The goodness-of-fit approach (which I recast as an “adaptation pressure” 
explanation of implementation) is particularly appropriate in the EU context (for 
which it has been developed), where a policy is imposed from above onto the 
many diverse member states. Viewing the implementation of EU policy as the set 
of national responses to achieve some kind of international uniformity in policy 
objectives almost instinctively leads the viewer to consider the differences 
between the national context and the policy to which it must adapt. This instinctive 
response may explain why this consideration emerged very early in the study of 
EU implementation and why it remains (in spite of its detractors) important in the 
literature. As such, it forms an integral part of the approach taken here. At the 
same time, several conceptual and methodological aspects of “goodness-of-fit” 
explanations of implementation in the EU (discussed below) have hindered its 
application in existing studies and must be addressed in order to apply the 
approach to a large-n analysis of post-transposition application. The same case 
can be made for institutional explanations, the second major component of the 
theoretical approach taken here: although it has substantially illuminated the 
subfield, it must be adapted to the reality of large-n analysis of post-transposition 
application.
While the “goodness-of-fit” approach has enriched the study of EU 
implementation, scholars who use the approach tend to see the “misfit” between 
national context and the demands of EU policy as the sole source of implementation 
failure. One exception discussed in the literature review is the interaction between 
“misfit” and institutional characteristics of the member states (including veto 
players). These institutional characteristics do not exhaust the possible factors 
upon which the influence of “misfit” may be conditional. Drawing on the top-
down approaches identified in the literature (which, although often also viewed 
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in isolation of other factors do in fact lend themselves to conditional effects), the 
theoretical approach taken here examines the interaction between the “goodness-
of-fit” approach and one variant of the top-down approach that stresses the 
importance of policy discretion in shaping member states’ responses to adaptation 
pressure. The other major top-down factors identified in the literature (policy 
complexity and the character of the decision-making process that shaped EU 
policy) are relatively constant within farm animal welfare policy and so will not be 
considered here.
The final element of the theoretical approach considers the role of transposition 
delay in influencing post-transposition application. This factor has so far been left 
out of the study of implementation in the EU. In the relevant section below, I 
argue why this factor may improve our understanding of the phenomenon. This 
thesis, which takes as its starting point the potential for the transposition literature 
to help understand post-transposition application is a natural arena for examining 
this factor.
Two approaches discussed in the literature review will not be part of the 
theoretical approach laid out below. The administrative capacity approach is 
straightforward enough that it offers no new insights into the study of post-
transposition application, although it may still be an important part of the puzzle. 
As such it will be included in the later analyses as a control variable and will be 
considered alongside other theoretical factors in the case study chapters. The 
culture of compliance approach, on the other hand, is deliberately excluded. The 
approach cannot account for the within-country variation in implementation 
quality across policies and time that this thesis seeks to explain.
Adaptation pressure
In the previous chapter, the review of the “goodness-of-fit” literature concluded 
that the existence of a wide variety of approaches identifying themselves with 
this kind of explanation has led in part to a stretching and thus weakening of its 
theoretical usefulness. Nevertheless, the success that the approach has had 
empirically, combined with its seeming intuitive appeal, makes it difficult to 
ignore when attempting to explain variability in the implementation of EU 
regulatory policy. Instead of viewing this kind of explanation as a single theory to 
be disproven or not in each round of empirical testing, it may prove fruitful to 
extract a set of propositions based on its collected wisdom that are applicable to 
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the empirical question at hand. Because not all dimensions of “misfit” may be 
applicable within a single sector like animal welfare regulation, some aspects of 
adaptation pressure will be dismissed as irrelevant. Many aspects are likely 
immeasurable.
With some exceptions, the several variants of the “goodness-of-fit” or 
“adaptation pressure” explanations for implementation success or failure adopt a 
static conceptualization of “misfit” that manifests itself at the national level. There 
is nothing inherent in the approach itself that requires a static conceptualization. 
Instead, the cross-sectional manner in which the concept is applied in existing 
research leads scholars to this static conceptualization. Although encompassing 
several possible dimensions (institutional, legal, political, etc.), the extent of misfit 
is a function of the difference between the incoming EU policy and the existing 
national policy (or lack thereof ) that it modifies, replaces, or fills in. Such an 
approach that compares two snapshots in time treats the difference between 
them (the concept of interest) as a constant. Even for those that use “observed” 
adaptation pressure (by counting the number of national implementing measures 
needed to transpose a directive and by considering their novelty or position in 
the legal hierarchy), the outcome that is observed is still a function of that static 
difference, but only the end state is observed. 
The concept is inherently multilevel, even if the scope of analysis does not 
always permit recognition of this fact. If several policies are observed across 
several member states, then the size of this difference may vary across countries, 
as countries vary in their preexisting policies. These cross-national differences 
may be smaller in a policy field already heavily influenced or determined by EU 
legislation. The size of the difference also varies across policies for this reason and 
others. Besides cross-policy differences in the extent of preexisting policy 
harmonization, adaptation pressures may be greater for policies that are more 
technically complex than others, impose more costs on a larger number of private 
actors, or require more changes to public actors’ routines and standard operating 
procedures.
For some of its variants, a static conception of adaptation pressure for use in 
analyses of transposition timeliness is acceptable on theoretical grounds and may 
also serve to simplify things methodologically. Although some time exists 
between the promulgation of a directive and the moment at which a country 
must have national laws in place to implement it, the factors regarded as creating 
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misfit, like a country’s legal order, its preexisting policy, the constellation of 
interests affected, or the administrative and political institutions that may facilitate 
or hinder transposition, are unlikely to change before the deadline. The 
methodological simplicity afforded by a static conception was mentioned above 
– scholars need only assess misfit immediately prior to the introduction of new 
policy. Although not without their challenges, assessing the changes brought 
about by new EU policies relative to existing national ones or, even simpler, 
observing the actions taken to adapt is easier than monitoring the ways in which 
adaptation pressures change over time. The former requires only two snapshots, 
the latter requires a longer exposure.
This same static conception of adaptation pressure is also compelling for 
understanding post-transposition application. The “misfit” hypothesis in fact 
emerged from and was further refined in a set of qualitative implementation case 
studies. Although later variants of the “misfit” hypothesis added a dynamic 
component when seeking to explain implementation, the dynamic component 
referred not to continuing or newly emerging sources of adaptation pressure but 
to the evolution of a country’s response to the same static “misfit” (Knill & 
Lenschow, 2001). The qualitative approach to understanding the impact of “misfit” 
in these case studies allowed rich descriptions of adaptation pressures mainly 
stemming from cross-national differences in existing policies and regulatory 
styles. Although they are important for understanding the bigger picture, many 
of these country-level differences have already disappeared in a policy sector like 
farm animal welfare, which had already matured by the 2000s. The administrative 
structures necessary for veterinary inspection were put in place in most member 
states decades earlier, even in the New Member States. As discussed in the policy 
history chapter, specific animal welfare regulations were promulgated at national 
and EU levels before the period under investigation in this book. Thus the major 
sources of adaptation pressure considered here will be those that emerge from 
the policy level as the policy evolves over time. 
Preexisting national policies cannot be completely ignored, however, because 
there is at least the potential that changes to EU legislation do not mean changes 
for some member states. This could be the case whether these changes involve 
additional transposition or not. On the one hand, new or modified requirements 
may not be applicable to some member states. For example, the requirements for 
long journey transport of animals by sea introduced in Council Regulation (EC) No 
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1/2005 do not create adaptation pressure for landlocked member states. On the 
other hand, requirements may already exist in some member states in advance of 
their appearance at the EU level. By the time the battery cage ban for laying hens 
went into effect throughout the EU, they had already been banned in several 
countries, including Germany, Austria, and Sweden. These instances represent 
departures from the norm, and rather than developing a separate hypothesis for 
this kind of “absence” of adaptation pressure, I will take them into account when 
interpreting the case studies and quantitative analyses that follow.
While the static component of misfit remains important for understanding 
why implementation is smoother in some countries than in others, particularly in 
the months or years immediately after transposition, a dynamic conception of 
adaptation pressure becomes more important when we seek to understand 
implementation over a longer period and in relatively mature policy sectors. The 
importance arises from the fact that while the process of transposition largely 
stops once national implementing measures are agreed and in force, post-
transposition application involves continuous action by member states’ 
administrations, and adaptation continues. National legislation may need to be 
amended as EU legislation is modified, but analyses of transposition treat these 
modifications as new transposition “events” to which the same static conception 
of adaptation pressure could be applied. That is, the transposition of original and 
amended EU legislation are independent observations in these studies, subject to 
the same set of explanatory factors. With respect to application, these modifications 
feed into the ongoing process and represent new sources of adaptation pressure.
Adaptation pressures at the policy level that exert their influence on member 
state application of EU regulatory policy over time come from one of three sources: 
amendments, specifications, and phased-in requirements. Amendments to EU 
legislation introduce new or modify existing requirements in a policy sector in 
which member states are already applying EU requirements. For directives, these 
amendments must be transposed into national legislation by a certain deadline 
and for regulations they apply directly from the entry into force date of the 
regulation. Amended EU legislation will alter some requirements but leave others 
unchanged. The amendments to the welfare of farmed pigs directive4 introduced 
and modified both the general requirements for keeping pigs and the specific 
4 Council Directive 91/630/EEC laying down minimum standards for the protection of pigs, as amended by 
Council Directive 2001/88/EC amending Directive 91/630/EEC laying down minimum standards for the protec-
tion of pigs and Commission Directive 2001/93/EC amending Directive 91/630/EEC laying down minimum 
standards for the protection of pigs
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requirements for pig holdings, but it left unchanged the requirements regarding 
inspections and the provision of instructions and training to pig handlers. 
For regulatory policies such as these, modifications of requirements increase 
the likelihood of deficient implementation in two ways. First, the private actors 
whose behavior is being regulated must make changes to their equipment and 
practices, and these changes may be costly and hence resisted. New equipment, 
like larger cages for hens, may need to be purchased. Second, state actors must 
inform the regulated actors about these new requirements and must in turn 
adapt their inspection procedures to ensure that the required changes are being 
made. Some amendments may impose changes directly on public actors alone by 
forcing specific approaches to carrying out inspections or imposing penalties for 
non-compliance. During the 2000s, most requirements for the welfare of animals 
during transport were amended, few on farm welfare requirements were 
amended, and no amendments to welfare during slaughter or killing were made.
The second source of policy-level adaptation processes refers to the further 
specification of existing requirements through additional EU legislation. The 
eventual creation of such specifications is usually anticipated in the original 
Directive or Regulation. For example, Article 7 of the laying hens directive specifies 
that “Member States shall ensure that the establishments covered by the scope of 
this directive are registered by the competent authority and given a distinguishing 
number…The arrangements for implementing this Article shall be determined 
before 1 January 2002…”5 Although missing this deadline, “Commission Directive 
2002/4/EC of 30 January 2002 on the registration of establishments keeping 
laying hens, covered by Council Directive 1999/74/EC” laid down the means for a 
uniform egg identification system for registered laying hen holdings in the 
Member States. Under the original Directive (1999/74/EC), the Member States 
had to establish a registration system for laying hen holdings by 1 January 2002, 
but by 31 March 2003, this system had to reflect the requirements in Commission 
Directive 2002/4/EC. Another example of a legislative specification in the farm 
animal welfare sector is the detailed requirements for inspection contained in the 
official controls regulation that are meant to further specify how Member States 
are to carry out the inspection requirements in several of the other directives. 
Unlike amendments, these specifications do not represent major modifications 
and are primarily limited to modifying the behavior of state actors. Nevertheless, 
5 Council Directive 1999/74/EC laying down minimum standards for the protection of laying hens
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they represent an additional source of adaptation pressure with which Member 
States must cope and therefore increase the likelihood of difficulties in 
implementation.
The final source of dynamic adaptation pressures originating from EU 
legislation are those requirements that are phased in over time. Anticipating that 
particular requirements will be costly or otherwise difficult for member states to 
implement in the short term, EU legislation often stipulates that such requirements 
will not apply until a certain date after the rest of the requirements become 
effective. The animal welfare subfield contains many such phased in requirements. 
The phasing out of battery cages dictated in the 1999 laying hens directive that 
was not effective until 1 January 2012 is one of the most well-known of all EU 
animal welfare policies. Although by their nature these phased-in requirements 
are known to regulated entities in advance, they nevertheless represent a third 
source of adaptation pressure. The need for an extended deadline suggests that 
these requirements are particularly difficult to implement and are hence more 
likely to lead to implementation deficiency. Moreover, while some countries will 
take proactive measures to ensure that regulated actors comply by the time the 
requirement applies, others may take a “hands-off” or “wait-and-see” approach 
that leaves some actors scrambling to make the necessary changes in the final 
hour. Inspectors in turn must step up their enforcement activities to ensure that 
these changes are being implemented and the necessary capacity may be lacking. 
As a result of these tendencies, phased-in requirements may be a significant 
source of adaptation pressure.
Though hardly trivial, a hypothesis with respect to the effect of adaptation 
pressure on implementation can be advanced as follows:
H1: Each additional source of adaptation pressure (regardless of its origins in 
amendments, specifications, or phased-in requirements) increases the 
likelihood of implementation difficulty.
Discretion
Beyond the extent to which EU policies require difficult and costly changes by 
the member states, the content of EU legislation may also shape implementation 
depending on the amount of discretion it grants them. Although the effects of 
legislative discretion on implementation have often been speculated about, most 
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empirical analyses of their effects have been restricted to the transposition phase 
(Steunenberg & Toshkov, 2009; Thomson, 2007; Thomson, et al., 2007). Different 
studies of transposition timeliness that include legislative discretion as an 
independent variable have come to different conclusions about its effects. On the 
one hand, it may complicate transposition by providing more issues that can be 
fought over during agreement of national implementing measures. On the other, 
it may ease the transposition by giving the flexibility that allows these measures 
to more closely match domestic needs and preferences, thereby quickening 
decision-making. The empirical record is mixed with some studies finding 
significant results for either direction.
With respect to the application of legislation after it has been transposed, the 
direct effects of discretion (e.g., other than the possibility that discretion delays 
transposition and this in turn leads to difficulties in application) may be equally 
ambiguous. In reducing problems during application, national legislation has 
already ironed out the details and thus resolved any disagreements over how that 
discretion should be exercised. Political or administrative actors who were unable 
to obtain their preferences during this resolution may still complicate application 
by withholding resources or shifting administrative priorities, but these efforts 
may be applied equally to issues they initially opposed, for which there had been 
no room for maneuvering in EU legislation. In the event that disagreement 
remains unresolved, there is some chance that the discretion in EU legislation is 
retained in national legislation and thereby passed to administrative actors, but 
the end result will still be the same. By its very nature, the presence of discretion 
means that several alternative policies are consistent with the requirements of the 
directive. Implementation difficulties are fewer because there are more routes to 
implementation success. Moreover, member states may make careful use of this 
discretion in order to fit policies to their own circumstances and preexisting 
policies, thereby lowering adaptation pressures. To give an example of legislative 
discretion designed explicitly for the tailoring of requirements to national 
circumstances, the pigs directive requires that provisions are made so that farmed 
pigs have access to appropriate lighting “allowing for the different climatic 
conditions in the Member States.” 
There is at least one way that legislative discretion may lead to problems 
during post-transposition implementation. By giving member states the flexibility 
to choose their own way as long as the objectives of the policy are achieved, some 
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member states may take the path of least resistance and focus on minimizing the 
cost of policy adaptation while ignoring or paying only lip service to attaining the 
required objectives. The presence of ambiguously worded or difficult to measure 
objectives makes such an approach even more compelling. In the field of farm 
animal welfare, for example, member states have flexibility with respect to the 
kinds and sizes of penalties they impose on non-compliant actors as long as these 
are sufficiently dissuasive. For a penalty to be dissuasive it must influence the 
regulated actor’s calculus of compliance so that, facing a higher probability of 
larger fines, they are more likely to comply. The regulated actors’ calculus of 
compliance can never be observed, while the observable rates of compliance 
across the whole sector are determined not only by the dissuasiveness of fines. As 
a result, achieving the objective of dissuasive penalties is difficult to verify. 
Knowing this, some member states may make only minimal efforts to ensure 
dissuasive penalties. It is also worth mentioning that while the pathways to 
compliance are greater when legislation grants members discretionary authority, 
the number of possible routes to non-compliance still remain very large in 
comparison.
This variety of pathways between legislative discretion and final application 
suggest a conditional effect for the discretion hypothesis that relates the effect of 
discretion on implementation to the extent of adaptation pressure. Note that 
such an interactive effect may be expressed in two ways that are semantically 
different (and different in their emphasis) but are substantially identical:
H2A: As the amount of adaptation pressure increases, discretion decreases 
the likelihood of implementation difficulty.
H2B: In the absence of discretion, adaptation pressure increases the likelihood 
of implementation difficulty. 
Institutions
Moving from legislative factors, I consider next the national institutional 
characteristics that are likely to influence implementation success and failure. In 
the transposition literature, much of the focus has been on political veto players 
and their preferences. As summarized in the literature review, the preference-less 
approach to veto players predicted that as the number of veto players increases, 
the likelihood or length of transposition delay increases as well. Because more 
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actors have the ability to block the adoption of legislation unless they are satisfied, 
then all things equal, agreements on implementation measures are more difficult. 
A preference-based account controls for these actors’ preferences so that actors 
with similar preferences over the shape of policy will not be equally likely to slow 
transposition. The logic behind both these approaches operates through the 
negotiation of the content and form of implementation measures and as such 
focuses almost exclusively on partisan veto players. The influence of partisan veto 
players on application is less clear and at most an indirect one.
Others working in a similar vein point out the importance of ministerial veto 
players and interministerial coordination during transposition (Mastenbroek, 
2003; Steunenberg & Toshkov, 2009). As above, the more ministries involved in 
transposition, the greater the length and likelihood of delay. Because these actors 
play a major role in post-transposition implementation, it is reasonable to expect 
that the number of such actors involved during transposition may also have an 
effect at this stage. On the one hand, the inclusion of several ministries during 
transposition may result in balanced national legislation that takes into account 
the preferences and priorities of several disparate actors. Including multiple actors 
at this stage is particularly important if all share in the responsibility for 
implementation. Otherwise, authorities may have little motivation or face 
difficulties when implementing legislation forced upon them without their input. 
Yet on the other hand, disagreement among transposing ministries may result in 
ambiguous national implementing measures that are difficult to apply. The 
inability to resolve some contentious issues during transposition may lead to 
vaguely worded legislation that grants significant discretionary authority to 
actors directly responsible for implementation. Without clear legal guidelines, a 
broader range of implementation outcomes can be expected, with deficient 
outcomes among them. Including multiple actors during transposition may also 
increase the legal complexity of implementing legislation, creating the possibility 
for self-contradictions and unworkable provisions. Compromises during the 
planning stage may not be realistic for civil servants to apply. The inability to 
compromise might favor a literal approach to transposition, copying nearly word 
for word the text of EU legislation into national measures, preventing adaptation 
to national circumstances that would otherwise reduce adaptation pressures. This 
leads to my first institutional hypothesis:
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H3A: As the number of actors responsible for transposition increases, the 
likelihood of implementation difficulty increases.
While the ministries participating in transposition have the potential to shape 
implementation through the legislation they create, the division of authority 
among actors responsible for application should have a more direct effect. There 
are two dimensions to this division of authority: horizontal and vertical. The 
horizontal division of authority refers to the sharing of responsibility for post-
transposition implementation among different ministries or authorities. In the 
field of animal welfare policy, as in other policy sectors where the EU has 
competency, EU legislation requires that member states designate one competent 
authority to serve as a contact point for implementation. For most member states, 
the competent authority is the ministry, agency, or authority that plays the most 
significant role during application. The competent authority selected for farm 
animal welfare is usually the agricultural ministry or a state veterinary service 
within it or veterinary service existing independently. Depending on the nature of 
the policy and institutional characteristics of the member state, however, 
additional authorities may play some role. In some cases, ministries of justice have 
responsibility for administering penalties in the event of non-compliance. 
Customs inspectors or agents from the transport ministry may play an important 
role in enforcing animal welfare during transport legislation. Inspectors from the 
state veterinary service may share competence for slaughterhouse inspections 
with inspectors from a food safety authority. In several cases, there is no single 
national authority responsible for implementation and these tasks are divided 
among independent and coequally responsible subnational authorities, as in 
Spain.
The need for sharing responsibility among different authorities in a member 
state reflects national legal and institutional characteristics as well as the 
particularities of the policy being implemented. With more actors involved and 
no hierarchical relationships among them, problems of coordination and 
cooperation may lead to implementation deficiencies. Although each actor may 
have a well-defined role in implementing a particular policy, not all may carry out 
their role adequately. If responsibility is equally divided among several subnational 
authorities, then a diseconomy of scale creates problems. Not all regions will be 
equally endowed with resources for proper training, equipment, and personnel, 
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and some may lack the political will to implement policies conferred upon them 
by a distant government in Brussels. Coordination problems are no less important 
when responsibility is shared among equal national authorities. A state veterinary 
service generally possesses personnel with adequate training and skill to verify 
whether animal welfare requirements are being met. For inspectors within such 
an authority, this kind of work is one of their core competencies and veterinarians 
generally self-select into the profession and employment in a public agency 
because of their interest in the wellbeing of animals. Police or inspectors from a 
transportation ministry may not share the same value or possess adequate 
training to carry out such tasks. Moreover, their core tasks may take priority over 
enforcing animal welfare legislation. In a more basic way, the smooth operation of 
a policy implemented by several authorities may be more complicated as the 
number of authorities increases because extra effort is needed on the part of all to 
effectively communicate and coordinate their activities. The need for effective 
coordination among implementation authorities is underscored by the fact that 
among its operational criteria for competent authorities, the official controls 
regulation actually requires effective and efficient coordination between 
authorities involved (Article 4(3)). This leads to my second institutional hypothesis:
H3B: As the number of actors horizontally coordinating implementation 
increases, the likelihood of implementation difficulty increases.
The vertical dimension of the division of implementation authority is likely to 
affect implementation in a similar way. By vertical dimension, I mean the division 
of responsibility for application within a single competent authority among 
regional offices, or the degree of centralization. Two things matter: the number of 
regional offices and the relative degree of autonomy that the regional offices 
possess. The size of a country (both in land area and population) as well as the 
geographic distribution of the regulated activity (e.g., animal farming, 
transportation, and slaughter) determine the number of regional divisions within 
the competent authority. As with the horizontal dimension, a larger number of 
regional offices strains the ability of the central competent authority to carry out 
effective controls uniformly across the entire territory. The importance of this too 
is anticipated in the official controls regulation, which requires that competent 
authorities “ensure the impartiality, quality and consistency of official controls at 
all levels” (Article 4(4)) and that “when, within a competent authority, more than 
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one unit is competent to carry out official controls, efficient and effective 
coordination and cooperation shall be ensured between the different units” 
(Article 4(5)). This leads to my third institutional hypothesis:
H3C: As the number of geographic divisions within the central competent 
authority increases, the likelihood of implementation difficulty increases.
The effect that the number of regional offices has on implementation may be 
mediated by the distribution of authority among them, but it is uncertain whether 
this leads to greater problems for implementation. On the one hand, if regional 
offices possess more autonomy, then problems of coordination will likely increase. 
Extra effort will be required to ensure that each office correctly applies the 
provisions of EU policy. On the other hand, granting more autonomy to regional 
offices allows the personnel to use their expert local knowledge in order to tailor 
policies to the circumstances of their area. The degree to which regional authorities 
possess autonomy for carrying out animal welfare inspections varies. In some 
cases, the choice of inspection targets (inspection intensity) and the actual 
selection of farms or operators to be inspected are carried out at the central level. 
More autonomous regional offices select who they will inspect and in some cases 
the number of inspections they will carry out each year. Despite the theoretical 
uncertainty, it seems reasonable to suspect that the effect that the number of 
regional offices has on implementation depends in part on the degree of 
autonomy that these offices possess. This leads to my fourth and final institutional 
hypothesis:
H3D: The decentralization of implementation authority from the central office 
to regional offices increases the likelihood of implementation difficulty.
Transposition delay
The final major factor for explaining variation in the implementation of EU 
regulatory policy that I will consider here is the direct effect that transposition 
delay may have. Although some of the factors considered above may contribute 
independently to problems during transposition and application, problems 
during transposition may themselves complicate later implementation. Most 
importantly, transposition delay prevents member states from implementing EU 
policies when others have already begun to do so. Countries that transpose EU 
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legislation on time have a head start over those that do not, allowing more time 
to adapt to new policies and help regulated actors prepare for upcoming 
deadlines. Thus my final hypothesis:
H4: The greater the delay in transposing EU legislation, the greater the 
likelihood of implementation difficulty.
Summary
This chapter presents a set of complementary hypotheses for explaining cross-
national and cross-policy variation in the successfulness of regulatory 
implementation. These have been drawn from the transposition literature 
discussed in the previous chapter. The transposition literature serves as a starting 
point for deriving hypotheses for post-application implementation for two 
reasons. First, the transposition literature, perhaps given the narrow range of 
outcomes that it has attempted to explain, is both more concentrated and 
cumulative than the general implementation literature or work that considers 
post-transposition implementation in the EU specifically. Thus relying on this 
literature as a stepping stone helps focus attention to a small number of potentially 
interesting explanatory factors. Some of the works discussed in the previous 
chapter, though dealing with transposition, draw on more general implementation 
scholarship. Second, and following the spirit of cumulative social scientific 
research, I have argued that the transposition literature can generate insights 
beyond its narrow concerns with explaining variation in transposition rates and 
delays. Although the domain of activity to be explained is different, several of the 
mechanisms can be reasonably applied from the study of transposition to 
understanding post-transposition application. The purpose of this chapter has 
been to draw out those factors that can be applied in both domains.
These factors are the degree of adaptation pressure, the amount of discretionary 
authority delegated to the member states, and the institutional characteristics 
influencing implementation. To these three factors I have also added the effect of 
transposition itself on post-transposition application. The hypotheses derived 
from these factors are complementary in the sense that each can have an effect 
on implementation that is independent from the other. Nevertheless, several of 
these factors might influence implementation in conjunction with one another. 
The empirical analyses that follow, in addition to separately testing the hypotheses 
61
Theorizing post-transposition application
advanced above will explore the possibility of interactions between these factors 
in those cases that seem most likely to exhibit interaction effects.

CHAPTER 4




In order to set the stage for the analyses that follow, this chapter briefly outlines 
the history of animal welfare policy in Europe. Parallel developments in member 
states, the Council of Europe (an international institution comprised of European 
countries, some of which are EU member states and others that are not), and the 
European Economic Community (later the EU) will be traced. Because the primary 
purpose of this book is to explain cross-national and cross-policy variation in the 
implementation of farm animal welfare policies, the current chapter does not 
attempt to explain or interpret the evolution of these policies. Instead the main 
historical currents in policy formation and development are described and traced 
to give the reader context for the subsequent empirical chapters. These 
developments are traced from early national laws prohibiting cruelty to animals 
to the harmonization of major aspects of farm animal welfare in three sectors (on 
farm, during transport, and at slaughter or killing) provided by EU law. Providing 
such context will allow the reader to better appreciate the implementation 
difficulties that arise from an evolving farm animal welfare policy and that will be 
analyzed in the following chapters.
Animal welfare on the public policy agenda
Humans have long seen animals as a commodity to be exploited for their own 
survival (Kalof, 2007). The earliest religious texts enshrine a human-animal 
relationship in which humans are the masters of other animals and in fact all life 
on Earth. It would take several millennia for these ideas to be challenged. Although 
ideas about the dominance of humans over other animals persist today, 
Enlightenment thought in the 17th and 18th centuries led to some rethinking of 
this relationship. The utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham, hailed by some as 
patron saint of the animal rights movement, speculated in 1789 that “[t]he day 
may come, when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those rights which 
never could have been withholden from them but by the hand of tyranny…The 
question is not, Can [animals] reason? nor, Can they talk? But, Can they suffer?” 
(quoted in Benthall, 2007). 
Less than fifty years later, the world’s first national legislation providing for the 
protection of animals was enacted in the United Kingdom. The 1822 “Act to 
Prevent the Cruel and Improper Treatment of Cattle” made it a criminal offence for 
any person “who shall wantonly and cruelly beat, abuse or ill-treat any Horse, 
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Mare, Gelding, Mule, Ass, Ox, Cow, Heifer, Steer, Sheep, or other Cattle” (Great 
Britain, 1822). Two years later the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to All 
Animals (now the SPCA) was formed and the modern animal rights and welfare 
movements began in earnest, spreading to other countries in Europe and overseas 
and covering a wide range of issues, including vivisection and performing animals. 
Branches of the SPCA were founded in most European countries in the 19th century 
alongside homegrown organizations and others campaigning for particular 
animal protections. Prohibitions on cruel treatment of animals entered the legal 
code in Germany in 1838 (the Kingdom of Saxony), France in 1850, and the 
Netherlands in 1886 (to cite a few examples).
During the same period that saw the rise of the animal rights movement, the 
technological advances and changing demographic patterns of the industrial 
revolution led to the intensification of agriculture in the UK and elsewhere in 
Europe and North America, leading to a doubling of global agricultural production 
between 1820 and 1920 (Scully, 2003). This intensification persisted into the next 
century to feed armies during two world wars so that production doubled again 
in just thirty years from 1920 to 1950. Improved chemical fertilizers and 
mechanized farming techniques led to increased crop production, while 
increasingly confined quarters for chicken and livestock led to greater animal 
production on the same amount of land. Later, antibiotics and growth hormones 
increased meat production per animal.
The intensification of food animal production lowered prices and allowed 
European and North American middle class families to eat meat more frequently 
than they had both during and before the wars. The nature of production systems 
(with more animals kept indoors and out of public view) and a drop in the size of 
the agricultural labor force in most Western European countries together meant 
people enjoyed increased meat consumption without being aware of the 
potential harmful effects on animals’ well-being, the environment, or even human 
health. With little public concern at the time, intensive animal rearing also 
remained outside the public policy agenda. This changed in 1964 with the 
publication of Ruth Harrison’s Animal Machines (1964), which helped to launch 
modern animal welfare policy in the UK, from where it would spread across the 
continent and the world. Like Upton Sinclair’s The Jungle sixty years before, which 
brought public attention in the US to the poor worker and food safety conditions, 
leading to major regulation of this industry, and Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring from 
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1962 which called attention to the effects of pesticides on bird populations and in 
turn launched the modern environmental movement and led to significant 
environmental regulations, the book raised the salience of the issue for the 
general public and led to government inquiries (van de Weerd & Sandilands, 
2008). The farm animal welfare movement, particularly in the UK, received a new 
impetus.
Soon after the book’s publication, the British government launched an 
investigation into the various farm rearing systems and their consequences for 
animal health and welfare. The committee reported its findings in the 1966 
“Brambell report” (named for the leader of the investigation Professor Roger 
Brambell) and contained the guidelines that animals be allowed “to stand up, lie 
down, turn around, groom themselves and stretch their limbs” (Her Majesty’s 
Stationery Office, 1965). The report spurred the creation of the Farm Animal 
Advisory Committee in 1967 to provide technical policy advice to the UK 
government for drafting of new legislation to ensure the adequate farm animal 
welfare (Farm Animal Welfare Council, 2009). This committee, comprised of 
veterinarians, academic, industry, and NGO scientists, economists, and other 
experts, and now called the Farm Animal Welfare Council, has continued to shape 
animal welfare policy in the UK and abroad. It helped with the passage of major 
amendments to the 1911 Protection of Animals Act: the Agriculture (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act 1968 which contained direct references to avoiding unnecessary 
pain or distress for livestock. More important than this initial legislative push, 
however, was the elaboration of the Brambell report’s guidelines (quoted above) 
into the “five freedoms” (first mentioned in a 1979 FAAC press release) which 
together form the conceptual basis for most animal welfare policy of the last 
thirty years.
On the European agenda
Policy changes at this time were not limited to the United Kingdom. The first 
European6 farm animal welfare policy was created in 1968 with the Council of 
Europe’s adoption of the European Convention for the Protection of Animals 
During International Transport (revised in 2003). Under discussion since 1957, this 
6 That it was “European” refers to its origins in an international institution situated at the European level. Policy 
developed within the Council of Europe, although very influential for later European Economic Community 
(and hence EU) policy in the area, should be seen as separate and distinct.
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convention specified requirements for the international transport of domestic 
mammals (including farm animals and pets), birds, and cold-blooded animals. 
Requirements included those relating to an animals’ fitness for transport, the 
adequacy of the means of transport (sufficient space and appropriate materials), 
and provisions for adequate food, water, and rest. The Convention entered into 
force in 1971 and was eventually ratified by 15 of the current 47 member states of 
the Council of Europe, including members from both the West (e.g., all then-EEC 
members plus Iceland, Norway, Austria, etc.) and the East (USSR, Bulgaria, and 
Romania). This convention was followed by the European Conventions for the 
Protection of Animals Kept for Farming Purposes (1976, amended 1992), for the 
Protection of Animals for Slaughter (1979), for the Protection of Vertebrate 
Animals used for Experimental and Other Scientific Purposes (1986, amended 
1998), and for the Protection of Pet animals (1987)
During this period, other countries in Europe were modernizing their national 
animal welfare policies. West Germany introduced a progressive act in 1972 (the 
“Tierschutzgesetz” or Animal Protection Act) and France updated its Code Rural in 
1976 with more specific requirements for animal welfare (on farms and elsewhere). 
While national legislation and Council of Europe Conventions to ensure animal 
welfare went ahead, some members of the EEC voiced their desires for other 
international, but more binding and comprehensive, animal welfare policies to be 
developed within the EEC. When negotiating the European Convention for the 
Protection of Animals During International Transport (CETS No.: 193), the Belgian 
delegation declared that the issue should be “dealt with as a whole by the technical 
working parties of the European Economic Community” (Council of Europe, 1963).
Animal welfare policy in the EEC
While agreements in the Council of Europe continued ahead in the 1970s, 
limited efforts were initiated within the EEC. The first EEC animal welfare legislation, 
Council Directive 74/577/EEC on stunning of animals before slaughter, was to be 
fully transposed into Member State legislation by 1 July 1975. A much shorter 
directive than the more comprehensive one that was to follow on this subject 
nearly twenty years later, this directive required only that killing occurs quickly 
after stunning and that appropriate stunning equipment is properly maintained 
and operated by competent individuals. It provided derogations for emergency 
68
Chapter 4
slaughter, slaughter for personal consumption by farmers, and special slaughter 
methods practiced for religious reasons (“ritual slaughter”). Three years later, 
Council Directive 77/489/EEC on the protection of animals during international 
transport (with a transposition deadline of 1 August 1978) made the European 
Convention of the same name a part of EEC law. Although most EEC members 
were already party to the European Convention, its presence in EEC law meant 
greater enforceability through the courts of the EEC. When the EEC itself became 
a party to the European Convention for the Protection of Animals Kept for Farming 
Purposes in 1978, it launched a coordinated scientific research program into the 
welfare of farm animals as part of the its second coordinated agricultural research 
programme (1979-83). Its goal was “to provide scientific and technical knowledge 
necessary to secure the well-being of farm animals throughout the Community 
without eroding the competitiveness of the animal production industries” 
(Commission of the European Communities, 1984, p. iv). With this, an epistemic 
community was created to supply expert knowledge to EEC decision-makers.
 In its first three years, it coordinated a variety of research projects on 
equipment, rearing systems, and the behavioral needs for the major farm animal 
species. Its entire common research program focused on the rearing of laying 
hens, reflecting the higher priority given to this sector. Knowledge derived from 
projects with titles like “The effect of group size and density (social space) on egg 
layers in deep and shallow cages” or “The effect of rearing conditions on the 
behavior and productivity of laying hens” directly informed a draft directive on 
laying hens. This draft Directive would not become law until 1988 as Council 
Directive 88/166/EEC. In addition to codifying into law a set of best practices to 
ensure the well-being of laying hens kept in battery cage systems, the law most 
notably set minimum space and equipment requirements for these cage systems 
to be applicable to all newly constructed systems and eventually to all systems 
(from 1995).
Other major EEC legislation followed soon after in the three animal welfare 
policy subsectors – on farm, during transport, and at slaughter or killing. Thus 
Directives 91/629/EEC and 91/630/EEC laid down minimum standards for the 
protection of calves and pigs, respectively. Like the Directive on hens, these 
Directives set requirements regarding the space, equipment, and behavioral 
needs for calves and pigs. Both contained requirements to be phased in over 
several years. In addition to specifying requirements to be respected by individual 
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farmers, these directives stipulated first that member states must put in place a 
system of inspections and penalties in order to ensure farmers’ compliance and 
second that Commission officials must periodically monitor these inspection 
systems so that the requirements are uniformly applied within the EEC. The Office 
of Veterinary and Phytosanitary Inspection and Control (established in 1991 
within the DG for Agriculture) would be responsible for monitoring Member State 
compliance. The directives also anticipated future reforms of the rules by 
demanding the Commission to submit a report on the experiences gained in 
order to adapt the legislation based on these experiences and on any new 
scientific advances in the understanding of farm animal welfare. 
In the field of welfare during transport, Directive 91/628/EEC introduced more 
stringent and encompassing welfare requirements for the transport of animals 
within the EU than had existed under the European Convention. It introduced a 
harmonized system of route plans so that member states could verify whether 
animals being transported within their territories (originating there or elsewhere) 
met its requirements. Finally, Directive 93/119/EC went beyond the corresponding 
European Convention for welfare at slaughter or killing. Its annexes contain the 
only slaughter methods to be permitted within the EEC and prescribe in some 
detail the methods to be followed in the restraint, stunning, and slaughter or 
killing of farm animals of all kinds (including animals farmed for fur, despite their 
rearing in only a small number of Member States). Like the Directives dealing with 
on-farm welfare, these two Directives required both Member State inspection 
systems and the monitoring of these inspections by the Commission. Together 
these Directives and their subsequent amendments form the most significant 
part of the EU’s farm animal welfare legislation. They have been adapted and 
added to periodically since the 1990s, but their core features took shape at this 
time.
A major food crisis in the mid-1990s and the ensuing political fallout had 
profound consequences for the regulation of the food supply chain in the EEC 
(Krapohl, 2008). Although animal welfare policy is less directly concerned with 
food supply chain safety, the general lack of confidence in EEC governance of 
veterinary and food safety issues spread to animal welfare policy as well, reshaping 
the European-level regulatory and monitoring system. Although the public 
salience of the problem would not explode until 1996, the issue had earlier origins. 
In 1985, cattle began dropping dead in England after suffering head tremors that 
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would earn this newly discovered disease the name “mad cow disease.” Known 
also by its scientific name (bovine spongiform encephalopathy or BSE), it was first 
believed that it could not spread to humans, a position defended by the UK in 
order to protect its beef exports, which under the principal of mutual recognition, 
could not be discriminated against unless a threat to human health could be 
established. 
The lack of evidence for human health consequences of BSE meant that the UK 
and the Commission continued to view the issue as a trade issue. Inaction at the 
EEC level led France and Germany to threaten unilateral bans on the import of 
British beef, which both the UK and the Commission viewed as unlawful. The 
situation changed in March of 1996 when the UK government admitted that the 
transmission of BSE from cattle to humans “could not be ruled out” (Krapohl, 2008, 
p. 129). Action at the European level quickened and within the same month the 
export of cattle, beef, and beef products from the UK was prohibited by the 
Commission (while the Scientific Veterinary Committee maintained its reluctance 
to change course).
Political and judicial efforts by the UK proceeded to challenge and attempted 
to overturn the ban, which was gradually done two years later. More important for 
the discussion here is the backlash faced by the Commission for its mishandling of 
the crisis during its period of inaction. First, Italian farmers attempted to sue the 
Commission, alleging that its mismanagement led to the collapse of the European 
beef market. They lost their case, but the European Parliament took up their 
challenge to the Commission. They launched an inquiry into the Commission’s 
response to the BSE crisis and concluded that a lack of transparency on the part of 
all actors within the Commission involved with the crisis had aggravated the 
situation. Facing the threat of censure by the EP, the Commission in turn responded 
with plans to introduce major reforms into foodstuffs regulation (Vincent, 2004). 
Scientific, legislative, and control bodies would be separated, transparency of 
decision-making would be improved, resources for control would be increased, 
and bodies responsible for food safety regulation (including animal welfare 
policy) would be moved from the DG for Agriculture to the DG for Consumer 
Policy and Health Protection. 
Among the changes, the Office of Veterinary and Phytosanitary Inspection and 
Control (located in Grange, Ireland) was moved and renamed the Food and 
Veterinary Office (FVO). With its mandate strengthened and its resources increased, 
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it now became the major organization within the European Commission tasked 
with monitoring the compliance of Member States with a large and expanding set 
of food safety and veterinary legislation. Its mission is “to monitor, report on and 
assist in the enforcement of Community legislation on food safety, animal health, 
plant health and animal welfare systems by Member States and by third countries 
exporting food, plants or animals to the EU” which it achieves through inspections 
of control systems in Member States and third countries (European Commission, 
2001c, p. 3). The organization’s restructuring to reflect its new mandate was 
completed in October of 1998, and the number of staff doubled between 1997 
and 1999 to 154 staff members including 87 inspectors to reflect these reforms 
(European Commission, 2004k).
The Food and Veterinary Office
Before completing the discussion of the development of animal welfare 
legislation in the European Union, I will briefly describe the activities of the Food 
and Veterinary Office (FVO, located in Grange, Ireland). The FVO is the most 
important actor at the EU level for overseeing the implementation of EU food and 
veterinary policy (including farm animal welfare policy) in the member states. 
Although the analyses that follow focus on the actions taken (or not taken) by the 
Member States in order to implement EU animal welfare legislation, and the states 
are thus viewed as the central actors, the primary sources of information about 
these actions are the FVO reports following their inspection missions concerning 
EU animal welfare legislation. The principal activity of the FVO is the inspection of 
control systems in place for EU food and veterinary legislation and it carries out 
200-250 inspection missions per year in Member States and third countries. The 
legal basis for these inspections lies within the individual Directives or Regulations 
whose requirements are to be inspected. By 2010, animal welfare counted as one 
of the twelve types of control systems (see Table 1) that the FVO monitors in the 
Member States and third countries (some systems) which can be grouped into 
one of four major areas: food safety (the largest share of inspections), animal 
health, animal welfare, and plant health (these last three of relatively similar 
importance). Individual inspections may examine aspects of multiple sectors (for 
example, some missions to assess the safety of food of animal origin have 
addressed limited aspects of animal welfare at slaughter or killing, largely because 
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these missions include visits to slaughterhouses), but otherwise inspections fall 
into one category.
Table 1: Control systems monitored by the FVO
Sector Control system
Animal health Animal health (live animals; semen, ova, and embryos; products of animal 
origin)
Food safety Food of animal origin
Imports of animals and food of animal origin
Feedingstuffs and animal nutrition
Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies (TSEs) 
Animal by-products (ABPs)
Veterinary medicines and residues
Foodstuffs and food hygiene
Imports of food of plant origin
Plant protection products
Animal welfare Animal welfare (on farm, during transport, at slaughter or killing)
Plant health Plant health (Genetically Modified Organisms, pesticides, seed and 
propagation material, plant health and biosecurity, plant property rights)
Given the political fallout from the BSE crisis and the continued urgency of that 
problem at the start of the FVO’s new mandate, much of the work in the early 
years focused on inspections to ensure that adequate control systems were in 
place to respond to BSE outbreaks. Since then the annual mission program has 
changed to reflect the diversity of the areas covered (so that all types of control 
systems are inspected in all member states periodically), priorities that arise from 
legislative reform or the phasing in of new requirements, EU enlargement, and 
follow-up missions for serious problems identified during previous missions or 
through complaints. As an example of planned missions to reflect priorities, a 
series of inspections was undertaken from 2002 to 2004 to verify compliance with 
laying hen welfare requirements that entered into force in 2002 (European 
Commission, 2005h). The FVO also carried out missions between 2001 and 2004 
prior to the big EU enlargement of 2004 to assess the readiness of control systems 
in the acceding countries. With respect to missions carried out in response to 
major problems, the FVO sent two inspection missions to Greece concerning 
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welfare during transport and at slaughter in quick succession following an initial 
mission in 2003 that identified major shortcomings in both the control system 
and the actual application of welfare requirements by transporters and 
slaughterhouse operators (European Commission, 2003a, 2003c, 2004i).
I describe here the format of these missions, the results of which are the key 
source of information for the case studies and quantitative analyses that follow. 
During a mission, two or three inspectors from the FVO, accompanied by 
representatives from the competent authority (the agency or ministry responsible 
for implementation) of the Member State, visit a small number of establishments 
in order to directly observe the application of EU legislation. An inspection dealing 
with farm animal welfare will visit farms with laying hens, pigs, or calves, for 
example, while one dealing with welfare during slaughter will visit slaughterhouses. 
Assembly centers, staging points (places where animals stop temporarily during 
transport for food, water, and rest), markets, and slaughterhouses will be visited 
during inspection missions concerned with welfare during transport. FVO 
inspectors watch Member State officials carry out their inspections to ensure that 
all requirements contained in EU legislation are adequately assessed and that 
proper action is taken when non-compliance is detected. In addition to this direct 
observation, the documents used by inspectors (checklists and guidelines) are 
checked to see whether they are adequate to ensure correct application. Visits to 
the central competent authority (e.g., the central office of implementing agency 
or ministry) are made in order to audit inspections records to verify that the 
intensity of inspections is sufficient and that penalty systems in place on paper 
are carried out to the extent necessary to improve compliance. Finally, the FVO 
examines Member States’ transposing legislation to ensure its correctness (though 
it does not engage in a thorough legal analysis of Member State laws). 
After extensively discussing the findings of an inspection mission with 
representatives of the Member State, the observations are published as an 
inspection report. This serves to address the Commission’s commitment to 
transparency in food safety policymaking and control following the BSE crisis. 
Member States’ comments to the observations made are included in the published 
reports as footnotes. From these observations a set of recommendations are 
made to the Member State in order to improve compliance. The Member State in 
turn must supply the FVO with an action plan that sets out how it intends to 
address these recommendations. Table 2 gives some examples of recommendations 
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given to Member States by the FVO and the actions intended by the Member 
State to remedy the situation. Until the early 2000s reports also sometimes 
included recommendations to the Commission itself either to amend legislation, 
clarify requirements, produce additional guidelines or to initiate infringement 
proceedings against a Member State for failure to respect the Directives. 
Table 2: Sample FVO recommendations and member state responses





“Ducks and rabbits are 
spared any avoidable 
excitement during lairaging 
in slaughterhouses (Article 
3 of Directive 93/119/EC).” 
(European Commission, 
2006f, p. 17)
“In relation to 3, 4 and 5, the regions 
concerned will perform checks aiming 
to ensure that the conditions of 
slaughtering of ducks, rabbits and 
turkeys will be improved.” (European 
Commission, 2006f, p. 17)
Transport Belgium “Procedures for the 
authorisation of 
transporters include the 
documentation required by 
Articles 10 and 11 of 
Regulation (EC) No 1/2005.” 
(European Commission, 
2008d, p. 17)
“This documentation is not asked 
beforehand, but is checked on the 
spot. Possibilities to change the 
procedure will be looked at.” 
(European Commission, 2008d, p. A1)
On farm Poland “Actions are taken so that 
laying hen farms comply 
with the requirements of 
Article 5 of Directive 
1999/74/EC and Directive 
98/58/EC, and those which 
are operating under 
derogations until 
31.12.2009 meet this 
deadline.” (European 
Commission, 2008f, p. 14)
“In letters GIWz.400/AW-l 13/08 of 1 
December 2008 and
GIWz.400/AW-113-1/09 of 9 February 
2009, the Chief Veterinary Officer 
reminded the Voivodship Veterinary 
Officers that the transitional period 
granted in the Treaty of Accession for 
44 farms keeping laying
hens in the territory of Poland will end 
on 31 December 2009…” (European 
Commission, 2008f, p. A3)
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Horizontal Sweden “The CCA should take 
measures to ensure that 
audits are implemented in 
relation to official controls 
on animal welfare as 
required by Article 4(6) of 
Regulation (EC) No 
882/2004, and as 
recommended in the 
previous FVO report.” 
(European Commission, 
2010f, p. 30)
“The Ministry of Agriculture has given 
an independent investigator an 
assignment to suggest organization 
and responsibilities for audits 
according to Article4(6), Regulation 
882/2004. Necessary changes in legal 
basis will also be suggested. The 
investigation was finished in March 
2011.” (European Commission, 2010f, 
p. A6)
These missions to inspect particular control systems have, since the mid-2000s, 
been complemented by two more general means with which the FVO monitors 
compliance. First, in 2003 a unit was created within the FVO to continuously 
monitor Member States’ follow-up actions (European Commission, 2004k). 
Second, beginning in 2005 the FVO introduced general review missions to its 
regular mission program (European Commission, 2006l). These were introduced 
partly to monitor Member States’ compliance with “Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 
on official controls performed to ensure the verification of compliance with feed 
and food law, animal health and animal welfare rules” (a horizontal regulation 
specifying general requirements for Member State competent authorities in the 
entire sector covered by FVO inspections, see below) and also to monitor follow-
up to recommendations given in general reports. The results of general review 
missions are also published as mission reports containing recommendations of a 
horizontal nature and eventually these reports all followed the same format by 
addressing (nearly all) the requirements in Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 article by 
article generally and for each of the control systems.
 Additionally, beginning in 2005 the FVO started developing country profiles 
for each Member State. These profiles consist of two parts. The first describes the 
overall structure of the competent authority for food safety and veterinary policy 
and that of each of the eleven control systems covered by the FVO (those listed in 
Table 1). All ministries, agencies, and other authorities responsible for 
implementation are described in terms of their various responsibilities, the 
distribution of authority among them, and the vertical and horizontal structure 
within each. The second part of the country profile lists all the recommendations 
given to the Member States in the individual inspection missions, separated into 
the same twelve control systems plus horizontal recommendations given during 
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general missions. Beside each recommendation the report describes the latest 
findings related to the follow-up of that recommendation as well as a brief 
assessment of its current state: “action taken”, “in progress”, or “action still required”. 
In the latter case an indication may be made that “The Commission has initiated 
specific follow up measures in the case of this recommendation”. An annex to the 
report also includes a description of the number of staff within each authority, but 
the information here is neither standardized nor updated adequately enough to 
enable comparisons across the Member States in these terms. The country profiles 
are updated following general missions, but the recommendations may be 
followed up again in subsequent specific missions. Prior to the introduction of 
general review missions and country profiles, recommendations were followed 
up in subsequent specific missions dealing with the same subject. Together these 
country profiles and the reports of inspection missions provide a window into the 
application of EU food safety and veterinary legislation in the Member States, 
among which are the animal welfare laws examined here.
The continuing evolution of EU policy
After the first foundations of EU animal welfare legislation were completed in 
the early 1990s, policies continued to expand and adapt, albeit more gradually 
than in this initial period. To complement the species-specific approach to farm 
animal welfare, a general farm animal welfare directive was agreed in 1998. 
Council Directive 98/58/EC of 20 July 1998 concerning the protection of animals 
kept for farming purposes had as its transposition deadline 31 December 1999 
and specified general requirements for all farmed vertebrate animals except those 
living in the wild or intended for use in competitions, shows, and other activities 
(to which a different Directive applied). All of the on-farm welfare directives 
required the Member States to submit biannual reports to the Commission stating 
the results of their on farm animal welfare inspections (including any penalties 
administered), but it wasn’t until 2000 that these reports were standardized 
through legislation (Commission Decision 2000/50/EC of 17 December 1999 
concerning minimum requirements for the inspection of holdings on which 
animals are to be kept for farming purposes, which was replaced by Commission 
Decision 2006/778/EC on the same topic). Despite this attempt at standardization, 
interpretations of the meaning of the reporting forms by the Member States still 
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differed, making the reports not as easily comparable as had been intended. 
Moreover, several Member States have failed to submit reports and late filing 
remains problematic. The standardization of reporting for inspections of welfare 
during transport would not occur until five years later, and reports of inspections 
of welfare at slaughter or killing have never been required. 
These pieces of legislation mainly codified existing practices, but their 
introduction at this time partially reflects the increasing harmonization of the 
application of animal welfare policies made possible by the FVO’s surveillance. A 
much more significant policy change was introduced by Council Directive 
1999/74/EC of 19 July 1999 laying down minimum standards for the protection of 
laying hens. In 1996, the Commission’s Scientific Veterinary Committee concluded 
its study into the welfare of laying hens in various rearing systems and the 
economic consequences of them based on the experience of Council Directive 
88/166/EEC (Commission of the European Communities, 1996). Among its twenty-
two conclusions was the conclusion that “because of its small size and its 
barrenness, the battery cage as used at present has inherent severe disadvantages 
for the welfare of hens” (Commission of the European Communities, 1996, p. 109). 
The Committee also concluded (among others) that beak trimming (the main 
method used to prevent cannibalism and harmful feather pecking) should be 
banned “as soon as is practicable”, that hens have strong preferences for perches, 
and that egg prices could be as much as 50% higher if hens are reared in non-cage 
systems. This latter conclusion was made even taking into account the increased 
demand for cage-free and free-range eggs that was starting to pick up at the time.
Nevertheless, after intense negotiations over the final draft of the new 
Directive, a version of the law was agreed in which new standards for battery 
cages (termed “unenriched cages” to distinguish them from the roomier and 
improved “enriched” cages) went into effect quickly and all battery cages were to 
be phased out by 1 January 2012. Although exact figures have never been 
available, battery cages constituted the industry norm for egg production in 
Europe. In addition to space and other construction requirements, all enriched 
cages would be required to have perches (at this time required in nowhere else 
but Sweden). Requirements were also introduced for non-cage or “alternative” 
systems. With the introduction of this law and the gradual phasing out of battery 
cages throughout its territory, the EU launched its most publicly salient and 
possibly most expensive animal welfare policy.
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The next major change, with implications for several sectors, occurred in 2004 
with the agreement of Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 (entering into force in 2006) 
mentioned above. This regulation attempts to standardize control systems across 
multiple sectors in all the Member States through a large number of requirements 
(the regulation contains 63 articles). The most important change it introduced to 
all sectors is that the priorities and frequencies for inspections should be made on 
the basis of risk (targeted inspections). The regulation also introduced the 
requirement that all countries develop multiannual control programs for all 
sectors covered under the regulation. Among the other requirements include the 
verification of official controls and audits, the use of documented procedures for 
inspections, and the need for transparency with respect to control activities and 
confidentiality with respect to the identities and other private information of 
those inspected.
Two other legislative changes in the late 2000s worth mentioning are Council 
Directive 2007/43 of 28 June 2007 laying down minimum rules for the protection 
of chickens kept for meat production (the broiler chickens directive) and Council 
Regulation (EC) No 1099/2009 of 24 September 2009 on the protection of animals 
at the time of killing. The former introduces housing requirements for broiler 
chickens to be transposed by the Member States by mid-June 2010. The latter 
replaces Directive 93/119/EC (which had not been significantly altered since its 
creation) starting from 2013. Reflecting the scientific opinions of the European 
Food Safety Authority issued in 2004 and 2006, it updates requirements regarding 
restraint, stunning, and slaughter given the latest scientific knowledge and 
extends, for the first time, the scope of EU farm animal welfare policy to farmed 
fish. Rather than developing detailed requirements for fish farming, the regulation 
merely applies the general Article 3(1) (that “animals shall be spared any avoidable 
pain, distress or suffering during their killing and related operations”) to all 
vertebrate animals (except reptiles and amphibians) and provides for the 
possibility of more detailed requirements for farmed fish later. Because these last 
policy changes will be implemented by the Member States from 2010 or 2013, 
respectively, they will not be considered further in this book.
One final note regarding the evolution of EU animal welfare policy concerns 
the substantial backing given to this policy area in revisions to the EU’s founding 
treaties at the end of the 2000s. The thirteenth article of the Lisbon Treaty, which 
entered into force on December 1, 2009, states that “In formulating and 
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implementing the Union’s agriculture, fisheries, transport, internal market, 
research and technological development and space policies, the Union and the 
Member States shall, since animals are sentient beings, pay full regard to the 
welfare requirements of animals, while respecting the legislative or administrative 
provisions and customs of the Member States relating in particular to religious 
rites, cultural traditions and regional heritage.” The inclusion of animal welfare 
within the EU’s foundational agreements echoes the protection granted to 






The empirical part of the dissertation presents three implementation case 
studies, one for each of the three sub-sectors within EU farm animal welfare policy, 
and two sets of quantitative analyses. The purpose of these case studies is not to 
directly test the hypotheses advanced in the theory chapter but instead to suggest 
their plausibility. This is done by describing the implementation of each of the 
major policies in several member states and pointing out the importance of the 
explanatory factors from the theory chapter along the way. The order of the cases 
corresponds to the progression of live animals from their rearing or keeping on 
farm (chapter 6)7, their transport from farms to markets and/or slaughterhouses 
(chapter 7), and their slaughter or killing (chapter 8). Each case study will begin 
with a description of EU policy in the sub-sector that highlights the major 
requirements, followed by an overview of implementation difficulties and 
successes across 27 member states. The strategy for selecting a handful of 
countries for more detailed description comes next, after which the individual 
descriptions will be presented. A concluding section revisits the overview and the 
detailed descriptions in light of the theoretical expectations.
Before beginning the case studies, I present in this chapter the primary means 
that I use to evaluate the implementation record for each member state in each of 
the three policies. Although these evaluations are used to operationalize the 
dependent variable (implementation deficiency) for the quantitative analysis that 
follows in later chapters, the strategy employed is described here for several 
reasons. First, the selection of countries for more detailed investigation is based in 
part on these evaluations, so that the full range of implementation deficiency 
(including no deficiency) is preserved in the case studies. In other words, countries’ 
scores on the implementation deficiency indicator described in this chapter form 
both the dependent variable in the quantitative analyses but also the main criteria 
for selection of country-policies for the case studies. Second, and more importantly, 
these evaluations are themselves a distillation of an immense amount of 
qualitative information about the implementation of animal welfare policy in the 
member states. It is from this information, supplemented by additional secondary 
sources, that the case studies are constructed.
7 This subsector is referred to as “on farm” animal welfare (referring to those aspects of farm animal 
welfare that concern farm animals when they are still on the farm), while the more general policy 
area that is the scope of this thesis is referred to as “farm animal welfare” to distinguish it from the 
welfare of performing animals or animals used for scientific research and testing.
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Measuring the quality of implementation
The major purpose of this dissertation is to explain cross-national variation in 
the post-transposition application of EU animal welfare policies. Much of the 
scholarly interest in transposition and implementation more generally has as one 
of its core concerns the extent to which the member states are faithfully abiding 
by the requirements set at the EU level. The pursuit of a European policy in a 
particular policy area remains at best symbolic if legislation is not effectively 
implemented in all member states. While many analyses of implementation seek 
to explain the positive or negative effects of public policy by focusing on the 
outcomes of a restricted set of processes and procedures, the current analysis 
uses a conception of successful implementation that remains close to the 
objectives of legislation, reflecting this core concern of EU implementation 
scholarship. Hence I view implementation as relatively successful if the 
requirements of legislation are being respected and duly executed by a member 
state, its competent authorities, and its regulated entities, and as unsuccessful if 
they are not.
Within a single policy area like animal welfare, multiple pieces of EU legislation 
(directives, regulations, and decisions) supply the member states with 
requirements that they must implement. Several pieces of legislation might be 
grouped together to form a sub-policy within the general area that applies to a 
particular category of activities, class of actors, or sub-sector of activity. I refer to 
these lower level policy areas as sub-sectors. Within animal welfare there are three 
such sub-sectors: welfare on the farm, during transport, and at slaughter or killing. 
Each comprises a small number of unique pieces of legislation and all are governed 
together by horizontal legislation that applies to several policy areas (including 
animal welfare, animal health, and imports of food of animal origin, to name a 
few). Each case study chapter lists the legislation that governs the subsector that 
is the subject of the chapter.
Because implementation varies not only across member states and across 
policies but also across different requirements within policies, an appropriate unit 
of analysis at which implementation can be evaluated must be selected within 
policies. I take a pragmatic approach that balances the practice used in previous 
analyses with the characteristics I have observed in this policy. Reflecting the way 
in which EU law is structured, several studies use the article of a directive or 
regulation as the basic unit of analysis. An article bundles together a particular set 
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of requirements that are mutually dependent. In other words, articles are more 
independent from one another (the independence of observations is a key 
assumption for basic statistical analyses) than are the requirements within then. 
Pragmatically, it is easier to observe the implementation of a single article than it 
is to observe each requirement separately, as some requirements within a single 
article are more important than others. 
Strictly using the article as the unit of analysis presents several problems, 
however, when applied to animal welfare legislation that has evolved over a ten 
year period. First, some of the most important requirements within the field are 
contained in annexes. Nearly all the requirements governing the application of 
animal welfare during slaughter or killing are contained in four separate annexes, 
each governing a different slaughterhouse or killing process. The references to 
these annexes all appear in the same article, so using the article as the unit of 
analysis would combine these separate processes into a single implementation 
unit when the degree of implementation deficiency may vary from one to another. 
Second, when a policy sub-sector undergoes significant reforms, as did the 
transport sub-sector in the mid-2000s, requirements contained within the articles 
of the original legislation may be rearranged in the legislation that replaces it. 
New requirements may be introduced, others modified, while still others remain 
the same but appear in a new article or are divided into several. Finally, some 
articles do not contain requirements that must be implemented by the member 
states. Hence while I look first at each individual article to identify implementation 
units, in some cases it is necessary to break down articles into major constituent 
parts and in other cases, it is necessary to trace the implementation of major 
legislative issues even while the structure of the legislative text that defines them 
is rearranged. Some articles are left out of the analysis altogether. I call this unit of 
analysis the “issue” level as each article (or part of an article) roughly defines a 
single issue within the policy area. Within a single piece of legislation, some issues 
may be more important than others. Nevertheless, I treat each issue equally in the 
analyses that follow for two reasons. First, the division into issues (and their equal 
treatment) mirrors the practice of the FVO in its evaluation of implementation in 
the member states. The mission reports summarize the systems in place and offer 
recommendations structured around issues that are roughly equivalent to those 
used here. Second, there is likely no single criteria for determining the relative 
importance of issues within a single piece of legislation, as perceptions of 
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importance likely vary across officials from EU institutions and the member states 
and across the individuals whose behavior is affected by the legislation. 
Table 3: Articles, issues, and requirements in the calves directive*
Article† Summary of contents and sample requirements
Article 1 Scope of the directive
Article 2 Definition of terms
Article 3 Specific requirements for holdings, such as:
•	 “No calf shall be confined in an individual pen after the age of eight weeks, 
unless a veterinarian certifies that its health or behaviour requires it to be 
isolated in order to receive treatment.”
•	 “The width of an individual pen for a calf shall be at least equal to the height 
of the calf at the withers, measured in the standing position, and the length 
shall be at least equal to the body length of the calf…”
Article 4 General requirements for calf rearing (14 points in the annex), such as:
•	 “Materials used for the construction of calf accommodation…must be 
capable of being thoroughly cleaned and disinfected.”
•	 “…electrical equipment must be installed in accordance with current national 
rules so as to avoid electric shocks.”
Article 5 Provisions for amending the annex
Article 6 Requirement for the Commission to submit to the Council a report and 
proposals based on the opinion of the European Food Safety Authority on 
intensive farming systems for calves.
Article 7 Inspections and reporting requirements for the member states, such as:
•	 “Member States shall ensure that inspections are carried out under the 
responsibility of the competent authority in order to check that the provisions 
of this Directive are complied with.”
•	 “These inspections, which may be carried out on the occasion of checks made 
for other purposes, shall each year cover a statistically representative sample 
of the different farming systems used in each Member State.”
Article 8 Certification requirements for importing animals from a third country
Article 9 Requirement for the member states to assist veterinary inspectors from the 
Commission in carrying out checks on member state application
Article 10 Assistance for the Commission by the Standing Committee on the Food Chain 
and Animal Health
Article 11 Allowance for member states to apply stricter provisions
Article 12 Repeal of previous directive on calves and its amendments
Article 13 Entry into force date
Article 14 Address to the member states
* Council Directive 2008/119/EC of 18 December 2008 laying down minimum standards for the protection 
of calves (Codified version)
† Articles in bold are those that contain requirements that member states must implement and are thus 
single “issues” in this thesis; non-bold articles are not part of the analyses that follow
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Each case study chapter presents the division of a subsector into issues and 
the overall level of implementation quality observed in that issue across the EU. To 
illustrate how issues bundle together a set of requirements, Table 3 indexes each 
article from the calves directive (part of the on welfare subsector) and the 
requirements contained therein. For the entire domain of farm animal welfare 
policy (including horizontal issues) there are 76 issues.
For each issue, I evaluate the extent of implementation deficiency for the entire 
ten-year period (2000-2010) for each country based on the reports from FVO 
missions (see Box 1). Each country-issue is scored as either 0 (no deficiency), 1 
(minor deficiencies present), or 2 (significant deficiencies present). For a given 
issue, I determine whether the FVO has issued the member state any 
recommendations to make changes in order to bring implementation into 
compliance (Step 1). Although they are not identical, issues correspond to articles 
or parts of articles in the legislation, and nearly all recommendations in the FVO 
reports cite articles (and in most cases the specific point within the article), which 
enables me to link recommendations to issues. If the member state has not 
received any recommendations pertaining to a given issue during this period, the 
country-issue is given a score of 0 (no deficiencies present). If recommendations 
have been issued, I refer back to the relevant section within the main body and 
the conclusion of the report that records the FVO’s observations that give rise to 
this recommendation (Step 2). I trace the issue across later mission reports, noting 
when additional recommendations are given to the member state in relation to 
that issue (Step 3). I then decide whether the country-issue receives a score of 1 or 
2 based on the description of the situation with respect to that issue (Step 4). 
Problems that are widespread, intense, or lead to severe suffering for the animals 
receive a score of 2, while minor or localized problems lead to a score of 1. Finally, 
I observe how and when the member state addresses the recommendations 
pertaining to the issue to determine whether sufficient action has been taken.
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For example, the following observation from the report of a mission to 
Lithuania led to a recommendation to ensure that restraint equipment is 
appropriate for the method of stunning (the issue observed is the restraint of 
animals before stunning or killing which corresponds to Annex B of Directive 
93/119/EEC):
“Handling of animals was appropriate, except where some bovines were 
tied by the horns” (European Commission, 2004d, p. 6)
Because the observation indicates that this deficiency is an exception to the 
general “appropriate” means of restraining animals before stunning, I coded this 
issue for Lithuania (the “country-issue”) as 1 (minor deficiencies). On the other 
hand, the situation described below for the same issue in Spain led to a score of 2 
(significant deficiencies):
Step 1A: Locate the first FVO mission report in which the FVO gives a recommendation to 
the member state in relation to this issue. Record the year of this first recommendation in the 
issue sheet. Proceed to Step 2.
Step 1B: If no mission report between 2000 and 2010 contains a recommendation 
pertaining to that issue in the member state, score the member state as “0” (no implementation 
deficiency) for that issue and count the number of recommendations as “0”. Indicate “ND” (no 
deficiency) in the “year of first recommendation” and “year of completion” columns.
Step 2: Within the mission report, find the observations made by the FVO that compel 
them to issue the recommendation. Copy and paste these observations into the issue sheet 
and indicate the nature of the recommendation that these observations lead to.
Step 3: Examine later FVO mission reports to locate additional recommendations given to 
the member state in relation to this issue. Repeat Step 2 for each of these recommendations. 
Count the number of recommendations pertaining to this issue and record this number.
Step 4: On the basis of the observations collected in Steps 2 and 3, evaluate the extent of 
implementation deficiency for 2000-2010. Score a “1” for minor deficiencies present. Score a 
“2” for major deficiencies present.
Step 5: Examine subsequent country profiles and mission reports (if necessary) to 
determine how and when the member state took measures to address the recommendations 
pertaining to this issue. Copy and paste these intended or actual actions taken into the issue 
sheet. Record the year in which the last recommendation pertaining to this issue reached an 
“action taken” status. If the recommendations remain outstanding beyond 2010, indicate “NY” 
(not yet).
Box 1: Steps for coding implementation quality in issue-countries
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“Sheep were restrained in an inappropriate way as they were tied by one 
leg and then suspended before stunning. This system of restraint is 
forbidden by Annex B, Section 2 of Directive 93/119/EC. Although the OV 
had been working for several years in this slaughterhouse performing his 
daily inspections, this major deficiency had only been detected when he 
conducted an inspection using the check list provided by the CA of 
Extremadura 10 days before the inspection team’s visit” (European 
Commission, 2007h)
The presence of the words “major deficiency” and the fact that a forbidden 
system of restraint persisted undetected lead to the score of 2 for this issue-
country. 
The quality of inspection measure is a single score for this issue-country for the 
entire ten year period. In order to take into account the dynamics of implementation 
during this period, I also record some additional information. First, I record the 
year when a deficiency for an issue is first noted by the FVO for the member state. 
This is the first year in which an FVO mission report contains a recommendation 
for that issue. Next I trace that issue over follow-up FVO mission and country 
reports. If the problem persists, or related deficiencies are noticed, the FVO may 
repeat or issue additional recommendations for that issue. I record the number of 
recommendations for a particular issue-country that appear in all reports for the 
ten-year period. Country reports contain a listing of outstanding recommendations 
and their status: action taken, in progress, or no action taken. When action is 
taken, I record the year when the deficiency is remedied for that issue (when the 
quality of implementation has effectively moved from either a one or a two to a 
zero). If a recommendation does not appear in either of the next two country 
reports (under any status), then I look for the follow-up to that recommendation 
in later mission reports on the same subject. If the recommendation is not 
followed-up in these, then I assume that the actions announced by the member 
state to remedy the situation have been sufficient to eliminate the deficiency. 
Many recommendations are still outstanding at the end of 2010, so their end 
years are recorded as “not yet” remedied. For the qualitative case studies, I have 
also noted the steps that the member state has taken to eliminate the deficiency. 
From the above additional information, I observe that in most cases, 
implementation quality is relatively stable over time. Minor deficiencies persist for 
the entire period in 65% of the cases, while major deficiencies persist if 64%. While 
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the remaining deficiencies are corrected sometime within the ten year period 
under investigation, there is only a slight difference between major and minor 
deficiencies, with major deficiencies being addressed in 2.3 years on average and 
minor deficiencies being addressed in 3.2 years on average.
In the examples above, Lithuania eliminated the minor deficiency within the 
same year that the recommendation was issued (2004). In its response to the 
recommendations, the competent authority of Lithuania declared that it is 
“monitoring the proper restraint of animals before stunning” (European 
Commission, 2004d). The next country report for Lithuania notes in relationship 
to a pre-accession mission and the 2004 mission in which the above deficiency 
was noted that “out of nine recommendations contained in the reports of these 
missions, none required follow up during the general review mission” (European 
Commission, 2006c, p. 62). In the 2007 FVO mission to Lithuania regarding animal 
welfare during transport or slaughter (the last one in the period under 
investigation), no deficiencies related to the restraint of animals before stunning 
or killing were noted. Thus the minor deficiency, first noted in 2004 and leading to 
a single recommendation, was eliminated in 2004.
The situation with respect to this issue in Spain was quite different. The problem 
was first noted and led to a recommendation in a 2006 mission (European 
Commission, 2006k). A follow-up mission in 2007 led to that recommendation 
being repeated and an additional recommendation being given to improve 
documented procedures so that inspections are carried out satisfactorily 
(European Commission, 2007h). The situation had not improved in the 2009 
mission, leading to another recommendation on the same subject (European 
Commission, 2009c). In the 2011 country report, action was still required on one 
or more of these recommendations. Hence a major deficiency, first noted in 2006 
and leading to four recommendations from 2006-2010, was not eliminated during 
this period.
See Boxes 2 and 3 for the complete description of the steps taken to score 
these two cases. Appendix A contains an example “issue sheet” which lists for 
each member state, the score given and the additional details recorded. The 
scoring described in boxes 2 and 3 produce one line each (one for Lithuania and 
one for Spain) in this issue sheet (the issue sheet corresponding to requirements 
for restraint of animals before stunning, slaughter, or killing contained in Appendix 




The first FVO mission report to Lithuania that covered aspects of animal welfare during 
slaughter was conducted as a pre-accession mission in 2003 (European Commission, 2003e). 
No recommendation was issued to Lithuania during this mission regarding the restraint of 
animals prior to stunning. A second FVO mission to Lithuania in 2004 covered welfare during 
slaughter. One of the recommendations in this report stated “Regarding surveillance in 
slaughterhouses: to ensure that (a) Restraint facilities are appropriate to the stunning 
equipment (Annex B of Council Directive 93/119/EC)” (European Commission, 2004d, p. 8). 
Thus the year of the first recommendation is 2004.
Step 2
The recommendation identified in Step 1 corresponds to the observation that “Handling 
of animals was appropriate, except where some bovines were tied by the horns” (European 
Commission, 2004d, p. 6).
Step 3
The only other FVO mission to Lithuania covering aspects of animal welfare during 
slaughter happened in 2007 (European Commission, 2007g). The FVO did not issue 
recommendations to Lithuania concerning the restraint of animals before slaughter during 
this mission. Thus the FVO issued Lithuania one recommendation concerning this issue.
Step 4
Because the observation indicates that this deficiency is an exception to the general 
“appropriate” means of restraining animals before stunning, I coded this issue for Lithuania as 
“1” for minor deficiencies.
Step 5
In the addendum to the 2004 mission report, in which the recommendation identified in 
Step 1 was issued, the State Food and Veterinary Service (SFVS) indicates that it “is monitoring 
the proper restraint of animals before stunning” (European Commission, 2004d, p. 9). The 
FVO’s first country profile for Lithuania was created in 2006 and notes that (in relation to this 
and other recommendations) “out of nine recommendations contained in the reports of 
these missions, none required follow up during the general review mission” (European 
Commission, 2006c, p. 62). Thus I assume that the actions announced in the addendum to the 
2004 mission report were taken and eliminated Lithuania’s minor deficiency with respect to 
this issue. Thus the year in which this deficiency was corrected is 2004.




FVO missions to Spain covered welfare during slaughter in 2002 and 2003 but in neither 
of these missions did the FVO issue recommendations regarding the restraint of animals 
before stunning. The third FVO mission covering this topic (a 2006 FVO mission that covered 
the safety of food of animal origin as well) issued the recommendation “to ensure that the 
animal welfare conditions at the time of slaughter or killing set out in Council Directive 
93/119/EC are met” (European Commission, 2006c, p. 24). Although this recommendation 
does not directly refer to the restraint of animals before stunning or that part of the Directive, 
the observations that led to this recommendation (see Step 2) included this topic. Thus the 
year of the first recommendation is 2006.
Step 2
The 2006 mission report contains the observation that “In one large SH (Castilla-La 
Mancha), lambs were stunned in the lairage without restraining” (European Commission, 
2006k, p. 19). This follows the broader observation that “generally, very limited evidence was 
seen of checks on animal welfare rules in the SHs [slaughterhouses] visited” (European 
Commission, 2006c, p. 19).
Step 3
Two FVO missions to Spain in 2007 dealt with animal welfare during slaughter. The first 
dealt solely with this subsector and issued two recommendations that can be traced back (in 
part) to observations concerning the restraint of animals before stunning:
“(3) Adequate training on animal welfare requirements at slaughter and transport is 
provided to inspectors in slaughterhouses as required by Article 6 of Regulation (EC) No 
882/2004.
(4) Official controls implementing Directive 93/119/EC are carried out following 
documented procedures, as required by Article 8(1) of Regulation (EC) No 882/2004“ 
(European Commission, 2007h, p. 18).
These recommendations stem from the following conclusions:
“(2) Official controls performed were incomplete as the system relies mainly on inspections 
performed by inadequately trained official veterinarians (contrary to Article 6 of Regulation 
(EC) No 882/2004), with no precise instructions (contrary to Article 8(1) of Regulation (EC) No 
882/2004), and with no measures to verify their effectiveness (contrary to Article 8(3)(a) of 
Regulation (EC) No 882/2004).
(3) As a result, major deficiencies in relation to the requirements of Directive 93/119/EC 
and of Regulation (EC) No 854/2004 regarding the transport and ante mortem inspections of 
poultry, the handling and lairaging of animals, the restraint of sheep and the stunning of 
poultry and sheep were not detected” (European Commission, 2007h, p. 17).
The specific contribution of improper restraint to this conclusion comes from the 
observation that “Sheep were restrained in an inappropriate way as they were tied by one leg 
and then suspended before stunning. This system of restraint is forbidden by Annex B, Section 
2 of Directive 93/119/EC” (European Commission, 2007h, p. 11).
The second FVO mission in 2007 that covered this topic was conducted as a follow-up to 
Box 3: Scoring requirements concerning restraint of animals before stunning in Spain
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the 2006 mission. It included the recommendation “To ensure that the animal welfare 
conditions at the time of slaughter or killing are in accordance with Council Directive 93/119/
EC and that animal welfare during transport is respected as required by Regulation (EC) No 
1/2005” (European Commission, 2007i, p. 24) This recommendation stems from the observation 
that “In one slaughterhouse visited, sheep and goats were not properly restrained and some 
were not properly stunned, which is not in compliance with the requirements of Articles 5(1)
(b) and 5(1)(c) of Council Directive 93/119/EC respectively.” (European Commission, 2007i, p. 
18).
Another FVO mission took place in 2008 and issued a recommendation for Spain to “Take 
measures to ensure that restraint of animals stunned by electrical means comply with the rules 
laid down in Point 3 of Annex B to Directive 93/119/EC” (European Commission, 2008i, p. 147). 
This recommendation resulted from the following observation: 
“Concerning restraint prior to stunning, although changes had been made recently 
in a smaller slaughterhouse in Aragon regarding arrangements for stunning, sheep 
were individually pulled by a hind leg and attached to the lifting equipment, which was 
used as a method of restraint before applying stunning. Directive 93/119/EC Annex 
B(3) requires that such animals must be presented in such a position that the equipment 
can be applied and operated easily, which was not possible for the person working on 
his own to both restrain and stun sheep. As a result one in four sheep were inadequately 
stunned. In the two other slaughterhouses there were three workers carrying out 
restraint and stunning and although some back up stunning was required stunning 
was generally effective” (European Commission, 2008i, p. 146).
The last FVO mission to Spain concerning welfare during slaughter before the end of 2010 
occurred in 2009 and contained the recommendation 
“To ensure that for infringements of the requirements of Directive 93/119/EC the 
operator remedies the situation, as required by Article 54 of Regulation (EC) No 
882/2004 and where necessary sanctions are imposed which are effective, proportionate 
and dissuasive as required by Article 55 of Regulation (EC) No 882/2004” (European 
Commission, 2009c, p. 20).
The following observation contributed to this recommendation:
“In Extremadura, in a slaughterhouse where sheep were slaughtered during the 
visit, the OV kept good records and had reported to the operator on eight occasions in 
2008 infringements on problems with restraint of bovine animals and provision of 
water for different species. These had not been resolved” (European Commission, 
2009c, p. 18).
In sum, deficiencies related to the improper restraint of animals prior to stunning led or 
contributed to six recommendations by the FVO between 2000 and 2010.
Step 4
I score this issue-country as “2” (major deficiency) because the FVO uses the words “major 
deficiency” in its observations on this issue.
Step 5
The latest recommendation concerning this issue was given in 2009 and no country profiles 
were made between 2009 and the end of 2010. The country profile of 2011 (outside the time 
period of investigation here) indicates that action is still required for at least one of the 
recommendations concerning this issue (European Commission, 2011b). Thus I indicate that this 









Five major pieces of EU legislation (and their amendments) provide minimum 
animal welfare requirements for the keeping of animals on farms in the member 
states (Table 4). Council Directive 98/58/EC applies general requirements “for the 
protection of animals bred or kept for farming purposes”. This directive includes 
the basic requirement that keepers take steps to prevent “unnecessary pain, 
suffering or injury” and contains other general requirements in its annex with 
respect to staffing, inspection, record keeping, feeding, breeding, and buildings, 
etc. The directive serves mainly to give effect to the European Convention for the 
Protection of Animals Kept for Farming Purposes, to which most member states 
were already a party, and as such does not introduce major changes to the animal 
welfare policies in most EU countries. Requirements such as that all animals “have 
access to feed at intervals appropriate to their physiological needs” safeguard 
basic principles of on farm animal welfare, but do not require modifications in 
procedures, equipment, or buildings for member state competent authorities or 
animal keepers. Nearly all member states successfully implemented these general 
requirements during the 2000-2010 period, as reflected by the very small number 
of FVO recommendations that refer to this legislation. As a result, the analyses 
that follow do not include this Directive.
Four species-specific directives provide more detailed requirements to define 
on farm animal welfare policy for calves, pigs, laying hens, and broiler chickens, 
respectively. As mentioned earlier, the 2010 deadline for the transposition of the 
broiler chicken directive means that this legislation is not included in the analysis 
either. 
Council Directive 91/629/EEC specifies animal welfare requirements with 
respect to rearing calves. This Directive, like Council Directive 91/630/EEC (signed 
into law the same day) on welfare requirements for pigs and Council Directive 
88/166/EEC on those for laying hens, sets minimum requirements for the 
installations in which animals are housed and mandatory provisions for their 
keeping or rearing. These include physical requirements for the installations in 
which calves are raised and other equipment as well as requirements with respect 
to the environment (air circulation, temperature, lighting, etc.), inspections, 
cleaning, feeding, and watering. One of its most important measures was to 
prohibit the tethering of calves and the keeping of calves isolated in crates. Several 
of the minimum requirements for installations were phased in: new housing could 
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Area Legislation Transposition or entry into force date
General on farm 
welfare
Council Directive 98/58/EC of 20 July 1998 concerning 
the protection of animals kept for farming purposes 31 December 1999
Calves
Council Directive 91/629/EEC of 19 November 1991 
laying down minimum standards for the protection of 
calves
1 January 1994
Council Directive 97/2/EC of 20 January 1997 
amending Directive 91/629/EEC laying down 
minimum standards for the protection of calves
31 December 1997
Commission Decision 97/182/EC of 24 February 1997 
amending the Annex to Directive 91/629/EEC laying 
down minimum standards for the protection of calves
1 January 1998
Council Directive 2008/119/EC of 18 December 2008 




Council Directive 91/629/EEC of 19 November 1991 
laying down minimum standards for the protection of 
pigs
1 January 1994
Council Directive 2001/88/EC of 23 October 2001 
amending Directive 91/630/EEC laying down 
minimum standards for the protection of pigs
1 January 2003
Commission Directive 2001/93/EC of 9 November 
2001 amending Directive 91/630/EEC laying down 
minimum standards for the protection of pigs
29 November 2001
Council Directive 2008/120/EC of 18 December 2008 




Council Directive 88/166/EEC of 7 March 1988 
complying with the judgment of the Court of Justice 
in Case 131/86 (annulment of Council Directive 
86/113/EEC of 25 March 1986 laying down minimum 
standards for the protection of laying hens kept in 
battery cages)
1 July 1987
Council Directive 1999/74/EC of 19 July 1999 laying 
down minimum standards for the protection of laying 
hens
1 January 2002
Commission Directive 2002/4/EC of 30 January 2002 
on the registration of establishments keeping laying 
hens, covered by Council Directive 1999/74/EC
20 February 2002
Broiler chickens
Council Directive 2007/43/EC of 28 June 2007 laying 
down minimum rules for the protection of chickens 
kept for meat production
30 June 2010
Table 4: Legislation in the on farm welfare sub-sector
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not be built or brought into use for the first time after 1 January 1994 that did not 
meet these, and any such housing could not be used after 31 December 2007. 
These physical requirements did not apply to holdings with less than six calves. 
Calves imported from third countries must have met equivalent requirements.
The pigs directive (91/630/EEC and its amendments) provides similar 
requirements for the rearing of pigs. Most importantly, the directive sets minimum 
space requirements for pigs depending on their size, prohibits the tethering of 
sows and gilts, and mandates group housing for sows and gilts (from 2013). 
Finally, Directive 1999/74/EC did the same for laying hens. Different requirements 
were specified depending on the housing system: unenriched cages (known 
more commonly as battery cages, to be phased out by 1 January 2012), enriched 
cages, and alternative (non-cage) systems for rearing laying hens.
Figure 1: Deficiency in the implementation of on farm animal welfare in 27 member states, 
by level of deficiency
The implementation of on farm animal welfare policy in 27 Member States
Figure 1 gives some information about the deficiency of implementation of on 
farm animal welfare policy in the member states. For each country, the scores 
(described in the previous section) are summed across the thirteen issues in this 
subsector. Although the individual scores are measured ordinally (that is, moving 
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from 0 to 1 does not represent the same change in the underlying scale of 
implementation deficiency as does moving from 1 to 2), the total score reasonably 
approximates the overall deficiency of implementation by weighting significant 
deficiencies twice as important as minor ones. Countries are ranked from high 
score (greatest deficiency, on the left) to low score (least deficiency, on the right). 
Because there are thirteen issues, the maximum possible column height is twenty-
six (if a country experienced significant implementation problems in all thirteen 
issues). The shading within columns enables a distinction to be made between 
contributions to the total score from issues experiencing minor deficiency (scored 
as 1) and contributions from issues experiencing significant deficiency (scored as 
2). Thus France has a total score of 14, consisting of eight issues in which the 
country experiences minor deficiency and three issues that experience significant 
deficiency. 
Figure 2 displays the same total score as in Figure 1, but displays the contribution 
from each of the three species on farm animal welfare policies. Note that for four 
of the New Member States (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and Romania), no pre- or 
post-accession missions covered the welfare of calves during the ten year period.
Figure 2: Deficiency in the implementation of on farm animal welfare in 27 member states, 
by species
Across 27 member states, the average score is 8.6, with a standard deviation of 
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3.5. The best performer in this sub-sector was Finland with a score of 4. The quality 
of implementation was also generally good in Germany, Denmark, Estonia, the 
Netherlands, and Slovakia (all with scores of 6). On the side of the scale, Italy 
performed the worst with a total implementation deficiency score of 19. Other 
member states in which situation with respect to EU on farm animal welfare policy 
needed major improvements included France, Greece, Bulgaria, and Belgium, all 
with scores of 12 or higher. In Italy and Greece, major deficiencies were observed 
in more than half the issues included in the analysis (8 and 7, respectively). Most 
of the score for Bulgaria can be attributed to issues experiencing major deficiencies. 
For Belgium and France, these high scores reflected a relatively low number of 
major deficiencies (3 for both) accompanied by minor deficiencies observed 
across a larger number of minor deficiencies. Each of these underperforming 
countries had deficiencies in each of the three directives, with the exception of 
the calves directive in Bulgaria.
 For another perspective on implementation difficulties in this sub-sector, 
Figure 3 displays deficiency information for the thirteen issues (calculated as 
described above but across countries within the same issue). None of these issues 
were implemented with complete success by all the member states. As a group, 
member states fared best in implementing the general requirements for the 
keeping of calves and hens, with which no member state had major difficulties. 
The two issues with the most implementation problems were the general 
requirements for the keeping of pigs and the requirements for unenriched 
(battery) cages. In the former case, the most commonly cited problem was a lack 
of manipulable material. In the latter, several countries continued to allow non-
compliant cage systems (modified battery cages) to be used after the date from 
which they were prohibited. Note that because the prohibition on battery cages 
took effect at the start of 2012, the continued use of these after that date does not 
influence scores in this analysis.
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The strategy for selecting countries for the case studies is as follows. Each case 
study chapter includes four cases (country-policies): two old member states and 
two new member states (those that acceded to the EU in 2004 or 2007). Both new 
and old member states are included because they vary on a number of important 
dimensions that are relevant for their implementation of EU animal welfare policy. 
Unlike the old member states, new member states were not involved in the 
creation of the farm animal welfare policy under investigation here. Instead, new 
member states had to satisfactorily put in place systems for implementing these 
policies in order to accede to the EU. From both the new and old member states I 
select one country that experienced substantial implementation deficiency (and 
thus has a high deficiency score) and one that did not. Selection on the dependent 
variable necessarily limits the inferential usefulness of the case study chapters 
(see e.g. Geddes, 1990), but the inclusion of all issues in all countries in the 
quantitative analyses that follow ensure that the hypotheses developed earlier 
are satisfactorily tested. Each case study chapter follows this logic but not strictly: 
some exceptions are made in order to avoid using the same countries twice (and 
even this principal is relaxed in one case). Thus in the case study for on farm animal 
welfare, I select the poor performers Italy (old) and Bulgaria (new) and the 
successful implementers Finland (old) and Slovakia (new).
Italy: transposition delay and problems of regional and local coordina-
tion
As mentioned above, major deficiencies in the implementation of on farm 
animal welfare requirements have been observed in Italy. Some of these problems 
can be attributed to late and incorrect transposition of the laying hens directive, 
while others result from a lack of coordination of effort among the local and 
regional authorities responsible for organizing farm inspections. Decreto 
Legislative n˚ 267of 2003 transposed the laying hens directive and entered into 
effect on 5 October 2003, already more than twenty months later than the 
transposition deadline of 1 January 2002. This text was adopted despite a warning 
letter from the Director General of DG SANCO that major discrepancies existed 
between the Decreto and the requirements of Directive 1999/74/EC (European 
Commission, 2004c). Among the seven inconsistencies cited in this letter include 
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permitting the bringing into service of unenriched cages up to nine months after 
the EU deadline of 1 January 2003 (and even further for cages that were ordered 
before 31 December 2002, an exception not allowed in EU legislation), the absence 
of requirements regarding litter area and nests, and the extension of the deadline 
for the operation of densely stocked alternative systems until 1 January 2007 
(these are prohibited beginning 3 August 1999). Rather than promptly amending 
its legislation to reach compliance, the Directorate-General of Veterinary Public 
Health, Food and Nutrition of the Ministry of Health (the central competent 
authority or CCA in Italy responsible for both national transposing legislation and 
coordinating the application of this legislation by subnational authorities) 
informed the regional authorities in 2005 to no longer apply the non-compliant 
derogation for unenriched cage systems (European Commission, 2005d). 
Moreover, the CCA indicated that it was waiting until after the review of Directive 
1999/74/EC that might lead to legislative changes at the EU level (these have not 
occurred). The FVO did not consider this a suitable excuse, and repeated its 
recommendation to properly transpose the directive in its 2005 mission report. 
Law n˚ 29 of 25 January 2006 correctly transposed the requirements, four years 
later than the initial deadline.
Although this thesis is about post-transposition application of EU policy, some 
discussion of transposition is necessary as late or inadequate transposition nearly 
always results in a failure to apply EU requirements. The absence of a correct legal 
text in Italy meant that prohibited cage systems could be brought into use for the 
first time after they should not have been allowed to do so. Moreover, the 
anticipation of changes to Italian legislation prevented the CCA from issuing up-
to-date inspection guidelines and checklists to regional authorities. To cite 
another example from the pig sector, the FVO noted that “the effect of the 
legislation being late was that requirements, such as the width of the openings in 
the floor…were not applicable on farms brought into use in 2003” (European 
Commission, 2005d, p. 6).
On time and correct transposition does not ensure successful application. In 
Italy, adequate implementation was hampered by the inability or unwillingness of 
some local authorities to apply animal welfare rules and the absence of suitable 
controls by the CCA to rein in this behavior (before 2007). Below the CCA is a 
“Regional Veterinary Service consisting of veterinary officers and administrative 
staff in each of the 19 regions and two autonomous provinces” and below the RVS 
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are 230 local health boards (Aziende Sanitarie Locali or ASLs) (European 
Commission, 2001b, p. 6). Veterinarians within the ASLs perform checks on farms 
to verify compliance and all enforcement actions in the event of non-compliance 
take place at this level. Until 2008, depending on the region, the ASL or the RVS 
chooses inspection targets (the percent of farms in their district to be inspected) 
and selects the farms it will inspect. This led to the recurring problem that a 
statistically representative sample of farms was not inspected (European 
Commission, 2005d). The RVS (or regional CCAs) coordinate and supervise the 
ASLs and the CCA in turn issues guidelines to the RVS. The CCA does not have a 
supervisory role with respect to the RVS. Beginning in 2007, a national inspection 
plan was developed and followed, eliminating many of the problems in this sector 
(although others still persist) (European Commission, 2010d).
 This decentralized structure, with its lack of supervision at the central 
level until 2007, led to major implementation deficiencies, as “the effectiveness of 
the CCAs in the different regions varies significantly” (European Commission, 
2005d, p. 12). The FVO notes that “the absence of the criteria from the checklist or 
standard report form developed in the different ASLs may account for the failure 
that not all the relevant requirements were properly checked” (European 
Commission, 2001b, p. 15). Sicily, for example, regarded 25% overstocking of 
laying hens in cages as satisfactory. After 2007, a national inspection program was 
created, though problems in this sector remain.
Finland: centralization and coordination
In Finland, (mainly) on-time transposition and more stringent on farm animal 
welfare laws ensure that EU requirements are respected in all but a few cases. 
Additionally, the central competent authority (CCA), which in Finland is the Food 
and Health Department of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, plays a more 
active role in directing Finland’s farm inspection program than that of Italy. By the 
time of the FVO’s 2001 mission to Finland for this sector, the country had already 
transposed the relevant directives, in many cases going beyond EU requirements 
(European Commission, 2001a). Whereas the three directives do not apply to 
small farms (fewer than six calves or pigs or fewer than 350 laying hens), Finnish 
legislation applies these requirements to all holdings. Moreover, transitional 
periods for phasing out existing equipment that do not meet EU requirements do 
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not exist in Finnish legislation. Most significantly, the keeping of veal calves is 
prohibited and the tethering of pigs has been illegal since 1996. The FVO noted 
only minor deficiencies, most of which are related to the definitions employed.
The organization of controls in Finland contributes to low level of deficiencies 
detected in this country. Municipal veterinarians perform controls at farms. They 
are supervised by the 13 regional provincial state offices (European Commission, 
2007a). The CCA “issues guidelines and instructions to the regional services” and 
writes the inspection checklists (European Commission, 2001a). In contrast to 
Italy, the CCA determines the overall inspection program:
“There is a good system of selecting farms to be inspected with a national 
farm register at central level fulfilling the requirement of randomness. The 
percentage of selected farms is adapted to each species in order to ensure 
a good representation” (European Commission, 2001a, p. 21)
This approach is not without faults, however, as national inspection rate targets 
are not always achieved in every region.
In Finland, no major deficiencies related to on farm animal welfare were 
detected in the 2000-2010 period. Three of the four minor deficiencies that led to 
FVO recommendations were addressed within a year of the mission in which they 
were observed. Problems with documented procedures in the pigs sector, noted 
in the 2007 FVO mission report, led to inspectors overlooking certain requirements 
and to confusion with regard to rules about medicines as these requirements are 
spread over several pieces of legislation (European Commission, 2007c). More 
comprehensive guidelines issued by the CCA in 2008 to the regional authorities 
clarified these requirements (European Commission, 2008a). The guidelines were 
still inadequate for the laying hens sector, however, and height requirements for 
cages have been inadequately inspected despite several FVO recommendations 
from 2007-2010. Action on this issue is still in progress according to the 2010 
country profile (European Commission, 2010a).
Slovakia: improving the system through training and guidelines
In Slovakia, the State Food and Veterinary Administration serves as the central 
competent authority (CCA) (European Commission, 2004e). A hierarchical 
distribution of authority exists in the CCA with eight Regional Food and Veterinary 
Administrations and forty District Food and Veterinary Administrations. Within 
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the latter, 230 veterinarians were employed in 2004. One veterinarian in each 
district takes the lead on animal welfare issues. The CCA created a national 
inspection program in which a set percent of holdings for each animal are to be 
inspected in each district, but the selection of farms occurs at the district level.
As noted above, successful implementation of EU farm animal welfare 
legislation is not limited to old member states, where some animal welfare rules 
have applied for nearly a decade before the period investigated in this book. In 
Slovakia, no major deficiencies were detected from 2004 to 2010, and minor 
deficiencies were observed in only five issues. In every case that a minor deficiency 
led to a recommendation, the CCA acted quickly to try to fix the problem. If these 
attempts were not immediately successful, additional efforts were made following 
subsequent FVO missions. The CCA primarily improved the control system 
through issuing detailed guidance and checklists to inspecting veterinarians and 
updating these as often as necessary. The attempts were undermined, however, 
by varying levels of supervision of the districts by the regional offices.
Slovakian animal welfare legislation, which incorporated EU requirements 
beginning in 2003, already contains within its text more specific guidelines for 
inspectors than the EU text (European Commission, 2004e). Where the directives 
include words like “adequate” or “sufficient” (words that are in turn included in 
national implementing measures that literally transpose the directives), Slovakian 
legislation replaces these words with specific parameters or rules. Although the 
legislation fully transposed the directives in 2003, existing legislation was more 
stringent than the EU rules (European Commission, 2006e), while modifications 
since then have increased their stringency or specificity. Calf holdings with more 
than six calves met EU requirements before the 2003 deadline, and some 
requirements applied from this date to all holdings, regardless of size. Slovakian 
pig welfare legislation also requires that pig keepers receive regular training and 
obtain certification, whereas the directive merely stipulates that animal welfare 
training courses for pig keepers are available. This latter change was made in 
response to an FVO recommendation that the existing system of disseminating 
information to pig keepers about animal welfare rules, which relied on the 
voluntary participation of local farmers associations, did not adequately cover 
this large sector.
Detailed guidelines and continued training are the two ways that the CCA in 
Slovakia strives to improve the farm animal welfare control system. The CCA 
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organizes training in which at least one veterinary inspector from each district 
participates. Already in 2004, the FVO noted that the detailed checklists provided 
by the CCA to district veterinarians provided a good basis for inspections 
(European Commission, 2004e). The quality of guideline and checklists does not 
alone ensure high quality inspections, however. Despite having comprehensive 
checklists, the FVO noted that “for certain requirements such as measurements of 
cages for laying hens, inspectors had not received adequate practical training” 
(European Commission, 2004e, p. 8). In response to this recommendation, the 
CCA planned to provide additional training on the issue before the end of the 
year.
The minor deficiencies observed can also be attributed to regional variation in 
control systems. The FVO believed as much, stating that “the level of supervision 
carried out by the regions on the districts differs from one region to another and 
as a consequence, where the level of supervision is not sufficient, the performance 
of inspections is of lower quality” (European Commission, 2006e, p. 16). In the two 
RVFAs observed by the FVO in the 2004 mission, one responded to overstocking 
of cages by demanding immediate action while the other did not consider the 
overstocking a problem. In response to this conclusion, the CCA required the 
regions to increase on-the-spot checks in the districts (European Commission, 
2007b). Inadequate supervision was no longer mentioned as a problem in the 
2008 report (European Commission, 2008g).
Bulgaria: poor supervision and failed commitments
Although Bulgaria does not have the worst record for implementing EU on 
farm animal welfare requirements, significant problems have remained unfixed 
since the FVO identified them in several pre-accession missions. All five of the 
issues with major deficiencies, first noted in either the 2005 or 2006 pre-accession 
FVO mission, had not been addressed by the end of 2010. The FVO attributes the 
continuing implementation problems in Bulgaria to a low level of supervision by 
the central competent authorities (CCA) of the lower levels, but through a careful 
investigation of the mission reports, it becomes clear that a lack of commitment 
on the part of the CCA plays some role as well.
In Bulgaria, the CCA is the National Veterinary Service, which is divided into 28 
Regional Veterinary Services (RVS). The CCA was reorganized in 2005 in order to 
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prepare for accession. Among these 28 RVSs are 264 municipalities, each with 
their own veterinarians responsible for inspecting farms for animal welfare 
requirements (among other duties). Control programs are drafted at the regional 
level, though in 2005 the FVO noted that not all regions had inspection plans in 
place (European Commission, 2005j). 
In the 2005 mission, the FVO observed several problems in Bulgaria’s on farm 
control system (European Commission, 2005j). The directives require that a 
statistically representative sample of farms for each species are inspected, but 
inspections in all regions did not include subsistence farms, which represent 
approximately one half of the holdings in the country. For both pig and laying hen 
holdings, many requirements were overlooked by municipal inspectors. Most 
significantly, severe overcrowding of laying hen cages went undetected. When 
deficiencies were observed, these were not always followed up with by authorities 
to ensure that compliance was achieved. When follow-up did occur and 
compliance was still lacking, penalties imposed were not sufficiently dissuasive to 
prevent non-compliance.
In response to these deficiencies, the CCA stated that it would send more 
detailed instructions to the RVSs for the performance of farm inspections. In the 
FVO follow-up mission, the team noted that these instructions were not sent 
(European Commission, 2006m). A checklist was amended but the amended 
checklist was not accompanied by guidelines and instructions for its use, resulting 
in further inadequate inspections. In relation to the problem of overstocking, the 
CCA made promised to make an overview all laying hen systems in the country. 
The follow-up mission noted that this overview had not yet been started a year 
later. 
By 2008, there was still no effective system in place for the supervision of the 
municipal authorities by the regional or central level (European Commission, 
2008e). The FVO remarked that in one region “checks are performed by the OV 
[Official Veterinarian] responsible for animal welfare himself and if these checks 
deficiencies regarding the checks of municipal OVs are noted, they would be 
informed about the shortcomings of their checks; however, no evidence that the 
OVs had been informed about shortcomings in their checks had been noted” 
(European Commission, 2008e, p. 3). 
In the following year, the FVO noted that farm inspections were taken over by 
the regional level, and the quality of inspections improved, even though significant 
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problems remained (European Commission, 2009a). Still no satisfactory system of 
supervision by the CCA of the regions existed. 
Conclusion
This chapter presented a set of four case studies describing the implementation 
of on farm welfare policy in different member states. These descriptions highlight 
several of the mechanisms that underlie the hypotheses presented in the previous 
chapter as well as focusing attention on other factors contributing to 
implementation success or failure. Transposition delay presented a challenge for 
Italian implementation of on farm welfare, the only case described above in which 
delay was present. The delay led directly to misapplication by leaving less stringent 
standards in place past the transposition deadline. It also had an indirect effect by 
delaying the adaptation to new requirements (through updated guidelines and 
checklists). The content of transposition measures seemed to have an effect as 
well. In Finland, early and more stringent requirements helped to ensure that the 
level of protection required by EU policy was reached. In Slovakia, the more 
specific requirements (in place of vaguely worded statements in the directives) 
provided sufficient guidelines for farmers and inspectors alike.
The relationships between central and regional offices of the implementing 
authority provide a more striking contrast between successful and unsuccessful 
application of on farm animal welfare policy. Effective supervision of regional 
offices by the central competent authorities of Finland and Slovakia (after some 
adaptation), and subsequent supervision by the regions of inspectors, led to 
better implementation outcomes in those countries. Centralized information 
about farms and the results of inspections in Finland allowed the creation of a 
national inspection plan with input from the regions on inspection targets. Poor 
supervision in Italy and Bulgaria, on the other hand, prevented the uniform 
application of EU requirements in these countries. Violations of EU requirements 
frequently went undetected and few mechanisms were in place to improve the 
efficacy of inspections.
One final factor, a country or agency’s willingness to apply the rules, seems to 
have some effect on the quality of implementation. This willingness (or lack 
thereof ) is more properly an intervening variable rather than a truly independent 
explanation for why some countries succeed while others fail. That is to say, there 
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are multiple, overlapping reasons why some countries will be more committed to 
applying the rules than others. The issue is brought up here because it is (or at 
least appears to be) a near-constant theme throughout the cases observed in this 
thesis. In Finland, more stringent requirements likely reflect public support for 
animal protection policies. Slovakia continually adapted its administration in 
order to satisfy FVO inspectors even after accession, while Bulgaria and Italy 
avoided major changes. Bulgaria made commitments that it did not uphold, 
despite the relative low cost or effort required for making these commitments 
(issuing guidelines and instructions requires fewer resources than putting in place 
an effective inspector supervision system). The reasons for Bulgarian and Italian 
recalcitrance cannot simply be attributed to lower capacity (although that does 
play some role). Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the cause of limited will to 
implement is the same for both countries. 
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This chapter describes the implementation of animal welfare during transport 
policy in the EU through an introduction to EU legislation and its requirements, an 
overview of cross-national differences in implementation success across the ten 
year period, and four more detailed case studies of application by particular 
member states. The case shows that even in a policy subsector in which legislation 
has been reformed in order to improve implementation, old problems persist 
while new ones appear.
Overview of the policy area
In contrast to the relatively stable policy subsectors of animal welfare during 
slaughter or killing and on farm animal welfare, the animal welfare during 
transport subsector has been substantially reformed during the period under 
investigation. The first major welfare during transport legislation, Council Directive 
91/628/EEC, laid down requirements for transporting farm animals, dogs, cats, 
and other animals both within and between Member States for journeys exceeding 
fifty kilometers. Among these requirements are rules concerning the fitness of 
animals for transport, feeding, watering, and equipment for transport, loading, 
and unloading. Special provisions for the transport of animals by rail, water, and 
air were specified.
This Directive was amended by Council Directive 95/29/EC, which introduced 
several important changes. In addition to setting loading densities (the space 
required per animal depending on its size and the method of transport) for farm 
animals, the legislation introduced the requirement that all transporters covered 
by the directive obtain authorization to transport animals from the competent 
authority of the Member State in which they are based. Most significantly, perhaps, 
was the introduction of a harmonized route plan system for all journeys exceeding 
eight hours. Under this system, transporters filled out a route plan prior to 
departure with details concerning their intended journey, including the itinerary 
and the location and duration of planned intervals required for feeding, watering, 
and rest. Before departure these route plans must be checked by veterinarians of 
the Member State competent authority for their compliance with the requirements 
of the Directive and to ensure that the intended journeys were realistic. After 
completion of the journey, the route plans had to be sent back to the competent 
authority for further control.
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Significant problems in the application of the Directive and its amendment, 
which will be discussed below, led to a major overhaul of the EU legislation in this 
subsector (European Commission, 2000d). Because of the large variance in both 
the transposition and application of the existing EU legislation, and the potential 
trade distorting effects this might have, the Commission decided to replace the 
amended Directive with a regulation. Regulation (EC) 1/2005, which entered into 
force on 1 January 2005 significantly altered EU animal welfare during transport 
policy. Because of persistent and widespread difficulties with the route plan 
system, this was replaced with a more harmonized “journey log” system that will 
eventually be integrated with satellite navigation systems now required in all 
vehicles transporting animals for long journeys. These systems, which also 
continuously monitor temperature and other environmental conditions within 
vehicles, enable the quick detection of non-compliant journeys. In order to further 
reduce the wide variance in implementation within this subsector, the Regulation 
introduced more stringent requirements for the training of transporters to ensure 
that they are fully aware of and have the necessary competency to carry out the 
requirements of the Regulation. More stringent space requirements were also 
introduced, as well as requirements for actors other than the transporters 
themselves who have some role in the transport of animals (e.g, the animals’ 
keepers and operators of assembly centers).
Despite the attempts at greater harmonization, major cross-national differences 
still exist in the implementation of animal welfare during transport policy. Not 
only have some countries had difficulty adjusting to the new requirements, but 
problems with several of the requirements that were carried over, namely the 
monitoring of route plans (now journey logs) and requirements concerning 
journey times, resting periods, and feeding/watering intervals, have persisted. 
Moreover, as the setting of penalties for enforcement and administrative fees for 
transporter authorization is the responsibility of the Member States, wide 
divergence in these areas leads to compliance costs (and likely outcomes) that 




The implementation of animal welfare during transport policy in 27 Mem-
ber States
Figure 4: Deficiency in the implementation of during transport animal welfare in 27 
member states, by level of deficiency
Figure 4 provides an overview of the quality of implementation of animal 
welfare transport policy in the member states. The figure shows the total score 
(the sum of the individual scores for each of the thirty-two issues in this subsector) 
for each member state and the contribution to that score from minor (scores of 1) 
and major deficiencies (scores of 2), respectively. Given the number of issues, the 
maximum score is sixty four. Countries are ordered from left to right in order of 
performance (with the worst performers on the left).
The average total score for the member states is approximately fifteen with a 
standard deviation of 8.4. Countries with relatively poor performance (e.g., those 
for which the total score is higher than one standard deviation above the mean) 
include Belgium, Bulgaria, Spain, France, Italy and Lithuania. Among these, Spain 
in particular stands out with a total score of thirty-six. Spain received a score of 
two (again, indicating significant implementation difficulties) for half (sixteen) of 
all issues within this subsector. Those with fewer implementation difficulties 
(whose total score is one standard deviation below the mean) include Austria, 
Finland and Malta. 
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Malta, which received a score of three and the lowest score (indicating the 
fewest problems with implementation), is a special case with respect to animal 
welfare during transport. Given its isolation from mainland Europe and its small 
size, most of the EU requirements in this subsector do not apply in Malta. The pre-
accession mission report notes that “Council Directive 91/628/EEC3 on animal 
transport is not applicable, as journeys do not exceed 50 km” (European 
Commission, 2003f, p. 2). Maltese authorities believed the same was true of 
Regulation (EC) No 1/2005, but the FVO pointed out that several provisions 
applied to “farmers using their own vehicles” and to “other commercial transport 
up to 65km” (European Commission, 2009b, p. 7). Because Maltese authorities 
were late to develop their control system for welfare during transport, deficiencies 
related to fitness during transport, checks after long journeys, and reporting 
requirements were noted but as of the 2010 mission had not yet been addressed 
(European Commission, 2010e). Luxembourg, another small country, also has a 
relatively low score, but given its location on a major crossroads in Western Europe, 
the control system here has been more fully developed. 
Figure 5 gives a cross-issue perspective on implementation deficiencies for EU 
animal welfare during transport policy. In Appendix B, a correspondence table 
lists all thirty-two issues alongside their location in the old (Directive 91/628/EEC) 
and new (Regulation (EC) No 1/2005) European legislation governing this policy 
subsector. As mentioned above, Regulation (EC) No 1/2005 introduced new 
requirements, specifically those concerning assembly centers, requirements for 
transporter and long journey transporter authorizations, training, and the 
certification of the approval of means of transport. For most other issues, the 
























































Case study of welfare during transport
As with on farm animal welfare policy, there were no issues in this subsector 
that were free of implementation difficulties, though several experienced only 
minor deficiencies. Many of the issues with very low scores concerned the 
transport of animals by ship, which represents a small segment of animal welfare 
during transport and does not apply to all member states. Across the thirty-two 
issues, the average score was close to thirteen with a standard deviation of almost 
ten. Of the ten issues that were not part of the original animal welfare during 
transport policy, half had relatively low scores (four or below) and the highest had 
a total score across the member states of only eighteen (out of a possible fifty). 
From this it appears that the new legislation did not introduce issues that were 
difficult for the member states to adapt to, but the lower scores for these issues 
partly reflect the prevalence of issues related to transport by ship in this set and 
the fact that deficiencies in newer issues have had less time to be noticed by FVO 
inspectors. This does not mean that the new legislation did not introduce major 
adaptation pressures, however, as modifications of requirements related to 
preexisting issues may have experienced major deficiencies only after the new 
requirements went into effect.
The most problematic issues for implementation by the member states was 
were checks on journey logs (formerly called route plans). This was a significant 
problem in seventeen of the twenty-seven member states (and a minor problem 
in four others). In several countries, these checks were inadequate, leading to the 
approval of plans or intended journeys that were either not in compliance with EU 
requirements (too long, inadequate resting periods, etc.) or were unrealistic about 
the time required to reach the destination (and thus also not likely to respect 
requirements when actually carried out). Other issues for which many member 
states had difficulty included requirements for inspections and inspection reports; 
water and feeding intervals, journey times, and resting periods; fitness for 
transport; additional requirements for long journeys and the specification of 
sufficient penalties to deter noncompliance.
Case selection
As with the previous policy area, I describe the implementation of EU animal 
welfare during transport policy in greater detail for four countries: two that have 
been relatively successful and two that have experienced significant difficulties in 
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applying the rules. Within each pair, I include an old member state and a new 
member state. The countries experiencing relative success to be described below 
are Austria (with a total score of six) and Slovenia (seven). In order to avoid 
repetition and to provide insights from additional countries, I have excluded 
Finland (with a total score of four), whose implementation of on farm animal 
welfare policy was described in the previous chapter. For reasons described above, 
I also chose not to describe the country with the lowest score (Malta). The country 
experiencing the most significant implementation difficulties (Spain, with a score 
of thirty-eight) will be described alongside Lithuania (its score of twenty-four 
matches that of Bulgaria, described in the previous chapter, but is less than that of 
Italy, the country with the highest score after Spain).
Spain: uncoordinated decentralization
The structure of the competent authority in Spain is very decentralized, with 
most authority for implementation at the regional level. The central competent 
authority (CCA) with responsibility for animal welfare legislation in Spain is the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and is responsible for transposing EU 
legislation at the national level and issuing manuals and other guidelines to 
promote the harmonization of animal transport and other welfare controls in the 
seventeen autonomous regions (European Commission, 2000c). The CCA does 
not supervise the regions, and although supervision is legally possible for severe 
cases of non-compliance, this option has never been used (European Commission, 
2000c, p. 6). Not only do the regions apply and enforce the legislation, but they 
also may develop their own animal welfare legislation. Because they are 
responsible for enforcement, each region develops its own system of penalties 
and procedures for applying the legislation. The absence of a functioning system 
for the application of penalties in some regions has been a recurrent problem for 
the implementation of all animal welfare policy in Spain (European Commission, 
2003b).
Although the administrative structure varies from region to region, in general 
each region is divided into provinces which are in turn in charge of local veterinary 
units. Instructions are sent from the regional level to the provincial offices, 
although the CCA may play a limited role in coordinating the activities of the 
regions. Meetings are held between the CCA and the regions periodically for 
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informational purposes and guidelines may be supplied to the regions, but the 
regions are not required to follow these. The 2002 FVO mission, which included 
meetings with the regional competent authorities for Castilla-La Mancha and 
Galicia noted that neither region followed CCA guidance on control of route plans 
(European Commission, 2002b).
Of the many issues for which Spain experienced significant implementation 
difficulties, an illustrative example is provided by the failure to adequately control 
route plans (later journey logs). The 2000 FVO mission concludes that “Autonomous 
Regions did not supervise effectively the control of route plans” (European 
Commission, 2000c, p. 12). Specific examples of problems with this issue may be 
cited from several FVO reports in which various regional authorities are visited. 
Thus in Aragón, the FVO noted that “route plans had either: been approved 
although they lacked a proper itinerary although a staging point would have 
been necessary; sometimes no estimated journey time had been given; no time 
of arrival had been indicated or route plan had not been returned after the 
journey” (European Commission, 2002b, p. 8). One example is particularly striking:
“In Castilla y León, the [C]CA had asked the local unit visited to investigate 
a particular complaint regarding checks at a collection centre for sheep. 
The reply from the local unit indicated that the veterinarians had difficulties 
in assessing the feasibility of journey times. However, returned route plans 
seen by the inspection team indicated that information was available in 
this office and indicated that the journey to Greece was usually 60 to 94 
hours and never within 28 hours as indicated on the approved route plans. 
Route plans with this unrealistic journey time had continued to be 
approved” (European Commission, 2002b, p. 8)
By accepting unrealistic route plans, Spanish authorities allow the transport of 
animals in journeys that exceed the limits imposed by EU requirements. Combined 
with systemic problems in Spain regarding the transport of unfit animals, the 
welfare of transported animals from or through Spain has been seriously 
compromised in the last decade.
Given the difficulties of coordinating the autonomous regions, Spain has been 
slow to remedy the shortcomings identified during FVO missions. In response to 
the FVO missions of 2000, 2002, and 2003 (three missions in four years covering 
the same topic is unusual for the FVO and reflects the need to follow-up on serious 
and persistent problems), the CCA has done little more than issue additional 
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guidelines. Because several regions continued to ignore these guidelines, “controls 
on the route plans and the measures to ensure their return were inadequate” 
(European Commission, 2004j, p. 9). 
The replacement of the route plan system with journey logs under Regulation 
(EC) No 1/2005 did little to alleviate these problems in Spain. The 2008 mission 
report (which visited Aragón and Castilla y León notes that “in both ACs all the 
journey logs reviewed by the FVO were unsatisfactory”, with continued problems 
regarding unrealistic journey times, overstocking, and missing information 
(European Commission, 2008i). Similar problems were noted again for other 
regions in 2009 (European Commission, 2009c). In response, Spain’s CCA has 
indicated that although instructions now exist for fourteen of the seventeen 
Autonomous Communities, “the [C]CA is waiting for the European Commission to 
draw up a simplified version of the journey log” (European Commission, 2011b, p. 
56). Thus for this issue as for many others for which Spain has experienced 
significant implementation difficulties, the deficiency remains largely unresolved. 
Infringement proceeding were launched against Spain concerning the transport 
of unfit animals. Infringement proceedings were launched in 2011 against Spain 
regarding welfare during slaughter.
Lithuania: inadequate training
Lithuania has experienced major difficulties implementing EU animal welfare 
during transport policy, largely through inadequate provision of training to both 
official veterinarians and transporters. Although a small country, animal welfare 
controls in Lithuania are relatively decentralized. There are ten county offices of 
the State Food and Veterinary Services, the central competent authority (CCA) in 
Lithuania, which are further divided into thirty-four districts and four cities 
(European Commission, 2004d). According to the country profiles (which each 
repeat the same description word for word regarding welfare during transport), 
“controls on means of transport are carried out by official veterinarians working in 
the territorial services of the CCA with the assistance of the Police, or at the 
destination by the official veterinarians supervising the slaughterhouses” 
(European Commission, 2006c).
As early as the 2003 pre-accession mission report, the FVO noted that 
inadequate training of inspectors led to some checks missing important 
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requirements (European Commission, 2003e). At this point training courses were 
provided to veterinarian officials in Lithuania by NGOs and the Technical Assistance 
Exchange Office (TAIEX) of DG Enlargement. Officials from the CCA continued to 
attend workshops organized by TAIEX on animal welfare during transport and 
slaughter in 2006. These officials then organized training courses for representatives 
from the county offices who in turn trained the official and private authorized 
veterinarians involved in transport checks (European Commission, 2007g). 
The 2007 FVO mission revealed that despite these efforts, significant problems 
persisted in welfare during transport inspections, which they still attributed to 
inadequate training. They noted that “OVs were not trained to check drivers’ record 
sheets…and this prevented them from verifying the duration of journeys” 
(European Commission, 2007g). Welfare during transport requirements verified 
by officials in slaughterhouses were similarly problematic. Because the CCA did 
not organize any training for slaughterhouse inspectors related to transport 
requirements, these officials “permitted the systematic transport of unfit animals 
for slaughter” (European Commission, 2009f ). In response to the recommendations 
by the FVO regarding inadequate training, the CCA “organized training for 
veterinarians and persons responsible for implementation of animal welfare 
requirements during transport and slaughtering of the animals” (European 
Commission, 2010b). Although the FVO considers the deficiency corrected, it is 
too soon to determine whether these efforts have led to significant improvements 
in the implementation of transport welfare requirements in Lithuania.
Slovenia: early adaptation and innovation
Despite its location at an important European crossroads, Slovenia has one of 
the best track records regarding the implementation of EU animal welfare during 
transport legislation. Its position between Italy and Austria on the one hand and 
Hungary and the rest of the Balkan Peninsula on the other has ensured its 
importance as a transit point for goods, including live animals, entering Western 
Europe from both other new member states and outside the EU (until Croatia’s 
accession in 2013). Slovenia transposed and applied EU welfare during transport 
requirements beginning in 2000, four years before it acceded to the EU. Since 
then it has maintained a well-functioning and adaptive control system to ensure 
that EU requirements are satisfactorily met.
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The Veterinary Administration of the Republic of Slovenia is the central 
competent authority (CCA) and holds responsibility for welfare during transport 
lies. Inspection tasks are divided among official veterinarians in ten regional 
offices (aided by the police if necessary) as well as official veterinarians in 
slaughterhouses who check the welfare status of animals arriving for slaughter. In 
addition to this conventional administrative structure for welfare during transport 
controls, Slovenia has a mobile unit of official veterinarians (European Commission, 
2006b). This comprises three veterinarians in a specially-equipped vehicle that 
checks vehicles during transport and at any stage of a journey. Since 2007, this 
unit has been empowered to stop vehicles without relying on cooperation with 
the police. Under the annual inspection plan, the mobile unit performs 350-400 
checks (or 2% of the estimated activity in this subsector), but this target is not 
always met.
In the two FVO missions to Slovenia dealing with animal welfare during 
transport (in 2007 and 2009), four recommendations were given concerning 
minor deficiencies spread across seven issues (including cooperation with other 
member states, checks on journey logs, and the certification of approval of 
livestock vessels). In six out of seven issues, these were deficiencies were corrected 
by Slovenia within one year of their notification. The only recommendation issued 
in the 2007 report indicated that in some cases where the mobile unit detected 
non-compliance with welfare during transport requirements by vehicles 
registered in other member states, the unit satisfactorily communicated with the 
central office but did not contact the competent authority of the other member 
state (European Commission, 2007e). The FVO mission that identified this minor 
deficiency took place from 10 to 14 September, and the 2008 country profile 
reports that action had been taken: “reports on infringements identified since 
September 2007 were sent to the competent authorities of the relevant member 
states’ Control” (European Commission, 2008c, p. 97). 
Problems identified in the 2009 mission (mainly regarding documented 
procedures and checks on journey logs) were dealt with promptly by additional 
guidance and instructions in that same year (European Commission, 2009h, 
2011a). The only issue that took more than a year to resolve involved the inspection 
and certification of third country vessels in a Slovenian port. Because Slovenian 
authorities believed that Regulation 1/2005 was not binding with respect to these 
vessels and that “international agreements with third countries are vague and not 
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applicable” (European Commission, 2009h, p. 8), the authorities did not offer a 
certificate of approval to those third country (non-EU) vessels that complied with 
the requirements of the regulation. The deficiency was corrected by Slovenia after 
consulting the Commission as to the legal requirements and involved cooperation 
with the Maritime Services to develop a new procedure for such inspections 
(European Commission, 2011a). Unlike the other issues, fixing this deficiency 
required cooperation with state actors outside the CCA.
Austria: coordinated federalism
Like Slovenia, Austria has maintained an effective and adaptive control system 
for animal welfare during transport despite its location at the intersection of 
important crossroads between Western and Eastern Europe. From 2000 to 2010 
the deficiencies in this subsector noted by the FVO were minor, and Austrian 
authorities were quick to remedy the situation, even if that involved a major 
overhaul of their approach to implementing these requirements.
Austria, like Spain, is a federal country divided into nine provinces and 
depending on the policy area, these provinces may have sole competency for 
implementing EU legislation. Unlike the subsectors of animal welfare on the farm 
or at slaughter or killing, however, the implementation of animal welfare during 
transport has always been through a system of indirect federal administration 
(European Commission, 2005a). That is, the central competent authority is at the 
federal level and has the authority to issue instructions and control plans, but 
controls are carried out by authorities at the provincial and district level (each 
province is divided into districts). By contrast, until a new federal act entered into 
force in 2005, animal welfare on farms was the sole competence of the provinces. 
Each province had its own implementing legislation, organized and carried out 
inspections in their jurisdiction and as a result, the quality of control systems 
varied from province to province (European Commission, 2000a). With the entry 
into force of the new act, the system of on farm welfare more closely resembles 
that for welfare during transport.
Another difference between this subsector and the others in Austria is that 
until March 2007, the central competent authority was not a ministry with 
veterinary expertise (like the Federal Ministry for Health and Women or BMGF). 
Transposition and implementation of animal welfare during transport was the 
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responsibility of the Federal Ministry for Traffic, Innovation and Technology 
(BMVIT). Inspections are “mainly carried out by the police, customs officers, and 
staff working at border inspection posts and specially appointed control officers” 
sometimes with the help of public veterinarians (European Commission, 2006a). 
Even after the Animal Transport Act was amended from January 2004 (in order to 
fix several major inconsistencies with EU legislation), the FVO noted that “the 
relationship between the BMGF and the BMVIT on the issue of animal welfare 
during transport is limited” (European Commission, 2005a, p. 33). The FVO 
concluded that inadequacies in the interpretation, guidance, and training with 
respect to certain EU requirements in this field were the result of this lack of 
veterinary expertise in the central competent authority (European Commission, 
2002a).
Indirect federal administration has not ensured perfect performance, however, 
though only minor implementation deficiencies have been observed by the FVO 
in Austria. In one case the regional veterinarian (acting as a federal agent for 
controlling welfare during transport) interpreted requirements incorrectly by 
considering the point of departure for journeys originating in third countries as 
the place where the journey entered the EU instead of the actual place of departure 
(European Commission, 2000a). This occurred despite assurances from the Federal 
Ministry for Traffic, Innovation and Technology that its official position was that 
the point of departure should be considered wherever the journey commenced, 
even if in a third country. Nevertheless, amendments to the legislation cleared 
this up by providing a satisfactory definition. 
Other minor deficiencies have been corrected by these amendments and the 
transfer of authority from the Federal Ministry for Traffic, Innovation and 
Technology to the Federal Ministry for Health in 2007. Although no FVO missions 
between 2002 and 2011 to Austria examined animal welfare during transport, the 
2011 report concluded that “although the CA was delayed with guidance and 
check lists regarding welfare during transport, the system of transport checks was 
largely efficient and effective enforcement actions were taken when necessary” 
(European Commission, 2011c, p. 14). The FVO issued Austrian authorities only 
one recommendation regarding welfare during transport in this report that 
concerned only minor deficiencies.
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Conclusion
The cases described here echo some of the same issues raised in relation to 
implementing on farm animal welfare policy. Mechanisms related to transposition 
are less apparent – the major directive governing the subsector was already in 
place before 2000 and was replaced by a regulation midway through the decade 
– though still present, as illustrated in the case of Spain. Formerly, each region in 
Spain transposed the welfare during transport directive. Once the regulation 
replaced the directive, it still fell on the regions in Spain to enact their own legal 
frameworks for enforcement and sanctioning in relation to this and the other 
subsectors of the policy area. Large variability among the regions with respect to 
these systems has persisted, contributing (along with other regional coordination 
mechanisms) to significant deficiencies. On the other hand, Slovenia transposed 
and applied EU requirements very early (given its accession in 2004), and by 
beginning early has been able to adapt to FVO recommendations. 
The actual level of coordination, and the degree to which central offices are 
able to supervise and control the regional offices, appear to be more important 
factors in determining the quality of implementation. The experience of Spain is 
indicative of this pattern. In Spain, the central agency has very little authority over 
the autonomous regions. The CCA offers guidelines, but the regional authorities 
can ignore them. In effect, each region is a separate set of institutions responsible 
for implementation in its territory, yet Spain as a whole is held responsible (e.g., in 
infringement proceedings) for the overall low level of implementation quality. In 
Austria on the other hand, plans are developed centrally and implemented locally. 
The other member states discussed in this chapter also have relatively few 
problems of coordination between the different levels of authority with respect 
to welfare during transport policy. Coordination likely contributes to Slovenia’s 
success, but is insufficient to ensure that Lithuania implements the requirements 
without significant deficiencies. For a small country, Lithuania’s implementation 
of animal welfare policy is relatively decentralized. Nevertheless, the FVO attributes 
many of the persistent problems in this subsector to inadequate training of 
inspectors and operators. The FVO reports do not attempt to explain why 
inadequate training remains a problem even after additional training programs 








This final case study chapter considers the implementation of EU animal 
welfare during slaughter or killing policy. The format follows that of the previous 
two chapters: an overview of the policy area introduces the requirements 
contained in EU legislation, the performance of all twenty-seven member states 
for the policy area (from 2000-2010) is compared, and four more detailed cases 
illustrate the challenges and successes of selected member states in implementing 
EU policy in this field. Relative to the other policy sectors, EU policy with respect 
to welfare during slaughter or killing remained largely unchanged during the 
period under investigation, but recurrent problems in the area have led to a major 
reform of the legislation (the first in twenty years), with the original directive 
replaced by a regulation to take effect from 1 January 2013. Recent months have 
seen significant politicization of this field as countries, including the Netherlands 
and Poland, enact bans on the ritual slaughter of animals (e.g., slaughter that 
conforms to religious requirements for Islam and Judaism) for animal welfare 
reasons. 
Overview of the policy area
An early directive in this area, dating from 1974, laid down the basic principles 
that the stunning and slaughter of animals be performed by competent individuals 
using appropriate and properly working equipment, that stunning is performed 
immediately prior to slaughter and is done so as to minimize unnecessary 
suffering, and that slaughter induces death as quickly as possible following 
stunning. Recognizing the necessity to take into account “the particular 
requirements of certain religious rites”, this directive included the very open 
statement that it did not “affect national provisions related to special methods of 
slaughter which are required for particular religious rites”. The original, very brief 
directive, provided no specifics as to the appropriate methods or equipment.
Following the agreement of the European Convention for the Protection of 
Animals for Slaughter and much scientific research into the humane treatment of 
animals during slaughter or killing that helped produce that agreement, the EEC 
replaced the 1974 slaughter directive with the much longer and more detailed 
“Council Directive 93/119 of 22 December 1993 on the protection of animals at 
the time of slaughter or killing”. Maintaining the same principle (found throughout 
EU animal welfare policy) that “animals should be spared any avoidable excitement, 
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pain or suffering”, the Directive stipulated general requirements for slaughter in 
slaughterhouses (Chapter II) and for slaughter outside of slaughterhouses (e.g., 
for animals reared for fur, slaughter for personal consumption, emergency 
slaughter, or disease control; Chapter III). Specific requirements were laid out for 
the movement and lairaging (the holding of animals at slaughterhouses prior to 
their slaughter) of animals in slaughterhouses (Annex A), the restraint of animals 
prior to stunning (Annex B), the stunning or killing of animals other than those 
raised for fur (Annex C), the bleeding of animals (Annex D), killing methods for 
disease control (Annex E), and methods for killing fur animals (Annex G). Most 
importantly, Annexes C and F contained a limited list of permitted methods for 
killing and detailed the requirements and equipment necessary for carrying out 
each. In order to allow the legislation to adapt to technological changes in 
slaughter methods and scientific advancement in the understanding of animal 
welfare, the Scientific Veterinary Committee could advance proposals for the 
legislation’s amendment.
In relation to ritual slaughter, the Directive states (in greater specificity than 
the 1974 Directive it replaced) that in these cases the requirement that animals 
“be stunned or killed instantaneously in accordance with the provisions of Annex 
C” shall not apply. Moreover, the religious authority for whom ritual slaughter is 
carried out shall act as competent authority for applying and monitoring the 
provisions applicable to ritual slaughter, though they are to act under the 
responsibility of the official veterinarian. This provision potentially affords religious 
authorities considerable autonomy and discretion with respect to animal welfare 
during ritual slaughter.
Regarding the inspection and reporting obligations for the member states, 
these are less stringent than those in the fields of welfare during transport or on 
farm welfare. Like in those, the member state competent authority must carry out 
inspections and controls, but the legislation is silent with respect to enforcement. 
Whereas the welfare during transport Directive contained an entire article 
dedicated to this subject, and the regulation that replaced it obligated the 
member states to draw up national legislation regarding penalties for non-
compliance, the slaughter directive contains no reference to steps to be taken 
should non-compliance be detected by the competent authorities during the 
inspections and controls they are to carry out. Similarly, while both welfare on 
farm and welfare during transport legislation required that member states report 
132
Chapter 8
to the Commission on the results of their inspections from the start (and these 
requirements have become increasingly specific over the years), the slaughter 
directive contains no reporting requirements for the member states. As in the 
other areas, however, inspectors from the Commission (and thus the FVO) may 
inspect member state application of the legislation in this area.
In the preamble to the “Council Regulation (EC) No 1099/2009 of 24 September 
2009 on the protection of animals at the time of killing” (which replaces the 
welfare during slaughter directive of 1993), one citation notes that “large 
discrepancies have been observed between the Member States in implementing 
that Directive and major welfare concerns and differences susceptible to affect 
competitiveness between business operators have been pointed out”. In addition 
to adapting the specific requirements for stunning, slaughter, and other 
slaughterhouse procedures to scientific and technological changes, the new 2009 
regulation (which does not form part of the subsequent analysis) fills some of the 
gaps noted in the Directive mentioned in the previous paragraph. Mirroring the 
transport regulation, the welfare during slaughter regulation requires member 
states to draw up penalties for non-compliance and more detailed requirements 
are stipulated regarding monitoring and enforcement. Reporting obligations, 
however, have not been extended to this sector. The derogation for ritual slaughter 
has been maintained, but now may only be applied as long as the animal is 
slaughtered in a slaughterhouse. A final provision allows member states to 
maintain more stringent national rules to ensure “more extensive protection”, and 
cites ritual slaughter as one field in which this is permitted, but forbids member 
states with stricter provisions from prohibiting the sale of animal products 
obtained from animals killed in accordance with the less stringent requirements 
contained in the regulation. 
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The implementation of animal welfare at slaughter or killing policy in 27 
Member States
Figure 6: Deficiency in the implementation of at slaughter or killing animal welfare in 27 
member states, by level of deficiency
Similar to those in the previous two chapters, Figure 6 provides an overview of 
the application of welfare during slaughter or killing policy in the member states. 
As before, the figure shows the total score (the sum of the individual scores for 
each of the eleven issues in this subsector) for each member state and the 
contribution to that score from minor (scores of 1) and major deficiencies (scores 
of 2), respectively. Given the number of issues, the maximum score is twenty two. 
Countries are ordered from left to right in order of performance (with the worst 
performers on the left).
 The average score across all member states is approximately six with a 
standard deviation of 4.2. Poor performing countries (those whose score exceeds 
the average by more than one standard deviation) include Spain, Greece, Malta, 
and Belgium. Well performing countries (here referring to those countries with a 

























































Case study of welfare during slaughter or killing
A cross-issue perspective is given in Figure 7. As with on farm and during 
transport animal welfare policy, each issue experienced some implementation 
difficulty by one or more member states. The issue that created the most difficulties 
for the member states concerned stunning and killing procedures. This had a total 
score of thirty-two. Other problematic issues include requirements for spare 
stunning equipment (29), requirements for lairaging of animals (24), and the 
sparing of avoidable excitement, pain or suffering (23). 
Case selection
The case selection procedure follows the same principle as in the other 
chapters, with one innovation. Until now I have generally avoided repetition and 
have sought to balance countries with few deficiencies with countries that have 
many deficiencies. Here, instead of including two relatively high performers, I 
include a country that was a high performer in a case described previously but 
has an average level of implementation for at slaughter or killing. Thus I have 
chosen Sweden as the country with few implementation problems (its score of 
two is among the lowest). For countries experiencing significant problems in 
implementing welfare during slaughter or killing policy, I have selected Greece 
(whose score of 15 is lower than that of Spain, which has been covered in the 
previous chapter) and Malta, the new member state with the highest score. For 
the fourth case, I have selected Slovakia, which although covered in a previous 
chapter, is included here because successfully adapted its welfare during slaughter 
or killing implementation in a short amount of time. This selection also has the 
advantage of contrasting one member state (Sweden) that has consistently 
applied most animal welfare policies against another (Greece) that has been a 
major laggard in this field, failing to adapt its policies to be in compliance. Another 
contrast can be made between two new member states, one that has more 
quickly adapted to EU requirements (Slovakia) while the other has also been 
successful if slightly slower (Malta).
Sweden: an animal welfare leader
The implementation of welfare slaughter policy in Sweden takes place within 
the context of a set of animal welfare regulations that are similarly strict as those 
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of its northern neighbors (Norway, Denmark, and Finland). Although the rules 
differ somewhat across each of these countries, they each go beyond EU 
requirements in several ways and, in the case of Sweden, have a longer history. 
For example, a ban on conventional cages for laying hens was first announced in 
1988 and following a transition period that lasted until 2005 (seven years before 
the EU deadline), less than 2% of hens were kept in battery cages. Regarding 
welfare during slaughter and like Switzerland, Norway, and Iceland, Sweden has a 
complete ban on the slaughter (or killing for any other reason) of any animal 
(except fish) without prior stunning. This rule effectively bans ritual slaughter and 
has existed in the country in some form since 1937. Additionally, more stringent 
requirements in Sweden include the immediate availability of backup stunning 
equipment at the place of stunning and mandatory bedding for animals kept 
overnight at the slaughterhouse. 
In contrast to on farm or during transport welfare policy, the activities regulated 
by welfare during slaughter or killing take place in government approved facilities 
where official veterinarians apply and monitor welfare and other veterinary 
regulations. Although a veterinarian must be present in slaughterhouses, this 
does not ensure that all rules are being properly applied. These veterinarians must 
be kept up-to-date on the latest requirements and must be periodically monitored 
to ensure that they check all requirements correctly and apply appropriate 
sanctions when necessary. In Sweden, supervisory authority has until only recently 
been in the hands of 290 municipalities, with varying resources and commitment 
to enforcing welfare legislation. Administrative arrangements for the application 
of welfare during slaughter policy have overcome the complexities of coordinating 
the supervision activities of municipalities through administrative adaptation, 
effective auditing, and the dedication of sufficient resources to training activities. 
In the beginning of the period under investigation, central responsibility for 
coordinating animal welfare policy lay with the Swedish Board of Agriculture’s 
Department for Animal Production and Health, Animal Welfare Division. Prior to 
reorganization, the central authority had no authority over regional and local 
authorities but did convene a supervisory group five times per year to coordinate 
enforcement. Veterinary inspectors (VIs) operating in slaughterhouses are 
monitored periodically by the animal welfare inspector from their municipality, 
and the activities of these in turn are coordinated by the county. During this 
period, the FVO noted that although “in general VI’s were motivated to supervise 
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animal welfare issues”, the “high discretion for the VI…results in enforcement 
action not always being sufficient to ensure compliance.” The conclusion goes on 
to cite the “variable level of supervision of [animal welfare inspectors] by the 
[County Administrative Board]” as a contributing factor. 
Facing public pressure from vocal animal welfare interest groups in Sweden to 
improve the situation, the government moved central responsibility for 
implementation from the Swedish Board of Agriculture to a separate Animal 
Welfare Agency tasked with ensuring more uniform application beginning in 
2004. This short-lived agency had the authority to issue binding regulations to the 
municipalities and County Administrative Boards concerning their inspection 
programs, but it could not complete its aim of achieving greater uniformity before 
the newly elected government eliminated it in 2007 and transferred its 
responsibilities back to the Swedish Board of Agriculture. Still, the drive towards 
centralization and uniform controls continued. For on farm and during transport 
welfare, responsibility was transferred completely from the municipalities to the 
County Administrative Boards. This transfer was accompanied by a comprehensive 
audit of these authorities’ inspection programs. For welfare during slaughter or 
killing, centralization was complete when municipal and county inspectors were 
replaced by official veterinarians employed by the National Food Administration 
from 2008. No recommendations regarding welfare during slaughter have been 
issued to Sweden since 2003, and no outstanding recommendations existed by 
the time of the 2009 country report. This report also noted the extensive training 
programs in place for the full-time inspectors of the National Food Administration 
and part-time slaughterhouse official veterinarians.
Slovakia: responsiveness in a new Member State
The implementation of animal welfare during slaughter or killing policy in 
Slovakia has been marked by effective enforcement mechanisms and a willingness 
to remedy detected shortcomings as often as necessary to achieve a well-
functioning system. As early as 2004, the year in which Slovakia acceded to the EU 
and one year after it began applying EU animal welfare regulations, the FVO 
concluded that Slovakia had already “set up a reasonable system of control for 
animal welfare” (European Commission, 2004e, p. 9). Of the eight recommendations 
issued to the country in this first post-accession mission (which covered all three 
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sectors), only one concerned welfare during slaughter. The main shortcoming 
detected, an insufficient level of training and monitoring to ensure that all 
requirements are adequately checked by veterinary inspectors, affected on farm 
and during transport welfare as well. As documented below, training programs 
were frequently readjusted to achieve satisfactory controls. Meanwhile, the 
enforcement mechanisms in place and the comprehensive monitoring within 
slaughterhouses compensated somewhat for the shortcomings in training.
Responsibility for animal welfare controls in Slovakia lies with the State 
Veterinary and Food Administration within the Ministry of Agriculture. This 
administration is divided into eight regional administrations which are further 
divided into forty district administrations. Over the time period investigated, no 
significant administrative changes occurred with respect to animal welfare 
controls. As mentioned above, EU animal welfare directives were transposed and 
went into effect in Slovakia in 2003. The first FVO report notes that Slovakian 
legislation is “often more specific than EU requirements on which it is based” and 
that these interpretations “are useful for its practical implementation” (European 
Commission, 2004e, pp. 2, 8). For welfare during slaughter, these interpretations 
include the precise positions for stunning devices and the maximum stun to stick 
times (the time between stunning and the cutting of the throat meant to kill) for 
each method and each species of animal.
On the ground, the monitoring and enforcement system is intensive and 
involves fewer levels of authority than in other countries. Official veterinarians 
from the district veterinary administrations (and in some cases authorized private 
veterinarians) monitor animal welfare and other veterinary requirements in 
slaughterhouses and “are permanently present while the plant is in operation” 
(European Commission, 2008h, p. 10). These official veterinarians are afforded 
considerable discretion and authority. Upon detecting violations of the law, they 
may impose immediate corrective actions and may also “initiate infringement 
proceedings and impose fines on a natural person up to circa [EUR] 1300 and up 
to circa [EUR] 33 300 on a legal entity” (European Commission, 2008h, p. 38). 
Already in 2004, “deficiencies such as the lack of drinking facilities, inadequate 
stunning equipment and backup had been followed-up and corrected” (European 
Commission, 2004e, p. 7). Of the nine non-compliances detected in 2007, “three 
were corrected on the spot, whereas in six cases administrative proceedings had 
been initiated” (European Commission, 2008h, p. 39).
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In some cases, however, official veterinary inspectors failed to detect violations 
of welfare during slaughter rules. Since its first post-accession mission to Slovakia 
in 2004, the FVO has attributed such shortcomings to the inadequate training 
system in place for inspectors (European Commission, 2004e). At that time, 
training had been provided to at least one official in each district, but private 
practitioners were excluded and training materials were based on US systems, 
which was unusual for Slovakia. One veterinary inspector who attended the 
training failed to identify significant deficiencies regarding stunning practices in 
one slaughterhouse. In response to FVO recommendations issued during this 
mission, Slovak authorities stepped up their training efforts and provided 
additional training sessions between 2004 and 2007 (European Commission, 
2007b). Training responsibilities were transferred from the central level to the 
districts and outside experts were brought in from NGOs and abroad. Still in 2008, 
the FVO concluded that “training and guidance for [official veterinarians] working 
in slaughterhouses were insufficient” (European Commission, 2008g, p. 10). The 
administration responded promptly by enrolling all veterinary inspectors in a 
nine session training program and the FVO consequently closed its 
recommendations concerning this issue (European Commission, 2010c).
Malta: constraints from administrative capacity
The example of Malta shows a small country adapting EU animal welfare 
during slaughter requirements through frequent readjustments despite financial 
constraints and staff shortages. Between the FVO’s pre-accession mission in 2003 
and the latest mission covering this subsector in 2009, Maltese authorities have 
reduced significant problems in this area, though some issues remain. The precise 
hierarchy and names of organizational units changed frequently in this period. 
Prior to accession, implementation of animal welfare laws was the responsibility 
of the Food and Veterinary Regulatory Division of the Ministry of Rural Affairs and 
Environment. By 2006, this division was merged with that of fisheries to become 
the Veterinary Affairs and Fisheries Division. In 2008, additional levels of hierarchy 
were created within this division (now within the renamed Ministry of Resources 
and Rural Affairs). These changes may have had little significance during this 
period, however, as the 2006, 2008 and 2009 country profiles all note in the 
description of the overall distribution of responsibilities that because of “the small 
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scale of the services, the offices at central level are responsible not only for policy 
and co-ordination but also for direct implementation of controls” (European 
Commission, 2009b, p. 7). Additionally, given its small size, there are no regional 
divisions in the administration.
Problems identified in FVO missions have been generally addressed, subject to 
resource constraints. Prior to accession, the FVO observed that there were two red 
meat and eleven poultry slaughterhouses with a single official veterinarian 
responsible for controls (European Commission, 2003f ). By 2006, there was only 
one red meat slaughterhouse which was then government-owned and under 
permanent supervision by the administration (European Commission, 2006j). 
Four veterinarians were recruited for supervising various other food establishments, 
including the now nine poultry slaughterhouses. Despite government control of 
the country’s only slaughterhouse, significant problems in welfare during 
slaughter were observed. These included both structural deficiencies in the layout 
and equipment at the slaughterhouse and incorrectly applied slaughterhouse 
procedures. Following the FVO mission, both issues were promptly resolved, with 
the administration providing the FVO with a detailed account of the actions taken 
to fix the situation. Slaughterhouse reconstruction and training of operators were 
both completed in 2007.
 By the 2009, the FVO concluded that “controls at slaughterhouses have 
been sufficient to identify the most significant deficiencies” (European Commission, 
2009b, p. 9), but, at the same time, noted additional shortcomings in Malta’s 
application of this legislation. In particular, the FVO noted that “enforcement 
action has often been lacking in relation to the operational deficiencies and the 
food business operator, in this case another part of the same Ministry, has not 
responded to many requests for corrective actions” (European Commission, 
2009b). In response to this mission, the country committed itself to developing “a 
more effective system of actions that will ensure that deficiencies detected shall 
be corrected” (European Commission, 2009b). A country report of the same year, 
however, describes staff shortages and the “lack of specialists in certain fields”, 
which it cites as particularly acute in the Ministry for Resources and Rural Affairs. 
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Greece: unable or unwilling? Or, how much suffering went into that souv-
laki?
The situation in Greece with respect to implementing animal welfare during 
slaughter policy represents the one of the lowest levels of compliance with EU 
requirements observed by the FVO from 2000 to 2010. Greece experienced 
considerable difficulties implementing on farm and during transport welfare 
policies, but the focus of this discussion will be on slaughter policy. Not only did 
significant welfare problems persist in Greek slaughterhouses during this period 
(and still continue), but inspection and sanctioning systems achieved very little 
improvements. While attempting to deflect blame for the problem onto staff 
shortages, which did exist during the time, low levels of recruitment cannot by 
themselves explain the observed outcomes. In addition to staffing issues, low 
administrative will, combined with decentralized authority, have rendered the 
situation abysmal and have stalled improvements, despite ongoing EU 
infringement proceedings against the country in this field.
The monitoring of the situation in Greece by the FVO and its predecessor has a 
history stretching beyond the period under investigation here, but some mention 
must be made of these earlier missions. Missions were sent to observe the 
situation in slaughterhouses and with respect to welfare during transport in 1995, 
1996, and 1998, and each time major deficiencies in stunning practices were 
noted with no progress being made to fix the situation (European Commission, 
2000b). As a result, infringement proceedings were initiated against the country 
in 1999. This frequency of missions by the FVO to the country continued in the 
following decade, with FVO inspectors continually looking for improvements and 
finding few (or in one case, being unable to complete their mission objectives). 
Thus there were missions again in 2000, two in 2003, 2004, 2006, and missions 
related to other veterinary activities observed the situation with respect to welfare 
during slaughter in 2007, 2008, and 2009. This latest mission concluded that “the 
recommendation to respect animal welfare conditions at the time of slaughter or 
killing has not been satisfactorily addressed and the situation as regards animal 
welfare at slaughter was found to be largely unsatisfactory” (European Commission, 
2009e, p. 15).
The highly decentralized character of Greek administration in this field played 
an important role in shaping the ineffectiveness of the control system. The central 
level consists of the Directorate for Veterinary Inspection and Control (once the 
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General Veterinary Directorate) within the Ministry of Agriculture. This level issues 
guidelines and checklists for control programs, but the regional and local levels 
have principal authority for carrying out controls and imposing sanctions. The 
country is divided into 54 prefectures, each with their own Directorate of Veterinary 
Services and these are further divided into 347 rural offices (of which only 250 
were actually operating in 2000) (European Commission, 2000b). Official 
veterinarians in these district and local offices carry out controls in the country’s 
232 slaughterhouses, primarily on a monthly basis (as compared to the permanent 
presence of official veterinarians in slaughterhouses in the countries described 
above). Because the local authorities are under the budgetary control of the 
prefects, any personnel or major enforcement-related decisions must be approved 
not by the Ministry of Agriculture, but by the Ministry of Interior. The central 
authority committed the prefects to re-inspect all slaughterhouses by 2001, but 
by 2006 only 38 of the 54 prefectures had done so (European Commission, 2006h). 
Veterinary officials in these prefectures found deficiencies in 29 slaughterhouses 
but only in one were sanctions attempted (higher level officials in the prefecture 
dismissed these sanctions). Regarding actual controls, in 2000, the FVO found no 
evidence that controls were actually carried out (European Commission, 2000b). 
By 2006, some prefectures had control systems in place, but the FVO concluded 
observed “some local CAs providing a completely unacceptable level of control” 
(European Commission, 2000b, p. 16).
Staffing shortages contributed to this situation. In the General Veterinary 
Directorate, there were between one and two persons with responsibility for 
animal welfare issues, with most of their attention being devoted to Greece’s stray 
dog problem (European Commission, 2005b). Officials in the prefectures explained 
to FVO inspectors that it is difficult for them to receive approval for hiring new 
recruits and that “even if posts were available, the monthly salary for a recently 
qualified veterinarian recruited to the official services is not attractive in 
comparison with earnings in private practices” (European Commission, 2003a, p. 
6). This in itself likely contributes to a major conflict of interest observed later by 
the FVO concerning “direct payment by the owner of the animals to the veterinarian 
for providing inspection services at slaughterhouses outside working hours” 
(European Commission, 2006h, p. 16). Nevertheless, the FVO concluded that 
“although staffing levels are a problem, this does not account for the overall level 
of ineffectiveness of the control system” (European Commission, 2006h).
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Instead, a decisive factor seems to be a lack of administrative will, primarily 
demonstrated by the lack of cooperation the competent authority has given the 
FVO in conducting its missions. Following the mission in 2000 (which itself was 
conducted in order to evaluate the steps taken since the 1998 mission), a mission 
was planned for 2003 for additional follow-up. Four slaughterhouses were to be 
visited by FVO inspectors as part of this mission, but official veterinarians abstained 
from their duties during these visits. According to the FVO report, “no 
slaughterhouse was operational after the first day of the mission and according to 
the Greek authorities this was the situation throughout Greece” (European 
Commission, 2003c, p. 4). As a result, the FVO inspection team was unable to 
evaluate whether any progress had been made and whether commitments made 
by Greece since the last mission were respected. During an FVO mission three 
years later, the FVO report notes that “official veterinarians when asked direct 
questions referring to the slaughterhouse within their responsibility were 
prevented by the Director of the Veterinary Service from giving a direct reply” 
(European Commission, 2006h). At the same time, conditions in slaughterhouses 
improved very little during this period with few assurances provided that the 
situation would improve.
Conclusion
In this final case study chapter I examined the implementation of welfare at 
slaughter or killing welfare policy in the EU by way of general cross-national 
patterns and specific case studies of its implementation in Sweden, Slovakia, 
Malta, and Greece. This subsector differs from the others in that trained 
veterinarians (whether official or private) are nearly always present in the 
establishments subject to the regulation. Despite the possibility of constant 
monitoring by trained professionals, the quality of implementation in this field 
remains varied like in the others. This variability persists despite the legislation 
undergoing no changes in the period under investigation (nor for several years 
before).
The two old member states come from opposite ends of the spectrum in terms 
of their implementation record for animal welfare policy. While Sweden, along 
with its neighbors, has long been a leader in the field, Greece exhibited one of the 
poorest implementation efforts of all the countries in all three of the subsectors. 
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Malta and Slovakia also present a contrast. Both are new member states, and both 
have a relatively centralized administration for implementing farm animal welfare 
policy, but Slovakia has had the administrative capacity to adapt to the changes 
demanded by EU legislation and respond to FVO recommendations. The smaller 
size of Malta and its lower capacity has meant that adaptations there have been 
slower. 
Some of the factors described in the previous chapters, namely the degree of 
coordination between the different levels of authority, reappear here. This is 
especially the case with respect to Sweden (where a lack of coordination became 
the focus of public attention, leading to improvements in an already well-
functioning system) and Greece (where major decisions affecting the operation of 
veterinary inspectors are controlled by an outside ministry). The effect of 
inadequate training of officials on implementation quality also reappears here, 
this time with respect to Slovakia. The root cause of inadequate training, whether 
a lack of will or capacity, is not speculated upon in the FVO reports.
Nevertheless, willingness and capacity to implement the requirements do 
emerge again as factors that the FVO cites as being important for the 
implementation outcomes observed. Distinguishing between the two can be 
difficult. Maltese authorities appear to face significant constraints on their ability 
to implement these requirements, given the small size of the country, and the 
FVO is ready to take these claims at face value. Greek authorities, on the other 
hand, who may also face considerable resource constraints, cannot use this 
defense so easily. The FVO argues in one case that inadequate staffing is an 
insufficient explanation for this poor performance, implying that a simple lack of 
will on the part of authorities also undermines implementation. Claims about the 
absence of will (let alone its causal effect), however, are difficult to substantiate. 
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CHAPTER 9
Analyzing the Effects of Adaptation 




In this part of the thesis (chapters 9 and 10) I return to the four hypotheses 
advanced in the theory chapter and subject them to a series of quantitative anal-
yses. Below is a review of the hypotheses:
H1: Each additional source of adaptation pressure (regardless of its origins in 
amendments, specifications, or phased-in requirements) increases the 
likelihood of implementation difficulty.
H2A: As the amount of adaptation pressure increases, discretion decreases the 
likelihood of implementation difficulty.
H2B: In the absence of discretion, adaptation pressure increases the likelihood 
of implementation difficulty. 
H3A: As the number of actors responsible for transposition increases, the 
likelihood of implementation difficulty increases.
H3B: As the number of actors horizontally coordinating implementation 
increases, the likelihood of implementation difficulty increases.
H3C: As the number of geographic divisions within the central competent 
authority increases, the likelihood of implementation difficulty increases.
H3D: The decentralization of implementation authority from the central office 
to regional offices increases the likelihood of implementation difficulty.
H4: The greater the delay in transposing EU legislation, the greater the 
likelihood of implementation difficulty.
The previous chapters looked at the implementation of animal welfare 
regulations in the member states by exploring general cross-national patterns 
and more specific instances of their application in particular member states. 
Although some cross-issue differences were described (primarily in the 
introduction to each case study chapter), the case studies investigated 
implementation from a policy-within-country perspective for each of the three 
policy subsectors that make up farm animal welfare policy in the EU. Recall from 
the discussion of units of analysis in Chapter 5 that within a policy subsector (itself 
constituted by one or more pieces of legislation), a number of issues define norms 
that member states must adhere to and enforce in their territories. In this chapter, 
issue-level influences on implementation quality will be brought to the front and 
national-level factors will be put aside. The systematic analysis of cross-issue 
differences will reveal patterns that, while supported by evidence from the case 
studies, do not emerge directly from the descriptions of implementation success 
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and failure in those chapters. A premise of this chapter is that some issues may be 
more difficult for member states to apply than others according to characteristics 
of the issues themselves rather than the countries that implement them. The two 
issue-level factors considered here are the degree of adaptation required by an 
issue (independent of national circumstances) and whether an issue delegates 
substantial discretion to the member state. Although these analyses will be 
replicated in the following chapter when issues within countries form the unit of 
analysis, a separate issues-only chapter is presented because the analyses used 
here are more parsimonious and as a result rely on simpler and more easily 
interpretable methods (negative binomial regression in place of multinomial 
logistic regression).
Measuring dynamic adaptation
The theory chapter introduced three sources of policy-level dynamic 
adaptation pressure: sources of adaptation pressure that originate in the phasing 
in of requirements over time, adaptation pressure introduced by amendments to 
EU legislation, and pressure introduced by further specifying particular 
requirements in greater detail. They are called policy-level here to distinguish 
them from the national-level adaptation pressures or sources of ‘misfit’ that 
scholars have applied widely in this field already, even though I apply them here 
in an issues-level analysis (as described above, issues are simply the building 
blocks of policy). They are dynamic in the sense that their impact is felt not as an 
instantaneous burst of pressure (resulting from misfit) that makes implementation 
more difficult but rather they force member states to adapt multiple times over 
the course of implementing a policy. Some of these adaptations are completely 
anticipated, as in requirements that are phased in or partially anticipated, such as 
when legislation stipulates that the details of some requirements may be specified 
later. Others are not easily foreseen, as when requirements are modified in 
amendments to existing legislation.
Three count variables were constructed to indicate the number of amendment 
adaptation points, specification adaptation points, and phased in adaptation 
points, respectively, for each of the seventy-six issues. Each issue was coded 
individually through a careful reading of the legislative texts and care was taken 
to limit adaptation pressure points to those that introduced changes only within 
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the ten year period of investigation. Thus amendments were included only if their 
entry into force date occurred between 2000 and 2010 (even if the legislation was 
agreed prior to 2000). The same principle applies to specification adaptation 
points. Phased in requirements were included only if their effective date occurred 
in this period. Thus, for example, the well-known phase-out of battery cages that 
went into effect in 2012 is not included in the count of phased-in adaptation 
points for the issue “provisions applicable to rearing hens in unenriched cage 
systems” (battery cages). Each adaptation pressure point is a date from which new 
changes are introduced, thus if multiple requirements are modified or several 
additional requirements enter into effect from a certain date they will not be 
counted separately.
The number of additional adaptation pressure points are counted against the 
baseline policy in effect for that issue at the beginning of 2000, whether those 
requirements were newly in force that year or had been in force for several, or 
sometime after 2000 if no requirements existed for that issue. As an example of 
the former, Commission Decision 97/182/EC of 24 February 1997 amended the 
Annex to Directive 91/629/EEC (the calves directive) thus modifying several 
general provisions for rearing calves and introducing additional ones. These 
alterations came into force beginning 1 January 1998. No other modifications in 
this area occurred between 1998 and 2000, so the baseline for that issue is defined 
by those requirements in force from 1 January 1998. As it happens, no modifications 
with respect to this issue occurred between 2000 and 2010 either, so this issue 
experienced no adaptation pressure points of any kind for the period under 
investigation here, and receives a score of zero for each of the adaptation pressure 
point variables. As an example of the latter case, Article 4 of the laying hens 
directive introduces requirements for rearing hens in alternative (i.e., non-cage) 
systems that go into force from 1 January 2002 for “all newly built or rebuilt 
systems of production referred to in this chapter and all such systems of production 
brought into use for the first time”. Prior to this date there were no EU requirements 
for such systems, so the baseline for that issue begins at this time, and any 
adaptation pressure points are counted from then. For this issue, there was one 
phased-in requirement between 2002 and 2010 (see below), thus it receives a 
score of 1 for the phased-in requirements variable and a score of zero for the other 
two adaptation pressure variables.
The first source of adaptation pressure, phased-in requirements, are the easiest 
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to identify, as nearly every reference to a date following the legislation’s entry into 
force date indicates this phenomenon. Exceptions include dates with procedural 
implications like entry into force dates, the requirement for a review of the 
legislation after a certain time, or periodic reporting obligations beginning from a 
certain date. To continue the previous example from the issue containing 
provisions for rearing hens in alternative systems beginning in 2002, the second 
paragraph of that article states that “Member States shall ensure that the 
requirements laid down in paragraph 1 apply to all alternative systems from 1 
January 2007”. Thus these requirements are phased in for existing non-cage 
systems that have been brought into use before 2002 after a five year transition 
period. Of the seventy-six issues, sixty-eight had zero phased in requirements, six 
had one and two had two phased in requirements.
Amendments and specifications take some extra effort to identify (as they 
originate outside the original legislative text), and in some cases it is also difficult 
to distinguish them from phased in requirements (as amendments and 
specifications may involve additional phased in requirements beyond those 
immediately introduced). Identifying amendment adaptation points, the second 
source of adaptation pressure, requires a comparison between the texts of the 
original legislation and any amending legislation. The EUR-LEX database contains 
a page for each piece of legislation and contains links to any amending legislation. 
To identify amendment adaptation points it is necessary to read through 
amending legislation to determine whether and when changes are made to the 
articles that define each of the issues and thereby introduce new requirements or 
modify existing ones. Thus an example of an amendment adaptation point would 
be Council Directive 2001/88/EC of 23 October 2001 which amends Directive 
91/630/EEC (the pigs directive) by introducing additional requirements for the 
construction of pig holding systems. Note that amending legislation may 
introduce new issues and thereby establish a baseline for any newly introduced 
issue. For example, Council Directive 2001/88/EC inserted a new article into 
Council Directive 91/630/EEC containing requirements for instructions, guidance 
and training courses for individuals who care for pigs on farms. Prior to this 
amendment, no requirements specific requirements existed for this issue and 
hence the issue was introduced only when this amendment went into effect. 
For animal welfare during transport policy the task of distinguishing new 
issues from amended ones was complicated by the replacement of the directive 
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with a regulation in which the text defining issues was rearranged and many new 
issues were introduced (see Appendix B for the correspondence table). A careful 
comparison of the two texts reveals that while several new issues were introduced 
(those for which “NA” appears in the column that notes the source in the old 
legislative text for that issue), virtually no issues that were carried over were left 
unchanged (except for space allowances for animals during transport), and no 
issues were deregulated. Thus all issues but one (space allowances) in this 
subsector for which some policy existed under Directive 91/628/EEC experienced 
one amendment adaptation pressure point as a result of the replacement of this 
directive by Council Regulation (EC) 1/2005. Twenty-five or roughly one-third of 
the seventy-six issues were amended in the ten year period that is the subject of 
this dissertation. 
The third source of adaptation pressure, instances where additional legislation 
specifies in greater detail the requirements of existing legislation, can come from 
one of two sources. They may come from specific implementing legislation, as in 
Commission Directive 2002/4/EC of 30 January 2002 on the registration of 
establishments keeping laying hens, which specifies in greater detail the 
requirements for egg labeling that were first introduced in Article 7 of the laying 
hens directive of 1999. Identifying the issue affected in these cases is 
straightforward as the relevant part of the original legislation is directly referred 
to. Alternatively, they may come from horizontal legislation that affects all 
subsectors in the policy area (as in the reporting and inspection requirements 
introduced and amended by Commission Decisions 2000/50/EC and 2006/778/
EC, respectively) or that affect multiple policy areas (as in Regulation (EC) No 
882/2004, which regulates the performance of official controls for feed and food 
law, animal health, and animal welfare). In these cases, it is necessary to determine 
which issues are affected by the horizontal legislation through a careful reading of 
both the horizontal legislation and the non-horizontal legislation for which it 
specifies requirements. The distribution of specified pressure points is similar to 
that of phased in points: sixty-seven had zero specifications, six had one, and 
three had two specifications.
One final note regarding specification and amendment adaptation pressure 
points concerns the sometimes blurry line between these on the one hand, and 
phased in requirements, on the other. Both amendments and specifications do 
not always alter an issue from one moment only. They may themselves phase in 
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requirements, so that some changes are introduced when the amendments first 
enter into force while others are introduced later. On the one hand, relative to the 
original policy, these are all amendments as they were not part of the original 
legislation. On the other hand, they are phased in over time and thus may indicate 
difficult issues to implement immediately. Because the latter notion is more 
informative, I have chosen to consider any additional requirements introduced by 
amending and specifying legislation beyond the entry into force date as phased-
in requirements. Thus each piece of legislation of either kind can have at most one 
adaptation pressure point per issue. In these seventy-six issues, forty-four did not 
change during between 2000 and 2010 (and thus had one norm state, a concept 
discussed in the next paragraph). Of the remainder, nineteen experienced two 
norm states, twelve had three, and a single issue had four norm states.
As noted in the previous paragraph, the line between different types of 
adaptation pressure points cannot always be easily drawn. Because of this, I have 
also constructed an additional variable to measure this concept that makes no 
distinction between the different types I have identified above. For each issue, I 
identify the number of “norm states” in force between 2000 and 2010. The phasing 
in of a new requirement or the modification or specification of existing 
requirements shifts an issue from one norm state to another. For each issue there 
is at least one norm state – that which is in effect in the beginning of 2000. The 
number of norm states for an issue is simply the number of phase-ins, specifications, 
or amendments plus one. This variable will be used to test the same basic 
theoretical argument, that policy-driven adaptation pressure makes implementing 
an issue difficult, all things equal. Constructing it requires fewer difficult decisions, 
but using it prevents us from seeing how different types of adaptation pressure 
points affect implementation. Thus the analyses that follow will consider both 
separately.
Measuring discretion
In order to explore the relationship between discretion granted to the member 
states and implementation, I have adapted for the issue-level the delegation ratio 
following Franchino’s adaptation of Epstein and O’Halloran’s own discretion ratio 
(Epstein & O’Halloran, 1999; Franchino, 2001, 2004). This approach counts the 
major provisions in each piece of legislation and the discretion ratio is a function 
154
Chapter 9
of the proportion of those major provisions that delegate authority. It is calculated 
for the entire piece of legislation. I modify this approach to indicate the presence 
of discretion at the issue-level and only at this level. Like in Franchino’s adaptation, 
I indicate for each issue whether the provisions of that issue delegate authority, 
but I stop there and do not construct any index based on this indication. It is thus 
a dummy variable for each issue rather than a proportion for the whole policy and 
indicates whether delegation has been granted (in which case discretion exists). 
Although authority can be delegated to either the member states or the 
Commission under Franchino’s system, I consider only those issues containing 
provisions that delegate authority to the member states as relevant for testing the 
arguments set forth in the theory chapter. It is the member states that must adapt 
to the pressures of EU policy and only the delegation of authority to them matters 
for how well they adapt. For these seventy-six issues, thirty delegated authority to 
the member states.
Control variables
Two control variables are included in the subsequent analyses. The first is a 
dummy variable indicating whether an issue is one that appeared for the first 
time in the period under investigation. As mentioned above, the new transportation 
regulation, which entered into force at the beginning of 2007, introduced several 
(ten in fact) new issues into animal welfare during transport policy in the EU. The 
novelty of these issues means that implementing them may have been difficult 
for the member states. Such an effect is conceptually different from adaptation 
pressure points, which arise from an existing policy issue and influence 
implementation over the course of a long period of time.
The second control variable is a dummy variable for the issues from the 
horizontal regulation concerning official controls. Although the regulation went 
into force from 2006, the issues contained therein are “horizontal” issues in the 
sense that they are an implicit (and in many cases, explicit) part of implementing 
all other policies in the field of on farm animal welfare (and beyond). Despite not 
having a single legal source before the promulgation of the regulation, the FVO 
commented on and gave recommendations concerning many of the issues that 
the horizontal regulation later legislated. They came part and parcel with violations 
of other legislation in this field. When such issues persisted in member states after 
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the horizontal regulation went into effect, the FVO repeated these 
recommendations and at this point included references to the regulation in their 
recommendations. Because these are horizontal in nature, and because they are 
somewhat novel in the sense that specific legal text was elaborated them 
beginning in 2006, these issues may behave differently with respect to influencing 
implementation or with respect to the effects of the theoretical variables.
Dependent variables
Chapter 5 introduced the scheme used to code implementation quality for the 
seventy six issues across the twenty seven member states. The reader will recall 
that for each of these country-issues, a score of zero to two was given to indicate 
no problems with implementation (zero), minor deficiencies (one), or significant 
deficiencies (two). In the issue-level analyses of this chapter, I aggregate these 
scores across the countries in two ways, to produce two different dependent 
variables. Each indicator measures a different facet of implementation deficiency 
for a given issue (the units of analysis for all the analyses in this chapter are the 
seventy six issues across all policy subsectors). Because the degree to which 
countries are successful at implementing policy issues is a multidimensional 
concept (and the relative importance of these dimensions is difficult to rank), it is 
difficult to assign overall implementation scores that capture the full range of 
implementation deficiency for each country on each issue. In order to maintain 
some of these differences without getting into thorny issues about ranking the 
relative importance of different aspects within the implementation of a single 
issue, I take a pragmatic approach that in the first case looks at implementation 
deficiency in total (in which significant and non-significant deficiency are treated 
equally) and in the second case looks at only major implementation deficiency. 
While the hypotheses are expected to hold in both cases, splitting the dependent 
variable in this way allows testing for the possibility that some effects are more or 
less intense for significant deficiency than for deficiency in general.
The first indicator (used as the dependent variable in the first set of analyses in 
this chapter) counts the number of countries experiencing some problem with 
the implementation of an issue (both minor and significant deficiencies). Thus it 
counts the countries that have a score of either one or two for that issue. Figure 8 
displays the frequency distribution for this variable. The second dependent 
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variable is concerned only with significant implementation problems for any 
given issue and thus counts the number of member states that have a score of 
two for an issue. Figure 9 displays the frequency distribution for the second 
dependent variable. Both variables are left-skewed, and are different in that for 
every issue there are some countries that experience some implementation 
difficulty but there are some issues in which no country experiences significant 
implementation difficulty. Thus zeroes are observed in Figure 9 but not in Figure 
8. Because the FVO has inspected all twenty-seven countries for all seventy-six 
issues at some point between 2000 and 2010, no missing observations exist in 
these analyses.
Figure 8: Frequency distribution of first dependent variable
Methodology
The non-normal distribution of both dependent variables means that ordinary 
least squares (OLS) techniques would lead to biased and inefficient estimates. 
Moreover, the linear predictions obtained would generate predictions that fall 
outside the theoretical maximum and minimum for both variables (the maximum 
number of countries is twenty-seven and the minimum is zero). By thinking of the 
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dependent variables as counts of the number of countries that experience 
implementation problems within an issue, a count model can be applied. The two 
most commonly used approaches to modeling count data are Poisson and 
negative binomial regression. Both do not allow predictions of the dependent 
variable to fall below zero, thus satisfying one constraint posed by the theoretical 
range of the dependent variables here (that is, the minimum number of countries 
is zero). Theoretically these predictions have no maximum, thus predictions 
beyond twenty-seven (the maximum possible value for the dependent variables 
here) are possible. In the results that follow, I use model diagnostics to determine 
the probabilities for all values of the dependent variable that have a predicted 
probability significantly different from zero, and thus determine the extent to 
which the model predicts counts beyond twenty-seven.
Before proceeding, I will briefly review count models and the implications that 
the use of such models have for the interpretation of the results that follow (see 
Hilbe, 2011 for a more comprehensive overview). In classic multiple linear 
regression, the dependent variable is modeled as a multivariate normally 
distributed random variable conditional on a set of regressors (independent 
variables). The model consists of a linear combination of a constant parameter 
and partial coefficients for each of the independent variables. An estimation 
Figure 9: Frequency distribution of second dependent variable
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technique, typically ordinary least squares, is used to estimate the parameters. 
Because of the distributional assumption and the linear additive property of the 
model, the model generates predictions for the dependent variable across the full 
range of real numbers. Such a model is inappropriate for counts, which are discrete 
and non-negative. 
Poisson regression models deal with this limitation in two ways. First, they 
model the dependent variable as the mean of a Poisson random variable. The 
Poisson distribution has a single parameter, the Poisson mean or λ, which 
represents the average rate (or count per unit). Second, because the Poisson mean 
must be positive, in order to model it as a function of a set of independent 
variables (which together can assume any real value, positive or negative), the 
logarithm of the mean is predicted as a linear additive function of the independent 
variables. Thus the estimated coefficients for an independent variable represent 
the effect on the logarithm of the count for a one unit increase in that variable. 
Parameters are typically estimated using maximum likelihood estimation.
Because scholars conventionally prefer working with the effects of independent 
variables on the actual dependent variable (and not its logarithm), Poisson 
regression results typically present both the raw coefficients and incidence rate 
ratios (IRRs). The incidence rate ratio is simply the exponentiated coefficient. The 
terminology comes from epidemiology: the incidence rate (of, say, a disease or 
cancer) is the number of “incidents” in which the outcome occurs for a particular 
unit of time or area (thus the “rate” of “incidents” per unit). The “ratio” component 
refers to the ratio of the value of the dependent (incidence rate or count) variable 
given one value of the independent variable versus the value of the dependent 
variable given a different value of the independent variable, holding all other 
independent variables constant. In this ratio, the base case appears in the 
denominator and the numerator contains the value of the dependent variable 
given an increase of 1 in the independent variable from the base case. In social 
science applications, outcomes are typically discussed as counts (instead of rates) 
even though the use of the term “incidence rate ratio” remains. Thus for any 
coefficient β, IRR = eβ and it represents the factor by which the dependent variable 
changes for a one unit change in the independent variable. If the IRR is greater 
than 1, then subtracting 1 from the IRR will give the percent increase in the 
dependent variable for a one unit increase in the independent variable. If the IRR 
is less than 1, then subtracting the IRR from 1 will give the percent decrease in the 
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dependent variable for a one unit increase in the independent variable. 
Poisson regression has one important limitation. As mentioned above, the 
Poisson distribution has a single parameter λ. This is not only the mean of the 
distribution, but also the variance. In other words, the distribution assumes that 
the mean and the variance are equal (equidispersion). If the variance exceeds the 
mean (overdispersion), the estimated coefficients will be unbiased but their 
standard errors will be inflated. As a result, predictors may appear significant 
when they are not. The extent of overdispersion in a Poisson model can be 
estimated by the Pearson dispersion parameter (part of the standard output for 
estimating any generalized linear model), which if significantly different from one, 
indicates overdispersion.
As an alternative to Poisson regression, negative binomial regression relies on 
a different distributional assumption about the dependent variable, namely that 
the dependent variable is distributed according to a negative binomial distribution. 
This relaxes the assumption of equidispersion and is appropriate for modeling 
count data in which the variance exceeds the mean. The dependent variable is 
still modeled as the logarithm of expected counts against a set of independent 
variables, so the raw coefficients have the same interpretation and scholars 
typically present these alongside incidence rate ratios (as in Poisson regression). 
The results of negative binomial regression also include the heterogeneity 
parameter α, which estimates the degree of overdispersion. If this is significantly 
different than 1, then overdispersion is present and the negative binomial 
regression is appropriate. In the analyses that follow, Poisson regression models 
were estimated first, but the Pearson dispersion parameters were significantly 
different from zero. Hence I estimate and give the results for negative binomial 
regression and include the heterogeneity parameter α as an indicator of the 
overdispersion in each model.
One final note regarding the estimation technique concerns model fit. In OLS 
regression, the R2 or multiple R2 indicates the percent of the total variance in the 
dependent variable explained by the model. This is thus an implicit comparison 
between a model with no independent variables (i.e., using only the mean of the 
dependent variable to predict its value for each observation) and the estimated 
model (i.e., obtaining predicted values of the dependent variable from the 
estimated regression parameters) and shows the extent to which the latter has 
improved predictions of the dependent variable over the former. The R2 is 
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calculated from the sum of the squared residuals (the difference between 
predicted and actual values for each observation) from both “models”. This statistic 
is inappropriate for count models (which are estimated in this chapter) and 
qualitative response models (which are estimated in the next chapter) that both 
rely on maximum likelihood estimation in place of ordinary least squares.
Scholars have proposed a variety of goodness-of-fit measures for models 
estimated using maximum likelihood, but “no consensus has emerged on the 
single best measure, and each measure may give different results” (Pampel, 2000, 
p. 100). Following convention, a measure that is analogous to the R2 described 
above will be presented in the models that follow (Hilbe, 2011). The (McFadden’s) 
pseudo-R2 compares the likelihood of producing the observed data given a model 
with no independent variables against the likelihood of producing these data 
given the estimated model (McFadden, 1974). It is thus also called the likelihood 
ratio index (LRI). Like the OLS R2, it ranges (in theory) between 0 and 1, and the “LRI 
increases as the fit of the model improves” (to a degree) (Greene, 2003, p. 683). 
Unlike the R2 value, however, “the values between zero and one have no natural 
interpretation”, and “there is no way to make LRI equal to 1” (Greene, 2003, p. 683). 
Thus while I report the pseudo R2 value (the LRI) and the base and model 
likelihoods from which it is constructed, these should be seen “as only rough 
guides without attributing great importance to a precise figure” (Pampel, 2000, p. 
50).
The possibility that (unmeasured) characteristics of the six policy subsectors 
(welfare of hens on farms, calves on farms, pigs on farms, during transport, at 
slaughter or killing, and official controls) influence the extent of implementation 
difficulties cannot be ruled out, and these unobserved factors likely reduce model 
fit. The ideal solution would have been to theorize those subsector-level 
characteristics and include them in a multilevel model, but the limited number of 
subsectors rules out the possibility of such an approach. I nevertheless control for 
these effects in two ways: by clustering the standard errors in the negative 
binomial regressions according to these subsectors (see e.g. Moulton, 1990) and 
by including subsector-level dummy variables (e.g., in addition to the official 
controls dummy variable discussed above). Each approach is used when possible, 




I present the results in two stages. In the first stage, I explore the effects of the 
different kinds of adaptation pressure points on each of the two dependent 
variables. The second stage combines the different sources into a single indicator 
and adds the conditional effect of whether issues delegate authority (that is, 
whether discretion is present in an issue). The first stage allows a more informative 
test of the adaptation pressure hypothesis (H1) than will be possible in the second 
stage, while the second stage allows a complete test of the interactive effect of 
discretion (H2). 
Stage 1: the adaptation pressure hypothesis deconstructed
The motivation for the first stage is to explore differences in the effects of the 
three kinds of adaptation pressure: phased in requirements, amendments, and 
specifications. While the adaptation pressure hypothesis (H1) predicts that 
adaptation pressure will increase the likelihood of implementation deficiency 
regardless of the source, the possibility exists that one source of pressure has a 
larger substantive effect on implementation than another. It is also possible, on 
the other hand, that there are no differences in effect from one source to another. 
The results presented here enable such a comparison. 
For each dependent variable, I present three models in this first stage. The first 
contains only the theoretical variables (adaptation pressure points only), the 
second adds control variables, and the third includes policy subsector dummy 
variables. This last model in each triplet is a harder test for the adaptation pressure 
hypothesis, as it isolates the effects that different sources of adaptation pressure 
have from subsector-level differences. In the first two models I cluster the standard 
errors by policy subsector (to control for within-subsector homogeneity in these 
models) while the third does not include this clustering (the subsector dummies 
introduce greater statistical control than the clustering of standard errors). I first 
present the results for three models of “some implementation deficiency” (that is, 
no regard to whether that deficiency is significant or not) and then I present the 
results for corresponding models of “significant implementation deficiency”.
Table 5 shows the results of the negative binomial regressions, in which the 
number of countries experiencing some implementation deficiency is the 
dependent variable. Because the models are non-linear, incidence rate ratios are 
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included alongside each model to illustrate the substantive effects. As discussed 
above, these incidence rate ratios represent the factor by which the dependent 
variable changes for a one unit change in the independent variable, holding all 
the other independent variables constant. 
Table 5: Negative binomial explaining the number of countries experiencing 
implementation difficulty





























































































Observations 76 76 76 76 76 76
Pseudo R2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.022 0.022
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
For all three models, the overdispersion parameter α is significantly different 
from zero, indicating the appropriateness of a negative binomial model over 
Poisson regression. This fact has already been indicated in the methodology 
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section, but I note it here along with the diagnostic evidence. In model 1, which 
contains only the adaptation pressure variables, no variables are significant 
although each has a positive effect on the number of countries that experience 
implementation difficulty. Although hardly providing incontrovertible evidence 
for the adaptation pressure hypothesis, the model does not give results that are 
contrary to its predictions (as would be the case if the effects of the variables were 
negative, significant or otherwise).
Compared to model 1, model 2 begins to show some confirmation for the 
adaptation pressure hypothesis. When the new issue and official control variable 
dummies are added, the effect that phased in requirements have on the number 
of countries is positive and significant. The incidence rate ratio for this variable 
shows that each additional phased in requirement increases the number of 
countries experiencing implementation difficulty by 49%. Put another way, with 
all other variables equal to their means, the expected value of the number of 
countries experiencing implementation difficulties is 9.72 for an issue with zero 
phased-in requirements. Increasing the number of phased in requirements from 
zero to one increases the expected number of countries by 49% to 14.46. The case 
studies of on farm animal welfare alluded to this effect, with the phasing in of new 
requirements for laying hen holdings posing significant problems for several 
member states. Figure 10 displays the expected counts for different levels of the 
phased in variable, holding all other variables constant at their means. The effect 
is modestly significant at the p < 0.10 level. On the other hand, the effects of 
specifications and amendments remain insignificant even with these controls.
Of the two control variables, that for new issues is significant at p <0.001 and is 
negative, indicating that new issues experience fewer implementation difficulties 
than already existing ones. Holding all other variables constant at their means, the 
expected number of countries experiencing some implementation problems 
drops from 10.8 to 7.1 (a decrease of 34% or 1-IRR). This may be a characteristic of 
these issues themselves, the lack of reporting on their situation in the member 




Figure 10: Expected number of countries experiencing some implementation problems by 
number of phased-in requirements (holding all other variables constant), Model 2
In model 3 I deal with the possibility of inter-policy subsector differences by 
replacing the clustered standard errors with a dummy variable for each of the five 
subsectors (hens, calves, pigs, slaughter, and transport). This model allows us to 
test whether amendments, phased-in requirements, or specifications lead to 
implementation deficiency even when subsector differences have been accounted 
for. Note that in model 3, the base case has swapped relative to that in model 2. 
Whereas in model 2, a dummy variable for official controls issues was included as 
a control, model 3 uses official controls issues as the base case from which the 
coefficients for the other policy subsectors indicate deviations. This model gives 
additional evidence for the hypothesis that adaptation pressure points increase 
the number of countries that experience implementation problems. In this model, 
the coefficients for all three adaptation pressure variables are significant. The 
effect that phased-in requirements have on the number of countries is slightly 
reduced, though still significant at p < 0.05. Holding all other variables constant, 
an additional phased in requirement increases the expected number of countries 
experiencing some implementation problem by 40%. Amendments also have a 
significant (at the p < 0.05 level) and positive effect: an issue that has been 
amended will have 47% more countries experiencing implementation difficulties 
than one that has not been amended. Similarly, the effect of specifications is also 
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significant (at p < 0.10), positive, and also smaller substantively than that for 
phased-in requirements. Each additional specification increases the number of 
countries experiencing implementation difficulties by 39%. Figure 11 displays the 
expected counts for different levels of the specified requirements variable, holding 
all other variables constant at their means.
Figure 11: Expected number of countries experiencing some implementation problems 
by number of specified requirements (holding all other variables constant), Model 3
As alluded to in the discussion of model 2, in model 3 the effect of the newness 
of an issue is no longer significant, while transport issues have an expected 
number of countries experiencing implementation difficulties that is significantly 
lower than that for official controls issues (at p < 0.1). In other words, the effect 
attributed to novelty in the previous models is likely due to the difference between 
implementing transport issues as opposed to other issues (note that this effect is 
separate from the effect of amendments, and many transportation issues faced 
amendments). The expected number of countries experiencing some 
implementation difficulties is 12.5 for non-transport issues and 7.5 for transport 
issues (holding other variables constant). Of the other policy subsector variables, 
only that for calves is significant (p < 0.05). The number of countries experiencing 
some implementation difficulties is 11% less for issues related to calves than from 
other issues (holding other variables constant).
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Figure 12: Observed frequencies vs. predicted probabilities, Model 3
Together these models provide consistent evidence that adaptation pressure, 
regardless of its source, increases the likelihood that countries experience 
implementation deficiencies (significant or not). The presence of each source of 
adaptation pressure increased the number of countries that experienced 
deficiencies for a given issue, as predicted in the adaptation pressure hypothesis. 
Phased in requirements (like those for laying hens), although anticipated well 
before they go into effect, still cause problems for implementation. Similarly, 
amendments, like the changes to the welfare during transport policy that many 
countries struggled to implement, made issues more difficult to implement than 
those issues that remained unchanged. Specifications, although less common, 
also complicated implementation. The difficulty that many countries had 
implementing the registration system for laying hens is a testament to this effect. 
Turning to model diagnostics, Table 5 shows that although the models provide 
some supporting evidence for the adaptation pressure hypothesis, the goodness-
of-fit measures indicate that quite a substantial amount of variation in the 
dependent variable is unexplained by the models. The pseudo-R-squared reaches 
its highest at 0.02 for model 3. For model 3, Figure 12 compares the predicted 
proportions (the number of times a particular count outcome is predicted by the 
model, given different values of the independent variables, divided by a 
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standardizing coefficient of 30) with observed proportions (the number of times 
a particular count outcome is observed in the data divided by a standardizing 
coefficient of 30)8. Despite the low-level of fit, there appears to be little pattern to 
the relationship between predicted probabilities and their observed frequency, 
although the conditional variance appears higher for a lower count of the number 
of countries experiencing some difficulty implementing an issue. The figure also 
reveals that predicted probabilities beyond twenty-seven (the theoretical 
maximum given the number of member states in the EU during the time period 
analyzed) are very unlikely. The probability of observing a number above twenty-
seven given the model is 5.7%.
Table 6: Negative binomial explaining the number of countries experiencing significant 
implementation difficulty





























































































Observations 76 76 76 76 76 76
Pseudo R2 0.049 0.049
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
8 The standardizing coefficient of 30 is chosen here to assess the likelihood that the model gener-
ates predictions beyond counts that are impossible in reality (those beyond 27).
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Table 6 shows the results from the negative binomial regressions with a count 
of the number of countries experiencing significant implementation difficulties as 
the dependent variable, along with their incidence rate ratios. Although the 
overdispersion parameters are significantly different from zero only for model 6, 
and thus models 4 and 5 are more appropriately modeled using Poisson 
regressions as discussed above, I report negative binomial regressions for all three 
models for the sake of consistency. The results from Poisson regressions (not 
shown) that correspond to models 4 and 5 are consistent with the results reported 
from the negative binomial regressions (unsurprisingly, given that the negative 
binomial model is a generalization of the Poisson) (Hilbe, 2011). In contrast to 
Model 1, in which no variables were significant, the effect that amendments have 
on the number of countries experiencing significant implementation problems is 
significant (at the p < 0.10) level. The presence of an amendment increases the 
expected number of countries experiencing significant implementation problems 
by 51%, from 3.5 countries for issues that have not been amended, to 5.3 countries 
for issues that have been amended, holding the number of phased in and specified 
requirements constant at their means. In other words, amendments (like those in 
the transport sector, for example) lead to significant implementation deficiencies, 
but this effect is lost if significant and less significant deficiencies are grouped 
together.
Model 5, which introduces the two control variables, also shows some 
differences between the two dependent variables. Once controlling for the 
novelty of an issue and the official controls issues, the effect of amendments on 
the dependent variable remains significant (now at p < 0.05), again attesting to 
the importance of this factor. Holding all other variables constant at their means, 
the expected number of countries experiencing significant problems is 3.12 for an 
issue that has not been amended during the ten-year period and 5.66, or 81% 
larger, for an amended issue, and is thus an effect of comparable magnitude to 
that in Model 4. In contrast to the corresponding Model 2 (same independent 
variables, different dependent variable), the official controlss dummy variable is 
significant (at p < 0.10) while the new issues dummy variable is not. Holding all 
other variables constant, the expected number of countries experiencing 
significant implementation difficulties is 5.93 for official controls issues and 3.24 
for issues from the other subsectors. 
Finally, Model 6 replaces the official controls dummy with one for each of the 
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other policy subsectors and therefore does not cluster the standard errors by 
these subsectors. The results are similar to those in Model 3 but with some 
differences regarding the significance of the policy subsectors. Like in Model 3, 
the coefficients for all three of the adaptation pressure point variables are 
statistically significant. Phased-in pressure points are significant at the p < 0.10 
level, and each additional phased in requirement increases the expected number 
of countries experiencing significant implementation problems by 59%. Figure 13 
displays the expected counts for different levels of the phased in requirements 
variable, holding all other variables constant at their means. The effect for 
amendments is comparable to that in the previous two models: an issue that has 
not been amended has an expected 3.10 countries experiencing significant 
implementation difficulties, while one that has been amended has an expected 
8.32 countries. The effect that specification pressure points have on the dependent 
variable is also significant (p < 0.05), with each additional specified requirement 
increasing the number of countries experiencing significant implementation 
difficulties by 71%. Figure 14 displays the expected counts for this variable. 
Relative to official controls issues, both transport and calves’ issues have lower 
values for this dependent variable as in Model 3 for the previous dependent 
variable (p < 0.01). Once adaptation pressure is accounted for, these issues are 
Figure 13: Expected number of countries experiencing significant implementation 




easier to implement than the others. Additionally, hens and pigs have a significantly 
lower expected value than official control issues as well (p < 0.05). This conforms 
to Model 5 in which official controls issues had a significantly higher number of 
countries experiencing major implementation problems than other issues.
Figure 14: Expected number of countries experiencing significant implementation 
problems by number of specified requirements (holding all other variables constant), Model 
6
Again, these models have low fit, with Model 6 attaining a pseudo-R-squared 
of 0.05. Figure 15 plots the predicted proportions with their corresponding 
observed proportions (observed instances of a particular count value divided by 
the standardizing coefficient of 30) for Model 6. Although the pseudo-R-squared 
is low, the plot does not seem to reveal any patterns in the relationship between 
predicted probabilities and observed frequencies. That is, some predicted 
probabilities are greater than their corresponding observed frequencies while 
others are lower, but the size and direction of these differences does not show a 
consistent pattern across the range of values. Whereas the number of issues for 
which no country experiences any implementation difficulties (the dependent 
variable in the previous set of analyses) is zero, the number of issues for which no 
country experiences significant implementation difficulties is relatively large 
(thus the observed frequency for this value and its predicted probability are both 
positive). As in Model 3, the predicted probability for counts greater than twenty-
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seven is very small. Here the probability of such an occurrence is 0.2%. In other 
words, the constraints imposed upon the dependent variable in reality are 
reflected in the model. 
Figure 15: Observed frequencies vs. predicted probabilities, model 6
Taken together, both sets of models in stage 1 provide good evidence for the 
adaptation pressure hypothesis, whether examining implementation deficiency 
in general or significant implementation deficiency in particular. All three sources 
of adaptation pressure raise the number of countries experiencing implementation 
deficiency in an issue. At the same time, the results show that the effect of a given 
source of pressure on implementation varies depending on the implementation 
outcome observed. To put it more concretely, amendments increased the 
likelihood of significant implementation deficiencies, while having a less 
significant effect for implementation deficiency in general. This might explain 
some of the major problems observed in the implementation of particular 
transport issues. On the other hand, phased in requirements increased the 
likelihood of implementation deficiencies in general without affecting significant 
deficiencies in particular. That is, phased in requirements led to both significant 
and less significant implementation difficulties. The presence of a phased in 
requirement in an issue alone did not explain which of the two occurs.
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Stage 2: the mediating influence of discretion
In the second stage, I replace the three adaptation pressure point variables 
with one variable that combines the three (the number of norm states). The results 
of the models in the previous stage (in which all three sources had a positive effect 
on implementation deficiencies, both general and significant) suggest that these 
can be combined into a single indicator, the number of norm states (described 
above). The motivation for doing so is pragmatic. This second stage tests the 
interactive hypothesis between discretion and adaptation pressure. This is more 
easily accomplished in a single interaction (that between the number of norm 
states and the delegation of authority) than in three (one for each source of 
adaptation pressure). 
For this stage, I estimate four models for each dependent variable. The first 
includes only norm states and the two control variables, the second adds the 
delegation dummy variable, the third adds an interaction between it and the 
number of norm states, and the fourth includes policy subsector dummy variables. 
I cluster standard errors in the first three models but not in the fourth. I estimate 
the first models for each dependent variable as a robustness check for the tests of 
the adaptation pressure hypothesis of the previous stage. I include the discretion 
variable (whether an issue delegates authority) without its interaction in the 
second model in each set because the convention in social science is to report a 
model with only main effects before introducing interaction effects. Finally, the 
third and fourth models in each quadruplet allow an actual test of the interactive 
discretion hypothesis (H2), both with and without subsector dummy variable 
controls.
In Table 7 I report the results for negative binomial regressions in which the 
dependent variable is again the number of countries that experience some 
implementation problem (the same dependent variable as the models in Table 5). 
In place of three separate variables corresponding to the three sources of 
adaptation pressure, I have combined them into a single variable that measures 
the number of “norm states” where a norm state corresponds to a different set of 
requirements in place (each the result of an amendment, specification, phased-in 
requirement). The minimum value for this variable is a 1, with such a value 
corresponding to an issue that undergoes no modification for the ten-year period 
under investigation. If an amendment, phased-in requirement, or specification 
modifies the requirements for an issue once, then the value of the variable rises to 
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2 for that issue. This is not simply 1 plus the sum of amendments, specifications, 
and phased-in requirements, however, as the number of norm states is time 
sensitive. That is, if both an amendment and a specification modify the 
requirements within an issue, and these go into effect on the same day, the effect 
is to raise the number of norm states by one rather than two. I substitute this 
variable for its constituent parts in order to test for the possibility of an interactive 
effect between adaptation pressure and discretion. Having multiple variables for 
adaptation pressure and interacting each with the dummy variable for discretion 
would lead to a profusion of interactive effects that would make interpretation 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Model 7 replicates Model 2 from Table 5 (clustered standard errors and control 
variables for official controls and new issues) but uses the norm states variable in 
place of the variables for amendments, specifications, and phased-in requirements. 
The results in Model 7 are similar to those in Model 2. The number of norm states 
has a significant (at the p < 0.05 level) and positive effect on the number of 
countries experiencing some implementation difficulty (in model 2, the number 
of phased in requirements was the only significant adaptation pressure variable), 
with each additional norm state increasing the number of countries experiencing 
some implementation difficulty by 27%. Figure 16 displays the expected number 
countries experiencing some implementation problem across the range of values 
for the number of norm states, holding the other variables constant at their 
means. The new issues variable is also significant, but as it is no longer significant 
when the policy subsector dummies are included in the final model (Model 10), it 
is likely a spurious correlation due to these new issues coming exclusively from 
the transport subsector.
Figure 16: Expected number of countries experiencing some implementation problems 
by number of norm states (holding all other variables constant), Model 7
In Model 8 I introduce the main effect for discretion. Recall that this is a dummy 
variable indicating whether any of the provisions that constitute an issue delegate 
significant authority to the member states (the presence of discretion and whether 
an issue delegates authority are synonymous; the latter can be seen as an indicator 
176
Chapter 9
of the former, just as the number of norm states is an indicator of adaptation 
pressure). This variable is not significant in this model, but its inclusion does not 
affect the significance of variables from the previous model. In other words, the 
presence of discretion alone does not increase (or decrease) the number of 
countries experiencing implementation deficiencies. At the same time, the 
adaptation pressure hypothesis remains uncontested.
Model 9 introduces an interaction term to explore whether the effect that 
adaptation pressure has on implementation is conditional upon the presence or 
absence of delegated authority (and vice-versa). This is the first test of the 
interactive discretion hypothesis (H2). The raw coefficients for the main and 
interaction effects are both significant, but additional calculations are needed in 
order to determine for which levels of the variables the effects are significant and 
to interpret the substantive effects (Hilbe, 2011, pp. 520-529). Accordingly, the 
incidence rate ratio for the effect that norm states have on the number of countries 
experiencing implementation problems for issues that do not delegate authority 
to the member states is 1.43 while that for issues that do delegate authority is 
1.17. The former is significant at p < 0.01 while the latter is not significant. In other 
words, adaptation pressure appears to have an influence on the number of 
countries experiencing some implementation difficulty only for those issues in 
which countries have less flexibility. If a country does not have discretion, then 
adaptation pressure increases the likelihood that implementation deficiencies 
occur. With respect to the control variables, new issues have a larger number of 
countries experiencing implementation problems (as in Model 8) that is significant 
at p < 0.05.
In the last model of the number of countries experiencing some implementation 
difficulty (Model 10), I introduce dummy variables for each of the policy subsectors 
(official controls acts as the base case) and remove the clustering of the standard 
errors. The results are consistent with those of Model 9 (with respect to the 
significance of the interaction effect) and with those of Model 3 (regarding the 
direction and magnitude of policy subsector effects). Concerning the latter, both 
calf welfare on farms and welfare during transport are significant (at p < 0.05 and 
p < 0.01, respectively) and have an expected number of countries experiencing 
some implementation difficulty that is less than that of official controls issues. The 
interaction effect follows the same pattern as in the previous model: the effect of 
norm states on the dependent variable is significant at p < 0.01 for issues that do 
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not delegate authority (the incidence rate ratio is 1.98) but not significant for 
issues that do grant authority to the member states (the incidence rate ratio is 
1.14. Figure 17 displays the interaction effect through a plot of the expected 
number of countries experiencing some implementation difficulty across the 
number of norm states, for issues that do grant authority to the member states 
(Delegation = 1) and issues that do not (Delegation = 0), along with their 95% 
confidence intervals. As for the goodness of fit, the plot of observed frequencies 
against predicted probabilities looks nearly identical to that in Figure 10, and thus 
the model does not generate predictions that fall outside the range of possible 
values for the dependent variable.
Figure 17: Expected number of countries experiencing some implementation problems 
by number of norm states and different levels of delegation (holding all other variables 
constant), Model 10
Finally, Table 8 presents the analogous results in which the dependent variable 
is the number of countries that experience significant implementation problems. 
The results from Model 11 and its corresponding model from Table 6 (Model 5) are 
similar, and the adaptation pressure variable has a significant (p < 0.05) and 
positive effect on the dependent variable (in Model 5, the variable for amendments 
was the only significant adaptation pressure variable), with each additional norm 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































difficulty by 49%. Figure 18 displays the expected number of countries 
experiencing significant implementation problems across the range of values for 
the number of norm states, holding the other variables constant at their means. 
Both control variables are significant, with fewer countries experiencing problems 
for new issues but more countries experiencing them for official controls issues 
(both variables significant at p < 0.05).
Figure 18: Expected number of countries experiencing significant implementation 
problems by number of norm states (holding all other variables constant), Model 11
Model 12 introduces the dummy variable for issues that delegate significant 
authority to the member states, and as in the analogous model for the first 
dependent variable, the effect for this variable is insignificant. Model 13 adds the 
interaction effect and in this model the raw coefficients for the main effects of 
norm states and the delegation variable plus their interaction effects are significant 
(at p < 0.05), however, neither these raw coefficients nor their significance can be 
interpreted alone. Disaggregating the effects, the incidence rate ratio for issues 
that do not grant delegation to the member states is 1.81 while that for issues that 
do is 1.51 (both are significant at p < 0.05 as an incidence rate ratio of 1, the null 
case, lies outside the 95% confidence interval). In other words, the number of 
norm states increases the number of countries experiencing some implementation 
difficulty regardless of the presence of delegated authority, but the effect of norm 
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states is larger when an issue delegates no authority. In both Models 12 and 13, 
the effects of the new issue and official controls dummy variables remain 
significant.
In the final model (Model 14), the standard errors are no longer clustered by 
policy subsector and policy subsector dummy variables are included (except for 
the official controls dummy variable, so that official controls issues are the base 
case). The effects of the subsector dummy variables are similar to those in Model 
6. Issues from the hens, calves, pigs, and transport subsectors have a number of 
countries that experience significant implementation problems that is significantly 
lower than official controls issues. The dummy variable for new issues is no longer 
significant, again because of the likely spurious correlation between it and the 
transport subsector dummy variable. Turning to the interaction effects, although 
only the raw coefficient for the main effect of the norm states variable is significant, 
the calculations of conditional effects provide more evidence that the effect of 
norm states is conditional on whether an issue grants discretion to the member 
states. If an issue does not delegate authority, then the incidence rate ratio for the 
effect that norm states has on the number of countries that experience significant 
implementation problems is 2.17 (significant at p < 0.01). If an issue does delegate 
Figure 19: Expected number of countries experiencing significant implementation 
problems by number of norm states and different levels of delegation (holding all other 
variables constant), Model 14
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authority, then the incidence rate ratio is 1.62 (also significant at p < 0.01). Thus 
adaptation pressure leads to significant problems in implementation more often 
in issues that do not delegate authority to the member states than it does in issues 
that do grant discretion. Figure 19 displays this interaction effect by plotting the 
expected number of countries experiencing significant implementation difficulty 
across the number of norm states, for issues that do grant authority to the member 
states (Delegation = 1) and issues that do not (Delegation = 0), along with their 
95% confidence intervals. The plot of predicted probabilities against observed 
frequencies is indistinguishable from that in Figure 11, so it is not presented here.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have examined the implementation of farm animal welfare 
policy in the EU from a policy-level perspective (that is, the unit of analysis is the 
issue, and country level factors are left out). I have done this with statistical models 
of both the number of countries per issue that experience some implementation 
difficulty and the number of countries per issue that experience significant 
difficulty. Note that the former incorporates the latter, but it is likely that different 
processes give rise to each. I find some support for the two issue-level hypotheses 
at this level of analysis. Firstly, adaptation pressure contributes to implementation 
difficulty, in both a general sense and when looking at significant implementation 
problems. Thus the results give substantial evidence for the adaptation pressure 
hypothesis (H1). Whereas amendments seem to have the greatest effect when 
looking at significant implementation problems alone, phased in requirements 
contribute more toward any implementation problem (minor and significant). 
Secondly, discretion plays a role in influencing implementation, but only through 
its interaction with adaptation pressure. For both dependent variables, adaptation 
pressure has a significant effect for issues that do not delegate authority but has 
a smaller effect or no significant effect for issues that do grant discretion to the 
member states. This provides evidence for the interactive discretion hypothesis 
(H2). 
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In the previous chapter, I tested the adaptation pressure and interactive 
discretion hypotheses (H1 and H2, respectively) at the issue level. That is to say, I 
assumed a top-down approach in which issues varied in the degree to which 
countries implemented them successfully. More precisely, issues varied in the 
number of countries that implemented them with deficiency or with significant 
deficiency, and I modeled this variation using issue-level characteristics. The 
amount of adaptation pressure (and the source of that pressure) and the presence 
of discretion (measured as whether an issue delegated authority to the member 
states) were both found to have an important role in influencing implementation 
outcomes for these issues. Thus, I found support for both the adaptation pressure 
and the interactive discretion hypotheses at the issue level.
In this second quantitative analysis chapter, I expand in the analysis in two 
ways. The first shifts the unit of analysis to a lower level. Whereas the previous 
chapter considered the adaptation pressure and interactive discretion hypotheses 
from an issues-level perspective, the analyses in this chapter adopt an issues-
within-country approach. This is the smallest level of analysis considered in this 
thesis. Recall that the case study chapters examined the implementation of each 
of the policies at a general level (welfare on farms, during transport and at 
slaughter or killing) within a select number of countries. Individual issues within 
these policies for the selected countries were cited as examples of successful and 
unsuccessful implementation. Thus for the chapter on animal welfare during 
transport policy, I selected Austria and Slovenia to highlight successful 
implementation of this policy. In describing Austria’s implementation, I highlight 
its efforts regarding the issue of checklists for welfare during transport inspections. 
I evaluated the issue of welfare during transport inspection checklists (part of the 
welfare during transport policy) for Austria. The analyses in this chapter consider 
all possible evaluations of issues for each country. With seventy six issues observed 
in twenty seven countries, the number of observations for the analyses in this 
chapter is theoretically 2,052, however, because some countries have little to no 
calf farming, this number is slightly lower at 2,037.9 
Analyses could be performed on yet a smaller level of analysis – time. All 
variables could be coded not only for issues within countries, but also given a 
score for each year. For many cases, however, the dependent variable would not 
change during the entire ten year period, and for several of the independent 
9 76 issues × 27 countries = 2,052 issue-countries; 2,052 issue-countries – 15 countries with little to 
no calf farming = 2,037 issue-countries (observations) in the dataset
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variables, the values would change even more rarely. Chapter 5 presents some 
evidence of this stability. The introduction of time as a dimension, although 
technically feasible, would increase the complexity of the analyses exponentially. 
Thus the unit of analysis in this chapter remains at the issue-within-country level, 
with an implementation score given for the entire ten year period (as detailed in 
the first case study chapter). For the independent variables, one score is given for 
the entire ten year period based on the situation in place for the longest time.
The second way that this chapter expands on the analyses of the previous 
chapter is by introducing the remaining hypotheses. Unlike the adaptation 
pressure and interactive discretion hypotheses, the institutional and transposition 
delay hypotheses (H3 and H4, respectively), cannot be tested at the issue-level. 
The institutional characteristics assumed relevant for influencing implementation 
vary both cross-nationally and across issues. That is to say, institutional factors 
vary from one country to another and also from one issue to another within the 
same country. Similarly, the amount of transposition delay varies by country and 
by issue. It varies by issue because the issues are taken from multiple pieces of 
legislation, each with its own transposition deadline. As a result, both these 
hypotheses can only be tested at this lower level of analysis.
This chapter will proceed as follows. Like the previous chapter, it begins with a 
discussion of the dependent and independent variables. By shifting the level of 
analysis downwards, the dependent variable (though originating in the same 
coding described in Chapter 5) changes, although it still measures the degree of 
implementation deficiency. New independent variables at the country- and 
country-within-issue levels will be introduced (as controls and to test the 
institutional and transposition delay hypotheses); the independent variables 
carried over from the analyses in the previous chapter will not be described again. 
The discussion of variables is followed by a description of the methodological 
approach, including the justification for the modeling strategy and the way in 





The level of implementation deficiency serves as the dependent variable for 
the analyses that follow. In order to motivate the case selection in the qualitative 
case study chapters, Chapter 5 described in detail the coding for this variable. The 
reader will recall that I coded each issue (where an issue is an article or article-like 
part of a directive or regulation containing one major requirement) based on 
Food and Veterinary Office (FVO) mission reports. I gave a score of zero to an issue 
without implementation deficiency in the country in question, a score of one to 
an issue with minor deficiencies, and a score of two to an issue with significant 
and persistent problems of implementation (major deficiencies).
Table 9: Frequency Distribution of Implementation Deficiency
Table 9 provides a frequency distribution for the dependent variable 
(implementation deficiency). Most issues (61%) are implemented without 
deficiency, but a relatively large share of issues are implemented with minor or 
major deficiency. The tables displayed in chapters six to eight provide more 
information about the dependent variable by breaking down this variable by 
policy and country.
The independent variables
The adaptation pressure and discretion variables have been discussed at 
length in the previous chapter. The first set of analyses will replicate those of the 
previous chapter and so will make use of the variables that indicate the number 
of specifications, amendments, and phased in requirements, as well as the 
composite variable representing the number of norm states for a particular issue.
The analyses in this chapter introduce institutional factors through a number 
of variables that represent different aspects of the organization of implementing 
Frequency Percent
No deficiency 1,236 60.68
Minor deficiency 488 23.96
Major deficiency 313 15.37
Total 2,037
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farm animal welfare policy in a country. All these characteristics have been coded 
from the Country Reports generated for each country by the FVO. These Country 
Reports describe the organization of official controls in each country for all EU 
food safety and animal welfare requirements whose enforcement is supervised by 
the FVO. Because the organization of controls varies from one sector to another, 
each country report contains a sector-by-sector description of the organization of 
official controls: the ministry or ministries responsible for transposition and 
implementation, the hierarchical and geographic division of each implementing 
ministry or agency, etc. In the case of on farm animal welfare, the organization of 
controls may vary within a country depending on the policy subsector: on farm, 
during transport, or at slaughter or killing. Additional details about the organization 
of official controls have in some cases been obtained from FVO mission reports. 
In some cases, the organization of official controls has undergone restructuring 
during the ten year period under investigation here. The case study chapters 
provide several examples of these events, which are often followed by improved 
levels of implementation. The welfare during slaughter or killing chapter notes 
the influence of interest group advocacy and government change on the 
organization of official controls in Sweden, showing that some reorganization 
efforts may be short-lived. Because of the cross-sectional approach to data 
analysis in this chapter, a single score must be given for each institutional variable 
for the entire ten-year period. The score that is given is that which represents the 
situation in the country/policy for the longest period between 2000 and 2010. I 
consider the consequences of measuring the institutional variables in this way in 
the description of the variables (by noting the prevalence of change in each 
variable across the 27 countries in the period studied) and in the results (by noting 
whether the significance of each institutional variable is sensitive to an alternative 
specification based on values averaged across all years for each issue-country).
The theory chapter discusses several institutional factors that may potentially 
influence the post-transposition application of EU policy. The first links directly to 
the transposition phase and refers to the number of ministries and other actors 
responsible for transposing directives in the member state for the policy under 
investigation. The number is taken from the FVO country profiles, which names 
the authority or authorities responsible for transposition. For a given country, this 
number may be the same for all subsectors or different for each. In 93% of cases, 
there is a single ministry responsible. This may be either the same authority 
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responsible for application, or a legal ministry responsible for transposition in 
several policy areas. In the animal welfare field, multiple actors are responsible for 
transposition in only two countries: the UK and Spain. For the UK, each of the 
devolved authorities (England, Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland) enact their 
own transposing legislation for all policy subsectors. In Spain, the seventeen 
autonomous communities, plus the central government, and in some policy areas 
an additional central government ministry, are each responsible for transposition 
legislation. The number of transposing actors changed in two countries during 
the period of investigation: dropping from 9 to 1 for Austria in 2005 (except in the 
transportation subsector, where the federal level was already responsible for 
transposition) and increasing from 18 to 19 for Spain in 2002 for the transposition 
of during slaughter or killing legislation.
The second administrative factor refers to the horizontal dimension for 
implementing animal welfare policy in the member states. This is a count of the 
number of agencies and authorities that coordinate as equals in implementing 
these policies, and again is described in the FVO country reports (both in text and 
as an organizational diagram). As with the number of authorities responsible for 
transposition, this number varies both across countries and across policies within 
a country. Thus implementing welfare during transport policy often involves 
coordination between the agricultural ministry or veterinary authority and the 
police or a transportation ministry. The veterinary authority may be named as the 
central competent authority, but the FVO report notes that it must coordinate 
with separate authorities to implement policy. In the dataset analyzed here, 43% 
of issues are implemented by two administrative authorities acting as equals. In 
approximately one quarter (25%) of the observations, a single actor has 
responsibility. The number is as high as 311 actors for Sweden, in which each 
municipality has exclusive authority for applying animal welfare legislation within 
its jurisdiction but must coordinate with the central authorities. The results of the 
analysis are sensitive to this outlier, so I note the consequences for the results with 
Sweden excluded. Between 2000 and 2010, this number of actors changed in one 
or more subsectors in Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Germany, Sweden, and the 
United Kingdom, but the difference in values was greater than one in only two 
cases: in Sweden from 311 to 1 or 23 (depending on the subsector) in 2009, and in 
the United Kingdom from 2 to 5 in 2005 (for the implementation of on farm and 
during transport legislation).
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A third factor refers to the vertical division of authority within the central 
competent authority and is based on the geographic division of actors responsible 
for implementation. Two count variables have been constructed for this factor: a 
count of the number of primary geographic divisions of the central competent 
authority and a count of the number of secondary divisions. In order for a division 
to be included in this number, there must be a separate office located there, and 
it must have responsibility for administering animal welfare policy in that 
jurisdiction. The number of primary geographic divisions ranges from one (a score 
given to Luxembourg and Malta, whose central competent authority is not 
divided into regional offices) to 290 (Sweden), with an average of 27. Between 
2000 and 2010, this number changes in three countries, dropping from 12 to 3 for 
Denmark in 2007, 13 to 6 for Finland in 2010, and 290 to 22 for Sweden in 2009. 
The number of secondary divisions ranges from zero (in 44% of the observations, 
there is no further geographic division than the primary level) to 469 for the UK 
and has an average of 94. The results of the analysis are sensitive to extreme values 
in both of these variables, so I note the consequences for the results of excluding 
issue-countries with extreme values. During the period of investigation, this 
number changes from 0 to 10 for Denmark in 2007, 347 to 289 for Greece in 2005, 
197 to 195 for Italy in 2009, and 0 to 290 for Sweden in 2009.
The fourth factor relates to the way in which implementation is shared between 
the central and regional levels. One key aspect in the enforcement of animal 
welfare policy in the member states is the inspection plan drafted each year in 
each country. Both the subsector directives and regulation and the official controls 
regulation stipulate requirements for inspection planning. Each country is then 
free to organize its inspection program within these constraints: choosing the 
criteria for sampling farms and means of transport, setting targets for inspection 
(the percent of holdings to be inspected in each area, for example), and the actual 
selection of holdings. The creation of this plan is an important element in the 
distribution of authority for implementation within a member state, as in some 
countries, the entire plan is created at the central level while in others responsibility 
is more decentralized. Based again on FVO reports, a categorical variable has been 
constructed (and recoded as dummy variables for the analysis) to indicate the 
way in which inspection plans are created in a country for a particular policy. In 
18.5% of cases, plans originate completely in the central office and are dictated to 
the regions (if they exist). In 63% of cases, targets and selection criteria are 
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determined at the central level, and actual selection occurs in the regions. In the 
remaining 18.5% of cases, plans are created entirely by the regional offices. 
Between 2000 and 2010, the organization of inspection planning changed in 
three countries: Austria in 2005, Spain in 2003, and Italy in 2001. While the latter 
two occur early in the period under investigation, the change in Austria midway 
through the period suggests that giving a single score to Austria is problematic. 
Because these are dummy variables, taking the average across the period is an 
inappropriate solution, so instead I check the robustness of the results (not shown) 
for these two variables by re-estimating the models giving Austria a score based 
on the organization of planning in place for 2000-2004 (the main results are based 
on the organization of planning in Austria in place for 2005-2010). 
Besides the issues-level and institutional factors described above and in the 
previous chapter, the theory chapter also speculated on the effect of transposition 
delay on application. Transposition delay is measured here as the number of 
months between the day a measure should have been transposed in a member 
state (either through a date of entry for the legislation or through accession by 
the country into the EU) and the day in which correct transposition measures 
went into effect in the member state. This variable has also been constructed from 
FVO reports, which include a description of the legal measures in place in each 
country and any problems with those measures. In 56% of cases, there was no 
delay. In the remaining cases, delay ranges from eighteen days to ten years (the 
entire period under investigation).
Control variables
In addition to the issue-level control variables introduced in the previous 
chapter, two country-level control variables are used. The first is a dummy variable 
indicating whether a country acceded to the EU between 2000 and 2010. These 
countries began implementing EU animal welfare policy later than the old 
member states. Although the case study chapters provide examples of new 
member states that began implementing EU requirements several years before 
accession, the old member states still had several years to slowly adapt their laws 
and administration to the changing animal welfare policy from the early 1990s 
into the 2000s. 
The second variable controls for administrative capacity. This is the Worldwide 
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Governance Indicator’s measure of government effectiveness, which “measures 
the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and its independence 
from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, 
and the credibility of the government’s commitment to its stated policies”.10 The 
Worldwide Governance Indicators are produced by researchers associated with 
the World Bank and the Brookings Institution. The indicator itself is a combination 
of a number of relevant items taken from public, expert, and enterprise surveys as 
well as data provided by public institutions. Thus government effectiveness 
includes (among other things) perceptions of the quality of bureaucracy from the 
Economist Intelligence Unit (a survey of commercial entities), satisfaction with 
education and transportation system from the Gallup World Poll (a household 
survey), and the coverage area of drinking water, electricity, and basic health 
services from the French Ministry of Finance’s Institutional Profiles Database. 
Methodology
I conduct the analyses that follow using multinomial logistic regression. The 
decision to use this maximum likelihood approach to model estimation is based 
on the nature of the dependent variable. The dependent variable – the level of 
implementation difficulty – has both ordinal and nominal characteristics. In the 
ordinal sense, the degree of deficiency increases with each level of the variable 
(from no difficulty, to some and then severe difficulty). In another sense, however, 
the absence of implementation difficulty is qualitatively different from deficiency 
of any level of severity. In the interest of parsimony and reducing the technical 
complexity of the analyses, each was first estimated using ordinal logistic 
estimation (known as logit). Ordinal logit estimates a single regression coefficient 
for each independent variable, under the assumption that the effect of the 
independent variable on the dependent variable is the same when moving “up” 
one category regardless of the starting point. This assumption (the proportional 
odds assumption) is empirically testable, and in the fully specified models 
estimated below, tests revealed that the assumption was not tenable. As a result, 
all models are estimated using multinomial logit.
Multinomial logistic regression is essentially the simultaneous estimation of 




variable. Given that the dependent variable takes on one of three values, there are 
only three such comparisons in the models that follow. Thus the results present 
estimated coefficients for each independent variable when comparing no 
deficiency vs. some deficiency, no deficiency vs. severe deficiency, and some 
deficiency vs. severe deficiency. The raw coefficients represent changes in the log 
odds ratio for a one unit change in the independent variable. Because these 
coefficients are difficult to interpret, the results for each model are accompanied 
by illustrations of the substantive effects: the marginal change in the probability 
of observing one outcome vs. another for a one unit change in the independent 
variable (holding all other variables constant at their mean). For binary variables, 
the substantive effect is indicated for a one unit change in the independent 
variable. 
Thus for each model, the effect of each variable is indicated by three raw 
coefficients (one for each pairwise comparison) and three marginal effects (one 
for each coefficient). With six statistics reported for each independent variable in 
each model it is not possible to include several models in a single table as in the 
previous chapter. Given that I describe the results of ten models, the amount of 
information conveyed in tables becomes too wieldy for readers less interested in 
the technical aspects of the analysis. For this reason, I include all the regression 
results tables for the analyses of this chapter in Appendix C, although I refer to 
them directly in this chapter. To highlight particularly interesting results, I display 
additional figures that plot changes in predicted probabilities and I include these 
figures directly in this chapter instead of the appendix.
Results
The results section proceeds in three stages. To establish a baseline and as 
additional robustness checks for the adaptation pressure and interactive discretion 
hypotheses, I first replicate the analyses of the previous chapters at the issues-
within-country level. The replication introduces additional control variables that 
were not part of the original models because they could not be included at the 
issues-level. In the second stage, the effects of institutional factors on implementing 
the policies will be examined to test the institutional hypothesis (H3). Several 
administrative factors related to the organization of implementation of the policy 
in a country will be included. Like in the previous chapter, I examine this hypothesis 
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in isolation before testing it alongside the other hypotheses. The final set of 
analyses introduces transposition delay in order to test all four hypotheses 
simultaneously. As stated earlier, the actual regression results tables are included 
in Appendix C. Instead of interpreting each regression coefficient, I begin with 
those that are significant in the first model and build on these interpretations 
(noting similarities and differences) in the models that follow.
Stage 1: replication at the issues-within-country level
In the first stage of the analysis, I replicate the issue-level analyses from the 
previous chapter for the lowest level of analysis. That is, the unit of analysis has 
shifted from the 76 issues in the analyses in the previous chapter to 2,037 issue-
countries. There are 2,037 observations in this chapters’ models: 76 issues 
implemented by 27 countries yields 2,052 issue-countries, but several issues are 
irrelevant for some Member States, leading to the slightly smaller figure of 2,037 
issue-countries. I replicate the models from the previous chapter in order to retest 
the adaptation pressure and interactive discretion hypotheses while controlling 
for country-level factors. Controlling for country-level factors was not possible in 
the previous chapter because there were no unique observations for each country. 
Additionally, such a replication provides a baseline for introducing additional 
country-level variables and comparing the relative strengths of the issue-level 
and country-level hypotheses. These replication models proceed in a stepwise 
fashion analogous to the two stages in the previous chapter (that is, beginning 
first with the adaptation pressure hypothesis before adding the variables needed 
to test the interactive discretion hypothesis). Although country-level control 
variables are not added until the second model, all models in this chapter are 
estimated using robust standard errors that are clustered at the member-state 
level. This clustering adjusts the standard errors for the regression coefficients for 
within-country homogeneity. Without such an adjustment, the standard errors 
for country-level factors would be artificially low and thus make it more likely to 
reject the null hypothesis and find a significant effect (Moulton, 1990). 
I begin by modeling implementation deficiency as a function of adaptation 
pressure alone. Table 12 presents the results of a multinomial logistic regression 
model (Model 1) in which the severity of implementation deficiency is regressed 
on the three kinds of dynamic adaptation pressure (phased-in requirements, 
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amendments, and specified requirements). As mentioned in the methodology 
section above, there are three sets of coefficients: one for each pairwise comparison 
in the values of the dependent variable. In the absence of controls, the model 
shows strong support for the adaptation pressure hypothesis, thus conforming to 
the results of the previous chapter. Each of the three sources of adaptation 
pressure have a statistically significant effect for two of the three comparisons. 
What this means is that the presence of each type of adaptation pressure raises 
the probability of observing at least one level of implementation deficiency 
relative to another. According to this model, each source of adaptation pressure in 
an issue significantly influence implementation outcomes.
I next describe in detail the specific effects obtained in Model 1 for each source 
of adaptation pressure. First, phased-in points increase the probability of 
observing both minor deficiency and major deficiency relative to no deficiency (p 
< 0.01 in both cases). The marginal effect of phased-in points on no deficiency is 
-0.17; thus holding all other variables constant at their means, the instantaneous 
rate of change for additional phased-in points is a decrease in the probability of 
observing no deficiency by 17%. Corresponding changes in the probability of 
observing a minor deficiency and a major deficiency are increases of 12% and 5%, 
respectively. Put differently, a maximal increase in the number of phased in points 
(going from zero to two phased in requirements) while holding all other variables 
constant leads to a 34% decrease in observing no deficiency, a 26% increase in 
observing a minor deficiency, and a 7% increase in observing a major deficiency. 
Second, specified points have an analogous effect: they increase the probability 
of observing both minor and major deficiencies against that of observing no 
deficiency (p < 0.01 for both), although the marginal effects are somewhat smaller 
than those for phased-in points. The instantaneous rate of change for additional 
specified points decreases the probability of observing no deficiency by 10%, and 
increases the probability of observing a minor or major deficiency by 6% and 4%, 
respectively. A maximal increase from zero to two specified points decreases the 
probability of observing no deficiency by 10% and increases the probabilities of 
observing minor and major deficiencies by 6% and 3%, respectively. Finally, the 
effect for amendment points is somewhat different in that it has a significant 
effect on distinguishing major deficiencies from both minor and no deficiency 
cases (p < 0.01 for both). The presence of an amendment (the maximum observed 
number of amendments here is one) increases the probability of observing major 
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deficiency by 7% while decreasing the probabilities of observing no and minor 
deficiencies by 5% and 1%, respectively. 
These results, by conforming to those in the previous chapter, show additional 
confirmation for the adaptation pressure hypothesis, and show that there are 
some differences in the relative effects of each source. Most importantly, 
amendments behave differently from phased-in points and specified points by 
making major deficiency more likely relative to the other two outcomes. This 
echoes observations in the previous chapter and in the case study chapter for 
welfare during transport policy, a much-amended policy area that experienced 
many instances of significant implementation difficulty. The pseudo-R2 fit statistic 
of 2% is quite small and is unsurprising given the very spare model estimated 
here.
In the second model, I test the adaptation pressure hypothesis again using a 
different indicator of adaptation pressure and a set of control variables. Table 
13presents the results for Model 2, which replaces the three adaptation pressure 
point variables with the single variable incorporating these three components – 
the norm state variable introduced in the previous chapter. I add control variables 
at the issue- and country-level: whether an issue is a new one or an official controls 
issue for the issue-level (these two variables were included as control variables in 
the previous chapter), and whether a country is a new member state and the 
effectiveness of its administration at the country-level (these two variables are 
new to this chapter and are described above). The first two control variables put 
the test of the adaptation pressure hypothesis on an at least an equal footing, in 
terms of statistical control, with the corresponding models in the last chapter. 
Besides shifting downward the unit of analysis, the model also includes additional 
controls that could not be introduced at the higher level of analysis in the previous 
chapter. This therefore makes a stricter test of the hypothesis.
In general, the results provide additional support for the adaptation pressure 
hypothesis. Looking at the results of this model in detail, the norm states variable 
is significant for all three pairwise comparisons (p < 0.01 for no deficiency vs. 
minor deficiency and no deficiency vs. major deficiency, p < 0.05 for minor 
deficiency vs. major deficiency). The marginal effects indicate that, holding all 
other variables constant at their means, the instantaneous rate of change for the 
norm states variable is a decrease of 11% in the probability of observing no 
deficiency and an increase of 5% and 6% in the probability of observing a minor 
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or major deficiency, respectively. The maximal increase (from one to four norm 
states) decreases the probability of observing no deficiency by 35%, while 
increasing the probability of observing minor deficiency by 10% and major 
deficiency by 25%. 
Because the effect of norm states is significant for all three pairwise comparisons, 
and because additional norm states raise the probability of observing minor 
deficiency relative to no deficiency and major deficiency relative to minor 
deficiency, the effect that norm states have on implementation deficiency is 
increases monotonically. Although the dependent variable is not, strictly speaking, 
modeled ordinally, the results of Model 2 conform to an ordinal expression of the 
adaptation pressure hypothesis. Put simply, additional norm states increase the 
severity of implementation deficiency, exactly as predicted in the adaptation 
pressure hypothesis.
I next describe some additional results from Model 2. Several of the control 
variables are statistically significant and therefore suggest additional explanations 
for the differences across country-issues. As in the previous chapter, new issues 
are less likely to experience significant implementation difficulty (p < 0.05 for the 
difference between no deficiency and minor deficiency, and p < 0.01 for that 
between no deficiency and major deficiency). If an issue is a new one, it is 4% less 
likely (than an older issue) to experience minor deficiency, 6% less likely to 
experience major deficiency, but 10% more likely to experience no deficiency. 
Official controls, issues, however, are implemented with more difficulty. An official 
controls issue is 7% less likely (than other issues) to experience no deficiency, 2% 
less likely to experience minor deficiencies, and 9% more likely to experience 
major deficiencies. Both of these results conform to the differences between the 
number of countries experiencing some implementation deficiency and the 
number of countries experiencing significant implementation deficiency modeled 
in the previous chapter.
The country-level factors show interesting results as well. Most interestingly, 
the effect of new member states on implementation is significant for the 
comparison between no deficiency and major deficiency and between minor 
deficiency and major deficiency. In other words, new member states are clearly 
distinguished from the old member states in that they are 15% less likely to 
experience major implementation difficulties. Note that the effect for new 
member states is not reflective of the effectiveness of their administration, which 
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is included as an additional control variable. The effect of government effectiveness 
is less surprising: better governments also lead to a decrease in the probability of 
observing major deficiencies (p < 0.01 for both no deficiency vs. major deficiency 
and minor deficiency vs. major deficiency). The marginal effect for this variable 
indicates that the instantaneous rate of change in government effectiveness leads 
to an increase of 10% in the probability of observing no deficiency, an increase of 
4% for minor deficiency, and a decrease of 15% in the probability of observing a 
major deficiency. Both country-level variables have large effects relative to the 
other variables by decreasing the probability of observing one outcome by 15%. 
In summarizing the results of Model 2 with respect to the country-level control 
variables, new member states are less likely to observe significant implementation 
deficiency, once government effectiveness is taken into account. The latter, 
unsurprisingly, reduces the likelihood of implementation deficiency.
Before testing the interactive discretion hypothesis (H4) in Model 4, Model 3 in 
Table 14 introduces the presence of discretion (measured as whether an issue 
delegates significant authority to the member states with respect to the way in 
which they can implement the issue). I estimate this model to follow the 
convention that before modeling an interaction effect, one generally models the 
components of that effect first without their interaction. Although the effect of 
this variable is significant for the difference between no deficiency and major 
deficiency (p < 0.05), the substantive effect is the smallest relative to the other 
variables. The presence of delegating authority decreases the probability of 
observing no deficiency by 4% while increasing the probabilities of observing 
minor and major deficiencies by 1% and 3%, respectively. The effects of the 
remaining variables are nearly identical as those in the previous model and will 
not be discussed further. In short, introducing the main effect for discretion does 
not diminish the effects of the other variables. At the same time, it shows that the 
presence of discretion moderately increases the likelihood of some kind of 
implementation deficiency.
A test of the interactive discretion hypothesis at the issue-within country level 
is possible in the fourth model (Table 15) which interacts the delegation variable 
with the norm states variable. With the inclusion of the interaction, the coefficients 
for the delegation and norm states variables are significant for all three 
comparisons. This indicates that the effect of norm states is significant when 
issues do not delegate authority (as in the previous chapter) and that the effect of 
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delegation is significant when there is only a single norm state. The significance of 
the main effects was illustrated in the previous model, but additional figures are 
necessary to illustrate the interaction effects. Figure 20, Figure 21, and Figure 22 
display the predicted probabilities of observing each of the three outcomes for 
changes in the number of norm states for both provisions that delegate and those 
that do not. The interaction effect appears to be significant only for comparing no 
deficiency cases to major deficiency cases. Provisions that do not delegate 
authority are more likely than delegating provisions to experience no deficiency 
when the number of norm states is small. As the number of norm states increases, 
the relationship switches. Provisions that delegate authority are more likely than 
non-delegating provisions to experience no deficiency when the number of norm 
states is large. This can be seen in Figure 20, in which the 95% confidence intervals 
for low and high values of norm states do not overlap. The lines in Figure 21 only 
barely cross and their 95% confidence intervals almost completely overlap. The 
pattern in Figure 21 is the reverse of that seen in Figure 20, although there is more 
overlap in the 95% confidence intervals. Viewing the interaction from an 
alternative perspective, the effect that norm states has implementation difficulty 
is slightly larger for those issues that delegate authority than for those that do not, 
in accordance with the results from the previous chapter. In other words, the 
Figure 20: Predicted probabilities of observing no deficiency for changes in norm states 
with their 95% CIs 
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interactive discretion hypothesis is confirmed both at the issue-level (the previous 
chapter) and at the issue-within-country level. Adaptation pressure increases the 
likelihood of observing implementation deficiencies in the absence of discretion. 
When countries have the flexibility to meet requirements in their own way, 
Figure 21: Predicted probabilities for observing minor deficiency for changes in norm 
states with their 95% CIs
Figure 22: Predicted probabilities for observing major deficiency for changes in norm 
states with their 95% CIs
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adaptation pressure has a smaller effect on implementation deficiency than when 
countries lack this flexibility.
The final model in this stage (Table 14) replicates the previous model but uses 
different issue-level controls to explore the differences among the types of issues 
being implemented. This corresponds to an alternative set of control variables 
first introduced in the previous chapter, and is presented here as an additional 
robustness check for the adaptation pressure and interactive discretion 
hypotheses. With this robustness check, both hypotheses hold. The norm states 
and delegation variables, as well as their interaction remains significant and in the 
direction predicted by their respective hypotheses.
This model also demonstrates cross-policy differences that could not be 
observed in Models 1-4. Concentrating on these factors in particular and using 
official controls issues as the base case, we see that issues from the hens sector are 
significant for the distinction between no deficiency and major deficiency, and 
between minor deficiency and major deficiency (p < 0.01). Issues from this sector 
are 9% less likely than official controls issues to experience significant deficiencies, 
but 9% more likely to experience minor deficiency. Issues from the calf sector are 
also less likely to experience major deficiency (13% less than official controls 
issues) but are more likely to experience no deficiency (10% more relative to 
official controls issues). Issues from the pig sector are 26% more likely than official 
controls issues to experience minor deficiency but are less likely to experience no 
deficiency or major deficiency (18% and 8% respectively). Slaughter issues are 
only slightly different from official controls issues, being 6% less likely to experience 
significant deficiency. Finally, transport issues are significantly more likely to 
experience no deficiency (33% more likely than official controls issues), and less 
likely to experience minor or major deficiencies (20% and 13% respectively). As in 
the previous chapter, it should be remembered that this exceptionalism of the 
welfare during transport subsector exists only once the number of norm states is 
taken into account (which is relatively large in the transport subsector).
To summarize the results of this chapter so far, models 1 through 5 tested the 
adaptation pressure and interactive discretion hypotheses at the lowest unit of 
analysis possible in this thesis. Even in the presence of additional country-level 
controls, both of these hypotheses survived the stricter testing. Tests of the 
adaptation pressure hypothesis were particularly convincing because of their 
monotonicity. That is, increasing adaptation pressure was associated with the 
201
Analysis across countries and issues
increased severity of implementation deficiency. At the same time, the models 
demonstrated the difference between new and old member states: with 
government effectiveness controlled for, implementation was more deficient in 
the old member states than in the new.
Stage 2: testing the institutional hypotheses
In this second stage, I test the institutional hypotheses (H3A-D) alone. Like in 
the previous chapter in which I tested the adaptation pressure hypothesis by 
itself, I begin testing the institutional hypotheses in the absence of control 
variables. Table 17 contains Model 6, which includes all institutional factors (the 
organization of inspection planning, the number of first- and second-level 
regional offices in the central competent authority, and the number of transposing 
and implementing actors) and no other variables. The three significant variables 
in the model provide some evidence for two of the four institutional sub-
hypotheses.11 Most notably, the number of transposing actors increases the 
likelihood of a major deficiency relative to both minor and no deficiency (H3A). 
Spreading the organization of inspection plans between the central and regional 
levels decreases the likelihood of a minor deficiency (H3D). On the other hand, the 
number of regional offices (first- and second-level) is not significant (H3C), while 
the additional implementing actors decreases the likelihood of major 
implementation deficiency (running counter to H3B). This effect is probably a 
statistical artifact, however, given that Sweden has the largest number of 
implementing actors (each municipality has jurisdiction for farm animal welfare), 
and Sweden is one of the most progressive countries with respect to animal 
welfare legislation.12
I next describe in more detail the substantive significance of the findings from 
this model. With respect to the organization of planning inspection controls, and 
using centralized planning (e.g., targets are set and farms or inspected entities are 
selected at the central level) as a base case, dividing the tasks of setting targets 
and selecting entities for inspection between the central and regional offices 
leads has a statistically significant effect (p < 0.05) on the difference between no 
11 When using the ten-year average in place of the mode for the number of primary geographic 
divisions, there is a significant difference between no deficiency and major deficiency (with more 
such divisions increasing the likelihood of major deficiency), but the variable is no longer signifi-
cant when control variables are added, as in models 7 to 10. 
12 Excluding Sweden from this model does in fact render this variable insignificant.
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deficiency and minor deficiency (the effect for the other comparisons is not 
significant).13 Dividing this responsibility decreases the probability of experiencing 
no deficiency by 8%, while raising the probability of minor deficiency by 10%. The 
geographic organization of responsibility variables have no effect on 
implementation difficulty.
Some evidence is given for the horizontal division of authority.14 The number 
of implementing actors has a slightly significant effect on the difference between 
no deficiency and major deficiency, slightly reducing the probability of the latter 
(which runs counter to theoretical expectations). The number of transposing 
actors has a more noticeable effect, however. The effect is significant (p < 0.01) for 
the difference between no deficiency and major deficiency and between minor 
deficiency and major deficiency.15 In other words, the larger the number of actors 
responsible for transposing animal welfare legislation, the greater the probability 
that implemented issues experience significant implementation deficiencies. The 
marginal effect indicates that an instantaneous rate of change in this variable 
increases the probability of observing major deficiency by 1%. Viewed differently, 
a one standard deviation increase in this variable centered on the mean increases 
the probability of observing significant implementation deficiency by 4%.
Introducing the issue- and country-level variables in Model 7 (Table 18) renders 
the effect of the number of implementing actors insignificant, as expected. On 
the other hand, even with these controls, the effect of the number of transposing 
actors on implementation remains significant and in the same direction as the 
previous model. The effects of the control variables are generally of the same 
nature and significance as in stage 1. Model 8 (Table 19) replaces the issues 
controls with dummy variables for each of the issue types (as in Model 6). The 
main difference between this model and its counterpart in the previous section is 
that the inclusion of the institutional variables has rendered the difference 
between official controls issues and transportation issues insignificant. Otherwise, 
the significance and magnitudes of the remaining variables are similar to those in 
previous models. 
13 The effect of this variable remains significant in this model (and in the models that follow) 
regardless of the value given to Austria for the ten year period (see the above discussion regarding 
assigning a single value to Austria).
14 Neither vertical authority variable is significant, whether I use the mode or the ten-year aver-
age. This holds even when issue-countries exceeding 100 for either variable are excluded from the 
analysis, and persists for the remaining models.
15 The effect of this variable remains significant in this model (and the models that follow) when 
the ten-year average is used in place of the mode.
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To summarize the results of this stage briefly, both models 6 and 7 provide 
some support for two of the three institutional hypotheses (namely, H3A and 
H3D). The variables that correspond to these hypotheses (the number of 
transposing actors and the dummy variable that differentiates mixed inspection 
planning from centralized inspection planning) are both significant with and 
without control variables. Neither model finds support for the implementing 
actors hypothesis (H3B) and the vertical division of authority hypothesis (H3C).
Stage 3: the complete model of implementation deficiency
In the final stage of the analysis, I combine the institutional and issues-level 
variables (plus controls) in order to simultaneously test the three hypotheses that 
have been tested so far. The final theoretical variable, transposition delay, is also 
added to test the final hypothesis (H4). This final stage includes two models, each 
corresponding to a different set of control variables (and thus corresponding to 
the sets of control variables used in the models up to this point). In Model 9 (Table 
20), I use new issue and official controls issue dummy variables, while in Model 10 
(Table 21) I replace these with subsector dummy variables. 
With all variables combined in Model 9, the adaptation pressure, interactive 
discretion, and two of the four institutional hypotheses remain unfalsified. The 
number of norm states increases the severity of implementation deficiency 
(monotonically), corresponding to the adaptation pressure hypothesis (H1). The 
effect is significant for issues that do not delegate authority (issues without 
discretion), and the presence of discretion reduces the substantive effect that 
norm states have on implementation deficiency severity (H2). Like in stage 2, the 
number of transposing actors increases the severity of implementation deficiency 
(like the effect of norm states, this increase is also monotonic), corresponding to 
H3A. Planning inspections at both the central and regional levels increases the 
likelihood of deficiency relative to complete centralization of planning (H3D). The 
effect of transposition delay, however, is not significant, thus providing no support 
for H4. In sum, the hypotheses that were confirmed on their own remain strong 
when tested together.
I now describe in more detail the significance of the variables and their 
substantive effects. In Model 9, we see that the number of norm states remains a 
significant variable even in the presence of the institutional variables. The effect is 
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significant for all three comparisons for issues that do not delegate authority (for 
the differences between no deficiency and minor deficiency and between no 
deficiency and major deficiency this effect is very significant at p < 0.01; for the 
difference between minor deficiency and major deficiency this effect is moderately 
significant at p < 0.05). The marginal effects indicate instantaneous rates of change 
that decrease the probability of observing no deficiency by 16%, increase the 
probability of observing a minor deficiency by 7%, and increase the probability of 
observing a major deficiency by 10%. Of the institutional factors, only mixed 
planning and the number of transposing actors are significant. Mixed planning 
has a significant effect on the difference between no deficiency and minor 
deficiency: its presence decreases the probability of observing no deficiency by 
9% relative to completely centralized planning, while increasing the probability of 
observing minor deficiencies by 10%. Having a large number of transposing 
actors increases the probability of observing significant deficiencies relative to 
both no deficiency and minor deficiency. While transposition delay appears to 
have no effect on implementation difficulty, the effect of delegation (conditional 
upon the number of norm states) remains similar to that seen in model 4. The 
control variables have roughly the same effects and levels of significance as in the 
previous models. 
Finally, model 10 replicates model 9 but uses subsector dummy variables. All 
hypotheses that were significant in Model 9 remain so. In this model there also 
appears some evidence that transposition delay, the geographical distribution of 
authority, and the number of implementing actors all have some effect on 
implementation. The effect of the former, however, runs counter to the 
transposition delay hypothesis (H4). That is, instead of increasing the likelihood 
and severity of implementation deficiency, transposition delay slightly increases 
the likelihood of observing no deficiency. Although transposition delay is itself a 
form of implementation deficiency, the evidence here suggests that transposition 
delay improves post-application implementation for delayers. Additional 
implementing actors increase the likelihood of minor implementation deficiency 
(providing some support for H3B). With respect to the vertical division of authority 
hypothesis, H3C, the model has mixed results. Additional first-level offices increase 
the likelihood of no implementation deficiency (relative to minor deficiency) and 
the likelihood of major deficiency (relative to minor deficiency). Second-level 
offices still have no effect. 
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I turn now to a more detailed description of the significance and substantive 
effects. Transposition delay slightly decreases the probability of observing no 
implementation deficiency (p < 0.05), but the effect is very small. Similarly, an 
increase in the number of first-level regional offices decreases the probability of 
observing no implementation difficulty (p < 0.05), while increasing the probability 
of observing minor deficiencies, but this effect is also small in substantive terms. 
The effect of the number of implementing actors also appears significant here 
and this time in accordance with theoretical expectations. Additional 
implementing actors increase the probability of observing minor deficiencies 
relative to both no deficiency and major deficiency (p < 0.01). This effect is also 
substantively small. The number of transposing actors continues to have a 
significant effect on implementation difficulty, with a large number of such actors 
increasing the probability of observing major difficulties relative to both no 
deficiency and minor deficiency (p < 0.01). The effects of norm states (conditional 
on delegation) remain robust, as are the effects of the control variables. 
The results from this stage generally conform to those from the previous two 
stages and the analyses of the previous chapter. The adaptation pressure and 
interactive discretion hypotheses (H1 and H2) remain uncontested even in the 
presence of institutional factors. Several of the institutional hypotheses are 
confirmed (H3A and H3D as in the previous stage) even when tested alongside 
the adaptation pressure and interactive discretion hypotheses. Using subsector 
dummy variables, mixed support is given for the remaining institutional 
hypotheses (H3B and H3C). The transposition delay hypothesis (H4), introduced 
for the first time in this stage, is not confirmed.
Conclusion
In this second quantitative chapter, I have extended the analyses of the 
previous chapter by shifting the level of analysis from the issue-level to issues 
within countries. The chapter began with a replication of the previous chapter’s 
analyses that introduced country-level control variables. The results of the 
previous chapter were confirmed by these replications, despite the introduction 
of country-level controls. That is, the degree of adaptation pressure required by an 
issue contributes to implementation difficulty. The interaction term showed that 
this effect is particularly strongly for those issues that do not delegate discretionary 
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authority to the member states. Hence the adaptation pressure and interactive 
discretion hypotheses (H1 and H2) were both confirmed.
The analyses were further extended by including institutional factors. These 
factors varied both from country to country and from subsector to subsector 
within a single country. The analyses showed some evidence for a small number 
of these institutional effects. First, the number of actors responsible for transposing 
a directive negatively influenced implementation. Additional actors led to more 
difficulty (H3A). Second, the organization of planning inspection programs had 
some influence on implementation (H3D). When responsibility for these plans 
was divided between the central competent authority and its regional offices 
(that is, the former develops selection criteria and targets while the latter selects 
the farms or slaughterhouses for inspection), more implementation deficiency 
occurred than when plans were developed completely at the central level. Other 
institutional factors such as the number of implementing actors and the 
geographic division of the authority had little impact. These institutional factors 
as a whole mattered less for implementation than the issue-level factors explored 
first in the previous chapter, as evidenced by their lower statistical significance 
and their sensitivity to different model specifications. Country-level control 
variables, such as government effectiveness and whether a country had recently 
acceded to the EU, were also important in determining implementation outcomes. 
Interestingly, new member states were less likely than others to experience 
significant implementation problems.
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In this thesis, I have attempted to explain cross-national and cross-policy 
variation in the post-transposition implementation of EU regulatory policy by 
deriving and testing a set of hypotheses from the transposition literature. I tested 
these hypotheses quantitatively on a novel dataset describing how twenty-seven 
countries implemented EU farm animal welfare policy from 2000 to 2010. I 
constructed this dataset from the mission reports of the Food and Veterinary 
Office (FVO) and used these same reports (plus supporting material) to construct 
a set of case studies that aimed at establishing the plausibility of these hypotheses, 
while inductively uncovering additional interesting sources of variation in 
implementation success and failure. Among the hypotheses, I found support for 
the effect of adaptation pressure and for a conditional effect of discretion 
(conditional on adaptation pressure). I found mixed support for the importance of 
institutional factors. Beyond the initial hypotheses, I also found a notable 
difference in implementation outcomes between the new and old member states, 
with the former slightly outperforming the latter. Although much of the variation 
I observed remains unexplained, the evidence that I found for several of the 
hypotheses contributes both theoretically and empirically to the field of EU 
implementation studies.
In this concluding chapter I will begin by revisiting each of the hypotheses 
advanced in the theory section in light of the qualitative and quantitative evidence 
presented in the previous chapters. After evaluating each of the hypotheses, I will 
summarize the empirical, theoretical, and methodological contributions of the 
dissertation with respect to existing scholarship on transposition and EU policy 
application. Finally, I will discuss the normative implications of the findings and 
possible directions for future research.
Synthesis of empirical findings
The first hypothesis examined the impact of policy misfit or adaptation 
pressure on post-transposition implementation. In the theory chapter, I have 
noted that the intuitive appeal of such an explanation combined with its relative 
empirical success over the years makes it a difficult kind of explanation to ignore. 
Without denying the contribution of static components of adaptation pressure 
(those preexisting conditions within a given member state that either must be 
adjusted to make way for new requirements or that spare some countries from 
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adjustments that others must make), the primary focus was on so-called dynamic 
sources of adaptation pressure. These sources reflect the continuing evolution of 
a policy once countries begin the post-transposition phase, and as such, exist at 
the policy level. I hypothesized that additional sources of dynamic adaptation 
pressure for a given issue increase the probability that the issue is implemented 
with some or significant difficulty.
Before turning to the evidence found for this hypothesis in the quantitative 
analyses chapters, it is worth noting that the static components of adaptation 
pressure appear as relevant as ever from the case study chapters. Besides having 
a population wholly in favor of stringent animal welfare requirements, Sweden 
benefitted from introducing and enforcing such stringent requirements earlier 
than most other member states. As such, it needed fewer adjustments to bring its 
animal welfare laws and their application in line with the requirements of EU 
legislation. Another example of national circumstances (reflective of a static 
conception of adaptation pressure) pre-empting or easing dynamic sources of 
adaptation pressure can be found in Slovenia with respect to animal welfare 
during transport legislation. Given both its central location on key transit routes 
within the EU (after its accession) and from the EU to third countries (after 
Slovenia’s accession but before Croatia’s in 2013) and its small size, the country 
was able to implement EU welfare during transport requirements before accession. 
Not only did this give the country a head start, it also sowed the seeds of an 
adaptive welfare during transport policy subsector.
Regarding dynamic sources of adaptation pressure, which have been divided 
into three kinds: amendments, specifications, and phased-in requirements, the 
case studies provide some indirect support for the hypothesis that these 
contribute to implementation difficulty. Because the case studies were conducted 
at the policy-within-country level, the focus tended to be on cross-national 
differences. Cross-issue factors were only summarily discussed. Nevertheless, the 
evidence here points towards confirmation of this hypothesis. 
Examples can be cited for all three sources contributing to implementation 
difficulty. In the farm animal welfare sector, one of the most widespread problems 
concerns the lack of manipulable material for pigs in pig holdings. This requirement 
was introduced as an amendment to existing EU legislation for the welfare of pigs 
on farms. The main problems concerning welfare during transport reflected the 
difficulties that many countries had in adjusting their policy regime for the new 
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requirements introduced by Regulation 1/2005 (EC). Because these requirements 
were introduced fairly late in the period under investigation here, they had not 
been subject to the same degree of monitoring as requirements contained in the 
other subsectors. I suspect that extending the analysis to the present would reveal 
significant and persistent problems in this area. Specifications (although relatively 
uncommon as compared with the other two sources) also contributed to 
implementation difficulty in the on farm welfare and welfare during transport 
subsectors. The detailed requirements for egg labeling systems was a thorn in the 
side of many member states’ farm animal welfare regimes. Phased-in requirements 
were among the most difficult issues for the member states. While not every 
country had problems implementing the phased in requirements for laying hens 
kept in battery cages, a large majority had minor or significant problems.
By contrast to those issues that evolved in one or more ways over the duration 
of the period under investigation, those issues that did not change experienced 
fewer problems. Within on farm animal welfare and welfare during transport, 
those issues that changed the least experienced the fewest implementation 
difficulties. Although some issues in welfare during slaughter were problematic, 
most of these issues experienced very few instances of significant implementation 
deficiencies. This sector experienced the fewest number of changes during the 
period under investigation here (although EU legislation in this area has since 
been overhauled).
The findings in the quantitative analyses chapters also support this hypothesis. 
Looking solely at the issue-level analyses presented in Chapter 9 first, the 
coefficients for one or more sources of adaptation pressure remains significant in 
models of implementation deficiency, whether modeling any problem or 
significant problems. Before combining the three components into a single 
indicator of adaptation pressure, the individual contribution of each source was 
assessed. Additional phased-in requirements increase the number of countries 
experiencing implementation difficulties for a given issue. Amendments are 
particularly influential when examining severe problems alone. Individually these 
factors are only relevant once issue-level controls are included, but they remain so 
when issue-level dummy variables are added. When all sources are combined into 
a single indicator (the number of norm states that an issue passes through in the 
time period), the hypothesis sees its most resounding confirmation. The norm 
states variable is significant in all those models in which it is present. It remains a 
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significant predictor of implementation difficulty in chapter 10, when the level of 
analysis is shifted downwards and country-level controls have been introduced. 
Relative to other significant theoretical variables, its marginal effect is very large 
in these results, being exceeded by only some of the issue characteristics (whether 
an issue is a new one and several of the issue dummies).
Thus, taking both the qualitative and quantitative evidence together, I find 
support for the notion that adaptation pressures (and specifically those that 
evolve over time) make post-transposition application more difficult for the 
member states. Although the analyses presented in the preceding chapters have 
not exhausted all possible sources of policy misfit, many of which are immeasurable, 
they suggest the need to pay attention not only to the traditional “static” 
components of misfit (as in Knill, 1998; Knill & Lenschow, 1998, 2001), but also to 
the dynamic sources developed here.
The second hypothesis concerned the complex relationship between 
discretion and adaptation pressure. I posited a conditional hypothesis specifying 
that discretion will ease implementation when adaptation pressures are great. Or 
in other words, adaptation pressure has a more negative effect on implementation 
quality in the absence of discretion. Member states can adjust to the demands of 
difficult and evolving policies when they have greater flexibility to do so. In 
policies with a high degree of adaptation pressure, discretion will increase the 
likelihood of implementation success. By contrast, discretion should have either 
no effect on implementation when adaptation pressure is low or it should increase 
the likelihood of implementation difficulties.
The plausibility of this hypothesis (or one of its main effect variants) is difficult 
to establish in the qualitative case studies. Food and Veterinary Office (FVO) 
mission reports are more likely to note when differences in interpretation of EU 
legislation lead to respect of the requirements in some countries but failure to do 
so in others than they are to note the variety of interpretations that are compliant 
with EU rules. The conditionality of the hypothesis also makes it difficult to note in 
the case study chapters, particularly as the FVO focuses less on issue-level factors 
(like discretion or adaptation pressures) than it does on country-level institutional 
factors when considering the performance of each country.
Nevertheless, there is at least one observed instance where discretion appears 
to lead to implementation deficiencies. Countries are granted significant discretion 
with respect to the frequency and size of penalties applied to farmers, transporters, 
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and other operators who violate animal welfare legislation. These differences are 
a major source of implementation difficulty in the member states. This suggests 
both a main effect and a conditional effect for discretion, as provisions related to 
penalties have changed little in each of the policy subsectors under investigation 
during the time period in question. That is, they are issues that have experienced 
low levels of adaptation, a high level of discretionary authority for the member 
states, and consequently many implementation difficulties. Such an observation 
is not as convincing as would be observing an instance of great adaptation 
pressure, no discretion, and few implementation difficulties, but it nevertheless 
does not contradict the conditional hypothesis.
More convincing evidence for this hypothesis can be found in the quantitative 
chapters. Like the actual hypothesis for the main effect of discretion on 
implementation, the empirical evidence is equivocal. In the issue-level analysis, 
this main effect is not significant for the model predicting implementation 
deficiency generally and significant problems in particular. There is some evidence 
in the subsequent chapter, which indicates that the presence of discretion 
increases the probability of observing a major deficiency relative to observing no 
deficiency. Support for the conditional hypothesis is less equivocal, however, in 
both chapters. In all models that include this interaction effect, the significance 
and direction of interaction supports the hypothesis. In the issue-level analysis, I 
have shown that norm states increase implementation difficulty when issues do 
not delegate authority (or in other words, delegation decreases the probability of 
observing deficiency when there are greater sources of adaptation pressure). In 
the analyses discussed in the subsequent chapter, this story is largely repeated, 
with an additional nuance. At low levels of adaptation pressure, greater discretion 
is associated with implementation difficulties. At higher levels of adaptation 
pressure, the relationship is reversed. For these issues, which require significant 
modifications by the member states over time, the flexibility provided by greater 
discretion improves implementation outcomes. In the middle of the range, there 
is no significant difference between the two (as should be expected in such a 
relationship).
Next I turn to the four institutional hypotheses. The first concerns the number 
of actors responsible for transposition and posits that the more numerous these 
actors, the more likely that implementation deficiencies will result. The case 
studies provide numerous instances of this effect. In Spain, each of the regions 
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has responsibility for transposing animal welfare legislation. As a result, the 
regions vary significantly in the stringency of their rules (particularly in relation to 
the size of penalties that may be applied). Spain is not the only example, however. 
In Austria, prior to shifting responsibility for animal welfare from the provinces to 
the federal level, each province had its own set of animal welfare laws (with the 
exception of those for animal welfare during transport). The centralization of 
authority led to a marked improvement in applying EU animal welfare policy in 
this country.
The quantitative analyses in Chapter 10 support this hypothesis, with the 
number of transposing actors significantly increasing the probability of 
experiencing significant implementation difficulty relative to no deficiency. These 
analyses likely underestimate the importance of this (and other) institutional 
factors, however, as giving one score to a country for the entire ten-year period 
masks the effect that institutional changes may have in bringing about better 
implementation. Thus although the case of Austria appears clearly in the transport 
case study chapter, it does not exert its influence in the quantitative analyses, 
where Austria appears to have few actors responsible for transposition. Putting 
this shortcoming aside, however, we still see some confirmation for this hypothesis 
in the quantitative analyses.
The second institutional hypothesis concerned the number of coordinating 
actors responsible for implementing animal welfare legislation once national 
transposition measures had gone into effect. This hypothesis took the same form 
as the previous: more actors of this kind will increase the likelihood of 
implementation difficulty. Again we see qualitative evidence for this effect from 
the FVO mission reports. Problems of coordination between coequal ministries, as 
between Ministries of Transport and veterinary authorities have been cited in 
more member states as being problematic for implementing welfare during 
transport legislation. Other cases clearly contradict the hypothesis however. In 
Sweden, prior to institutional reform, each municipality had sole jurisdiction for 
implementing animal welfare within its territory, and yet Sweden had one of the 
best implementation records for this period. The quantitative analyses show very 
little support for this hypothesis as well, with the variable being significant only 
when control variables have not been included.
The third institutional hypothesis looked at the vertical dimension of authority 
within the central competent authorities responsible for implementing animal 
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welfare legislation in the member states and is analogous to those above. The 
greater the number of regional offices, the greater the likelihood of implementation 
difficulty. Very little evidence was found for this hypothesis in either the case 
studies or the quantitative analyses. FVO reports contain little information 
suggesting that there is a link between the number of regional offices and 
implementation difficulty. While countries with many regional divisions performed 
poorly (as in Bulgaria, Spain, and Greece), so too did countries without many such 
divisions (Lithuania and Malta to some extent). Conversely, countries with many 
regional offices performed well (Germany, Sweden, and Slovakia) and countries 
without them also performed well (Cyprus being a notable example). In the 
quantitative analyses, the coefficients for the variables representing this factor 
were always insignificant.
The final institutional hypothesis concerning the division of responsibility 
between the central and regional levels of the competent authorities posited that 
greater decentralization increased the likelihood of implementation difficulty. In 
contrast to the previous two institutional hypotheses, there seems to be some 
support for this final institutional hypothesis. Both the qualitative and quantitative 
data provide some evidence. For example, the Italian case shows that 
implementation problems in on farm welfare persisted largely because of 
coordination problems between the different levels of the central competent 
authority. The case study notes that depending on the region, sometimes the 
region selects targets for inspection while sometimes the district (the level below 
the region) selects targets. The effect is shown to be modest in the quantitative 
analyses. Mixed responsibility for inspection plans (cases in which the central 
authority develops criteria and targets while the local levels select entities for 
inspection) were slightly more likely to experience minor implementation 
deficiencies than were instances in which plans were entirely developed at the 
central level.
One final hypothesis concerned the relationship between transposition delay 
and implementation difficulty. I posited that increased delay in transposing EU 
requirements into national law would increase the likelihood of implementation 
difficulty. Observing such an effect in the case studies proved difficult, as delays in 
transposition were cited as problems of transposition and not of application. 
Once transposition had occurred, the timeframe for the FVO to observe post-
transposition application had been shortened. This reduced the likelihood of 
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finding a link. For the same reason, it was difficult to find a link in the quantitative 
analyses, which are based on human coding of the FVO reports. Thus in no 
instance was the coefficient for the transposition delay variable significant in 
predicting implementation difficulties. As a result, no evidence was found in this 
analysis linking transposition delay and implementation difficulty.
It is finally worth noting that some of the control variables were significant in 
the quantitative analyses and thus allude to other important explanations for the 
differences in implementation quality. Unsurprisingly, administrative capacity 
increased the likelihood of observing no deficiencies. This idea is also reflected in 
the case study chapters, in which countries with high administrative capacity, like 
Finland and Sweden, performed relatively well, while countries with low capacity, 
like Bulgaria and Greece, performed poorly. Two other control variables were 
significant, but their importance may be a function of the research design. New 
issues and new member states were both less likely to exhibit implementation 
problems by virtue of the fact of their newness – there was simply less time for the 
FVO to observe implementation deficiency. This could also be interpreted 
differently, however. The FVO may purposefully grant more leeway when 
observing new issues. The reason that new member states performed better than 
the old may also be seen in a different light, as intense pre-accession monitoring 
of these countries forced them to bring their implementation into compliance 
prior to accession, or these were extra vigilant in application of the legislation so 
that potential implementation problems would not be seen as a hindrance to 
their upcoming accession. The old member states, secure in their position within 
the EU, did not face similar monitoring and only the uncertain threat of 
infringement proceedings for their implementation failures. Despite being 
outside the theoretical focus of this dissertation, they remain important 
determinants of implementation success and failure for the cases described here.
Taken as a whole, these explanations add up to only a portion of the explained 
variation in implementation quality. As a result, a significant amount of variation 
remains unexplained, potential sources of which will be discussed in the following 
sections. There are additional explanations that may be more policy-focused, 
national-focused, or both. However, the explanations discussed in the results 
above are significant and interesting contributions to providing insight into the 




In the narrowest sense, this dissertation has described the implementation of 
EU farm animal welfare policy (including on farm welfare, welfare during transport, 
and welfare at slaughter or killing) in 27 countries for the years 2000-2010. 
Seventy-six distinct issues have been identified in this policy area and each of 
these seventy-six issues has been examined in all 27 countries. The degree to 
which each country has successfully or unsuccessfully applied each of these issues 
has been assessed, creating a window onto the entire policy area that allows 
cross-national and cross-policy comparisons, both separately and simultaneously. 
Through the coding of these issues and the subsector-by-subsector summaries 
provided at the beginning of each case study chapter, I have shown that differences 
exist from country to country and from issue to issue. The figures at the beginning 
of each case study chapter give an overview of these country-level and policy-
level differences in implementation success for each policy subsector. Some 
countries successfully apply most issues, regardless of their content. In contrast, 
others perform poorly when implementing most issues. Some issues are 
successfully implemented by most countries, others by very few. The case study 
chapters also reveal that where issues are poorly applied, countries generally (if 
belatedly) make improvements to achieve successful implementation. Still, some 
countries do not improve the situation and face infringement proceedings as a 
result. That is, the willingness and ability to adapt varies from one country to 
another. In short, the implementation of farm animal welfare policy in the member 
states exhibits a range of outcomes, but on the whole there is a trend toward 
successful implementation.
Both the case studies and the quantitative analyses have attempted to bring 
some order to this great variability, by applying lessons learned from the (primarily 
quantitative) transposition literature. Policy-level and national-level (or more 
precisely, institutional-level) explanations were examined qualitatively in the case 
studies, which described the implementation of each of the three subsectors in 
four countries each, for a total of twelve cases. These cases explored the plausibility 
of the mechanisms that underlie the explanations derived from the transposition 
literature. Additional factors that fell outside the main hypotheses were also 
identified inductively in these cases, attesting to the limits of positing solely 
generalizable statements about implementation. As discussed in the previous 
section, some kinds of explanations were easier to observe than others in these 
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cases, in part because the cases were based on the reports of an agency within 
the Commission tasked with monitoring implementation. Institutional factors like 
the horizontal and vertical division of implementation authority within the 
member states appeared highly relevant for explaining the variety of 
implementation outcomes from these case studies. Although presented from the 
perspective of institutional veto players, the case descriptions suggested that 
coordination of implementation among actors tasked with similar responsibilities 
presented greater challenges for implementation than conflict among actors in 
different ministries or departments with diverse preferences.
The quantitative analyses, both at the issue-level, and at the issue-within-
country level, painted a slightly different picture. The importance of the 
institutional factors mentioned above receded. In other words, while the case 
studies showed that these factors were important in some cases, their 
generalizability was limited. Of the institutional factors, only the number of 
transposing actors and the division of authority for the creation of inspection 
plans emerged as general patterns. Instead, policy-level factors played a role in 
determining implementation outcomes that could be more easily discerned from 
country to country and from issue to issue, a notion that has been argued and 
tested elsewhere (notably in Steunenberg, 2006, 2007). Most notably, adaptation 
pressure, in the form of amendments, specifications, and phased-in requirements 
made post-transposition implementation difficult, echoing earlier findings based 
on quantitative analysis of transposition that use a different conceptualization of 
adaptation pressure (Kaeding, 2006; König & Luetgert, 2009; Steunenberg & 
Toshkov, 2009; Thomson, 2007). It’s important to note that the conception of 
adaptation pressure presented here is seen solely from the perspective of the 
policy in question and not a “misfit” for any country-policy pair. The possibility that 
this latter notion of misfit played a role in these cases remains unexplored, but the 
variety of such factors that have been explored in previous research may help 
account for the mixed success of this type of explanation (Toshkov, n. d.). The 
dynamic adaptation pressure examined here is of a more general kind and easily 
reproducible in quantitative analyses of post-transposition application.
A second important empirical contribution made through the quantitative 
analyses has been to show that delegating authority to the member states 
influences the quality of implementation, but this effect is conditional on 
adaptation pressures. That is, as adaptation pressure increases, discretion 
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improves implementation outcomes. While evidence for the main effect of 
adaptation pressure has been found elsewhere (although not everywhere), this 
conditional finding is a new one and hence an important discovery made in this 
dissertation. It may help reconcile the conflicting findings in the literature on the 
effects of discretion for the timeliness of transposition. Through quantitative 
analyses on a relatively small number of directives (though with a large number of 
countries), several scholars have found that discretion, by slowing down decision-
making, delays transposition (Steunenberg & Toshkov, 2009; Thomson, et al., 
2007). Looking at only a selection of labor market directives, Thomson finds the 
opposite effect (2007). The analyses presented in this thesis suggest that discretion 
may either improve or derail implementation efforts, depending on the degree to 
which a policy requires significant adaptation from the member states. This might 
also account for an earlier finding on post-transposition application in which 
infringements were more common for directives that granted little discretion 
(Thomson, et al., 2007).
The hypotheses tested in the empirical chapters do not add up to a full 
explanation of differences in the implementation of this policy field (note the low 
levels of explained variation in the quantitative analyses), however, they echo the 
idiosyncratic features found in the case studies. Nevertheless, the empirical 
regularities detected bring some order to this vast puzzle of post-transposition 
implementation. In addition to the hypotheses discussed above, I have also 
described an interesting finding resulting from one of the control variables. In the 
analyses that included country-level variables, I showed that the New Member 
states were less likely than others to experience significant implementation 
problems. While in earlier findings within the transposition literature, the countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe were not different from the others with respect to 
the timeliness of transposition (Steunenberg & Toshkov, 2009), the finding here 
shows that they are in fact different. After controlling for administrative capacity 
(which is, admittedly, lower in the new member states), new member states are 
still less likely to experience major implementation deficiencies.
Theoretical contribution
A major aim of this dissertation has been to integrate findings from the 
transposition literature into a set of explanations for post-transposition 
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implementation. In doing so, I have made three important contributions. First, I 
have defined the concept of adaptation pressure in more precise terms that set it 
apart from the more traditional notion of policy misfit, which is a function of both 
policy and national circumstances, and I have shown that adaptation pressure is 
an important factor in explaining variation in implementation outcomes. 
Adaptation pressure, in contrast to the traditional notion of policy misfit, is 
inherent to the policy itself and has dynamic components. Because it is inherent 
to the policy itself, it can be applied without making pairwise comparisons 
between each country and the policy under investigation. This feature makes it 
easy to apply within a single policy area, as has been done here. Knowledge about 
the situation and circumstances in each country is not necessary to assess its 
importance empirically. Such knowledge is needed when the more traditional 
sources of policy misfit are examined, which makes cross-national comparisons of 
implementation costly in time and resources. Moreover, the sheer variety of 
sources of policy misfit stands in the way of parsimonious and generalizable 
explanations for implementation success and failure. 
The dynamic component of this conceptualization allows a more realistic 
interpretation of the difficulties that evolving policies pose for countries that must 
adjust to them. Earlier case study work on policy misfit contained descriptions of 
how EU countries’ responses to a static set of adaptation pressures emerged and 
responded over time (Knill & Lenschow, 2001). The case studies presented in this 
thesis have also shown such adjustments. The conceptualization here goes one 
step further, however, by allowing countries to adjust to policies while the 
requirements of these policies are themselves changing over time. This more fully 
captures the notion of dynamics than has been done in the earlier works on 
“dynamic” policy misfit. 
Besides developing this new conceptualization of adaptation pressure from a 
theoretical standpoint, I have shown its importance for understanding post-
transposition implementation. The case studies and quantitative analyses 
provided evidence for an explanation linking implementation outcomes with the 
shifting pressures that a policy exerts over time. As noted above, the degree of 
policy misfit is a factor that cannot be ignored in studies of top-down 
implementation. This seems to be the case in this thesis as well, where one or 




It is important to note that adaptation pressure is developed here not as a 
replacement for policy misfit, but as a complement to it. Its importance for this 
policy area was shown in the quantitative analyses, but the qualitative analyses 
also showed the importance of other non-dynamic sources of adaptation pressure 
that result from a mismatch between incoming policies and national circumstances. 
Because of the large number of potential factors of this kind, these were not 
included systematically in the case studies nor in the quantitative analyses. 
Including such factors may provide a more comprehensive explanation of the 
observed variation. The low model fit in each of the quantitative analyses suggests 
room for additional explanations, perhaps of this kind.
The second major theoretical contribution has been to include discretionary 
authority granted to the member states as a factor that influences post-
transposition implementation. Scholars of discretion have focused on its 
determinants, in both the American and EU contexts (Epstein & O’Halloran, 1999; 
Franchino, 2000, 2001, 2007). The transposition literature has examined the role 
that discretion plays in delaying the transposition of EU directives (Steunenberg & 
Toshkov, 2009; Thomson, 2007; Thomson, et al., 2007). Few have looked beyond to 
the effects of discretion on subsequent implementation (but see Thomson, et al., 
2007; Versluis, 2007). I have looked directly at this phase by hypothesizing that 
discretion also influences the application of EU policy, and its effect is conditional 
on adaptation pressure. That is, whether discretion increases the chances for 
successful implementation depends on the extent to which a policy introduces 
additional requirements over time (hence, exerting greater adaptation pressure). 
Support for this conditional hypothesis was found in the quantitative analyses. 
The greater the adaptation pressure, the more important discretion is for easing 
the adaptation by the member states to these new demands. As stated above, the 
conditional effect of discretion may help reconcile some of the conflicting 
empirical findings extant in the literature.
When hypothesizing that discretion delays transposition, scholars have largely 
relied on the argument that such discretion slows decision-making, because there 
are more decisions to be made about several alternatives policy formulations, 
each compliant with EU requirements (Steunenberg & Toshkov, 2009; Thomson, 
et al., 2007). It is the larger range of permissible policy formulations that improves 
post-transposition implementation, according to Thomson, et al. (2007). I adopt a 
more nuanced view and show some evidence for it. I do not dispute the basic 
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logic that discretion slows decision-making and hence delays transposition. I do 
not examine the transposition of the policies under investigation here and so 
cannot corroborate this argument. Because I find no effect for transposition delay 
on implementation, the effect of discretion on transposition is less relevant. But I 
do look for and find a link between the degree of discretion granted to the 
member states and post-transposition implementation. Rather than seeing 
discretion as a passive medium that simply widens the set of permissible 
outcomes, I see discretion as granting the member states flexibility for coping 
with an evolving and demanding set of policy requirements.
Previous investigations into the influence of discretion on transposition and 
implementation use the directive as the unit of analysis. I use issues within 
directives and regulations as the unit of analysis and still find evidence for a link 
between discretion and post-transposition application. The conditional hypothesis 
that I posit (which also relies on a policy’s degree of adaptation pressure) does not 
require a shift to this lower level of analysis, however, so it can also be tested using 
data at the level of legislation. Nevertheless, focusing on the issue instead of the 
overall legislation brings the analysis closer to the unit through which I argue the 
actual mechanism occurs. That is, countries apply EU legislation by implementing 
a set of requirements that define “issues”. The set of requirements for these issues 
changes over time (through amendments, specifications, and phased-in 
requirements) and the member states are granted more or less discretion in 
implementing each set of requirements. Hence within a single piece of legislation, 
there is variability with respect to both of these factors, and this variability may be 
lost when issues are aggregated up to the level of legislation. If the degree of 
discretion granted to the member states within issues is negatively related to the 
amount of adaptation pressure those issues impose, then legislation-level analysis 
will fail to see the relationship that I show to exist at the issue-level, regardless of 
the method of aggregation.
Finally, I have shown that while institutional factors remain important for post-
transposition implementation, the mechanisms are different enough that 
explanations originating in the transposition domain do not provide a compelling 
guide for differences observed during this next phase. The number of actors 
responsible for transposition may influence the subsequent steps, but the impact 
is modest if it exists at all. I did not have strong expectations regarding this 
hypothesis. I relied on institutional veto player explanations of transposition 
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timeliness, which predict that as the number of ministers required for transposition 
increases, transposition will be delayed (Mastenbroek, 2003). I showed that there 
is no link between transposition delay and post-transposition implementation. 
The direct link between the number of transposition veto players and application 
is not so obvious. Thus the mixed findings with respect to this hypothesis are 
unsurprising. The number of implementation veto players (including both the 
number ministries, agencies, and departments that share responsibility as well as 
the number of geographic divisions within ministries) did not have a significant 
effect on differences in implementation. Several observations in the FVO reports, 
however, seem to contradict this particular negative finding. That is, FVO mission 
reports themselves refer to the difficulty of coordinating across geographic 
divisions in several member states. Either these findings are anecdotal, or more 
likely, the count of veto players does not adequately capture the mechanism. In 
addition to possessing the ability to block or complicate transposition and 
implementation, veto players also have preferences that may direct their attention 
to exercising (or not) this ability to block (Steunenberg, 2006, 2007).
Instead, institutional factors related to the policy area in question may be more 
relevant, particularly those that are related to the organization of compliance. This 
conforms to earlier findings by Versluis that looked at a single directive applied in 
a small set of countries (2007). The quantitative analyses showed that the 
organization of authority with respect to inspection plans had some influence on 
implementation success. Those plans developed centrally had a greater chance of 
resulting in favorable implementation outcomes than those that were developed 
entirely by regional offices. Not all policy areas are structured by inspection plans, 
however, this specific organizational characteristic points toward the more 
general concept of the centralization of administrative decision-making. This 
degree of centralization will likely take on a variety of empirical manifestations, 
depending on the policy under investigation, and will have some influence on 
implementation success (as suggested by the preliminary evidence presented 
here).
Methodological contribution
This dissertation was designed as a mixed methods, systematic approach to 
improving our understanding of post-transposition implementation in the EU 
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member states. Rather than relying on expert interviews to assess the quality of 
implementation, I have systematically coded the implementation of 76 issues by 
27 countries through dozens of reports written by the Commission’s Food and 
Veterinary Office following their missions to assess compliance in each country. 
This approach has allowed me to assess both national- and issue-level explanations 
for differences in implementation quality. Few studies of implementation in the 
EU have investigated an entire policy area as it is implemented by all member 
states.
The qualitative and quantitative aspects of this approach complement each 
other, leading to results that are greater than the sum of their parts. The qualitative 
case studies, though unable to test systematically the relative importance of 
multiple explanations across all cases, have helped demonstrate the plausibility 
of particular explanations. Moreover, the semi-inductive nature of this component 
(the hypotheses presented in the previous chapter suggested a direction for the 
case descriptions but did not cover my eyes before other potentially interesting 
explanations) means they have helped identify additional factors that could be 
relevant in future studies of implementation. The quantitative sections, in contrast, 
have allowed the systematic testing of the hypotheses, although some important 
factors could not be included in the models because observation of them was 
difficult or too time-consuming. 
Together, these different components highlight the usefulness of a mixed 
methods approach in social science research more generally, though with a 
caveat. I do not dispute the power of case studies for inductively deriving a set of 
potential explanations for some phenomenon of interest. The case studies 
presented in this dissertation have suggested a number of potential explanations 
that may prove useful in later research. I also relied on the case studies as 
plausibility probes for the hypotheses tested systematically in the quantitative 
analyses. For the direct adaptation pressure hypothesis, the case studies provided 
ample evidence of the underlying mechanism. For more complex, conditional 
hypotheses, like that involving both adaptation pressure and discretion, however, 
the case studies were not useful for establishing plausibility. One might respond 
that a better case study design could have achieved this aim, but then that would 
involve designing case studies and case selection to more closely “test” the 
hypotheses. The inductive value would be lost. In short, there is a tension between 
relying on case studies for one purpose (for discovering unconsidered 
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explanations) or another (for plausibility probes of complex hypotheses).
Normative implications
The conclusiveness of the findings with respect to adaptation pressure and the 
conditional role of discretionary authority suggests an important implication for 
policy design. Adaptation pressure itself is unavoidable. The amendments, 
specifications, and phased-in requirements that pose obstacles for member state 
implementation are a necessary part of policymaking in the EU. They reflect both 
the reality of political compromises and the necessity of introducing requirements 
in such a way that gives member states time to anticipate and adjust. Nevertheless, 
the results show that such pressure is difficult for the member states to bear 
equally. As an ameliorating factor, the conditional role of discretionary authority 
has shown that when adaptation pressure is high, granting member states greater 
flexibility can help them more easily adjust to the new demands. As such, it may 
be useful to explore additional ways of granting member states flexibility for 
coping with these demands. 
The inconclusiveness of the findings regarding institutional factors are not as 
troublesome as they may appear at first glance. While it would have been useful 
to identify institutional designs that could achieve greater implementation 
success in the member states, institutions are difficult to change, and moreover, 
doing so often has unintended consequences. Thus null findings regarding the 
effect that the number of coordinating ministries or geographic divisions have on 
implementation is somewhat of a relief. Reorganizing the geographic divisions of 
authorities within member states’ administrations or reallocating policy 
implementation responsibility across different ministries would have significant 
distributional consequences. Moreover, if such reorganization were perceived to 
be imposed or urged top-down by the EU, it would contribute, rightfully, to 
Euroskepticism. 
Other institutional factors are likely to be important, but these have not been 
subject to systematic testing in this dissertation. In looking at the various 
institutional set-ups that characterize the implementation of farm animal welfare 
in the member states, the case studies observed that coordination and 
administrative capacity were relevant for determining implementation quality in 
some instances. Efforts aimed at improving both coordination and capacity have 
227
Conclusions
been and should continue to be an important part of the Commission’s strategy 
for assuring the uniform application of EU policy in the member states.
Regarding the finding that new member states were on average more 
successful at implementing these policies than others, the normative implications 
depend on the mechanism through which this difference operates. Because this 
finding emerged in the quantitative analyses through a control variable, I did not 
have any expectations (and hence any clearly defined mechanisms) as to its 
direction. It could be that accession to the EU focused the attention of 
administrators in these countries onto successfully implementing EU policies. This 
additional attention did not occur in the old member states, and hence they were 
on average less successful (importantly, after controlling for administrative 
capacity and the theoretical variables). 
Directions for future research
Although the dissertation has presented interesting findings regarding the 
implementation of regulatory policy in the EU, much work remains to fully 
understand this domain. First, I have presented a dynamic conception of 
adaptation pressure that could be further specified and subjected to more 
rigorous testing in the future. Although the case studies enabled me to explore 
the dynamic component qualitatively, the cross-sectional nature of the 
quantitative analyses limited the ways in which this explanation for implementation 
could be applied. Cross-sectional time series analysis of implementation data is 
one way that this concept could be utilized in later research. Without expanding 
the number of policies under investigation (this could also be done, but doing so 
necessarily increases the costliness of such an undertaking), a future study might 
explore the variation in implementation outcomes explicitly over time. Another 
possibility lies in developing more specific hypotheses on the ways in which 
adaptation pressures (and specifically, those stemming from the sources 
investigated here) influence different processes during post-transposition 
application. This can be achieved through carefully constructed case studies 
designed for theory building.
Second, I have explored the conditional impact of discretionary authority in 
determining implementation outcomes. Discretion remains a difficult and 
contested concept, one that defies simple operationalization. The extent of 
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discretionary authority present in EU legislation may not always be easily 
detectable through textual analysis of legal documents (as was done here). It may 
prove fruitful in the future to spell out additional sources of discretionary authority 
and to observe directly the ways in which discretionary authority is exercised. The 
previous two paragraphs provide some suggestions for future research with 
respect to one major independent variable in this study; they could easily 
accommodate this second major independent variable in an analogous fashion 
(although the degree of discretion is more stable than dynamic adaptation 
pressure). Direct observation of the means through which discretionary authority 
is exercised may begin with a textual analysis of national implementing legislation, 
rather than stopping at EU legislation as in this dissertation.
Third, the institutional explanations derived from the transposition literature 
proved inadequate for understanding post-transposition implementation. 
Further theory-building must spell out additional institutional explanations that 
are relevant for post-transposition implementation in particular. The qualitative 
case studies point toward several potential directions for this pursuit: the quality 
of coordination among implementing actors and the organization of 
implementation planning, for example. Future research could be designed with 
the aim of adequately conceptualizing “administrative coordination” and 
developing suitable survey-based measures of this concept. The extent to which 
administrative decision-making is decentralized could be traced throughout the 
implementation phase in order to assess the importance of this factor. The work 
of Versluis on regulatory enforcement is one example of this kind of research 
(2007).
 Finally, this dissertation was limited to exploring the implementation or 
EU regulatory policy within a single policy area. Although this policy area was 
comprised of three very different subsectors, each with a different set of actors 
and organization, and those subsectors themselves were comprised of very 
different issues, the particularities of this single policy area may stand in the way 
of general explanation. Further research could subject the two major findings 
discovered above to testing over a larger set of observations. Although scoring 
implementation quality was time-consuming, and will likely always defy an easy 
approach, the two main theoretical variables – discretionary authority and 
adaptation pressure can be operationalized in large-n research without extreme 
difficulty. This dissertation has shown that these factors are important pieces in 
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the puzzle of post-transposition implementation of regulatory policy in the EU.
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Appendix A: Sample Issues Sheet
The following table is an “issue sheet” providing documentation for each 
deficiency score given to each member state in a given issue. This “issue sheet” 
corresponds to the general requirements for keeping laying hens (Article 3 of the 
Laying Hens directive). There are 76 issue sheets in total, the one provided below 
is an example.
Table 10: Issue sheet for Article 3 of the Laying Hens directive
MS Initial 


















BG 2005 MR The following conclusion 
resulted in a recommendation 
to ensure that beak trimming 
occurs before 10 days of age:
“The CA has not carried out 
checks to ensure whether beak 
trimming is always performed 
before 10 days of age (point 8 
of the Annex to Directive 
99/74/EC) “ (European 
Commission, 2005j, p. 11)
1 1 Satisfactory:
“The check-list for 
the checks in poultry 
breeding holdings is 
to be developed in 
accordance with the 
new Ordinance, 
taking into account 
mission’s 
recommendations. All 
the requirements of 
this Ordinance are to 
be introduced into the 
check list in 




When developing the 
instructions on 
effecting checks and 
during the training to 
be rendered to the 
inspectors, special 
attention will be paid 
to all the 
recommendations 













CY 2009 MR The following conclusion led 
to a recommendation to ensure 
that certain requirements are 
complied with (beak 
trimming):
“The CA is carrying out 
regular inspections to monitor 
compliance with the 
provisions of Article 8(1) of 
Directive 1999/74/EC. 
Practices to restrict the feed 
and water requirements of 
laying hens and not in 
compliance with point 14 of 
the Annex to Directive 98/58/
EC had not been detected by 
the CA and were therefore not 
addressed. Enforcement action 
in the laying hen sector is 
being taken by the CA but is 
not effective in relation to 
claw shortening devices and 
the late beak trimming of 
birds. Deadlines for remedial 
action were given by the CA 
but were not in all cases 
respected by premises 
operators and not effectively 
enforced. Training is not 
sufficient to ensure inspectors 
can effectively perform all 
aspects of official controls on 
laying hen premises. There has 
been little improvement since 
the previous inspection in 
2006.” (European 
Commission, 2009d, p. 4)
1 1 No follow-up yet. NY










DK 2004 MR The following conclusion led 
to a recommendation to ensure 
that there are devices for 
inspecting cage systems of 
more than two tiers:
“Training and guidance is 
satisfactory and as a result 
inspections are generally 
thorough and methodical. 
Apart from failing to indicate 
the necessity for devices for 
inspection where there are 
more than two tiers of cages 




Commission, 2004g, p. 9)
1 1 Action taken:
“(2) To address 
recommendations 2, 3 
and 4, the VFA issued 
a letter on 26.3.2004 
to the regional 
VFCAs indicating: 
(a) Further 
interpretation of the 
new rules. 
(b) The need for 
equipment to inspect 
the third tier of cages 

















FR 2004 MR The following conclusion led 
to a recommendation to ensure 
that blinkers are prohibited:
“The application of blinkers 
(“spectacles”), which penetrate 
the nasal septum is a form of 
mutilation and is therefore 
prohibited by French and EU 
legislation (Chapter C(12) of 
Arrêté of 01.02.2002 and point 
8 of the Annex to Directive 
1999/74/EC), but this was not 
accepted as such by the CA.” 
(European Commission, 
2004h, p. 10)
1 1 Action taken:
“In relation to the 
recommendation 
concerning the use of 
blinkers piercing the 
nasal septum, the 
CCA issued a note on 
25.4.2005 reminding 
the local CAs that this 
procedure is 



























IT 2005 MR The following conclusion led 
to a recommendation to ensure 
that forced molting is not 
tolerated:
“Insufficient guidance also 
resulted in practices, such as 
forced moulting, which the 
CCA agrees does not comply 
with EU requirements, being 
tolerated in many regions.” 
(European Commission, 
2005d, p. 11)
The following conclusion led 
to a recommendation to ensure 
that staff receive training in 
order to perform checks 
satisfactorily:
“The laying hen sector in Italy 
is not making any concerted 
effort to replace unenriched 
cages in the lead-in to the ban 
on unenriched cages in 2012. 
Inspections are being regularly 
carried out on laying hen 
premises but inspectors were 
not sufficiently well informed 
or trained to detect and record 
all deficiencies noted during 
the mission. The CCA has not 
sufficiently communicated its 
view of enforcement policy on 
forced moulting to the regional 
CAs and there had been no 
change in the view of one 
region visited since the last 
FVO inspection in 2005.” 
(European Commission, 
2010d, p. 18)
1 2 No follow-up yet. NY


























PT 2005 MR The following conclusion led 
to a recommendation to ensure 
that forced moulting is not 
tolerated.
“Acceptance by the CA of 
forced moulting does not take 
account of Article 3 of Council 
Directive 99/74/EC and points 
11, 14, 15 and 16 of the Annex 
of Council Directive 98/58/
EC, which makes such a 
practice contrary to EU law.” 
(European Commission, 
2005e, p. 9)
The following conclusion led 
to this recommendation being 
repeated:
“The inspection activity 
performed by the CA does not 
provide adequate monitoring 
of compliance with the 
provisions of Directive 99/74/
EC as shortcomings on laying 
hen farms, such as forced 
moulting, are either not 
recognised or not enforced.” 
(European Commission, 
2009g, p. 4)
1 2 Action taken:
“During the visit to 
the farm the inspector 
was familiar with the 
records to be checked 
in order to identify if 
the practice of forced 
moulting is carried 
out; however, the 
flock in the house was 
very young. The 
inspector correctly 
pointed out that the 
checks on mortality 
and egg production to 
detect this practice 
would not be relevant 
for birds of this age. 
The house visited was 
overall in compliance 
with the requirements 
of Directive 1999/74/
EC. 
The audit team saw 
evidence at one 



















RO 2006 MR The following conclusion led 
to a recommendation to ensure 
that documented procedures 
facilitate adequate inspection 
of requirements:
“The training and guidance 
provided to official 
veterinarians have been 
insufficient to ensure the 
proper identification of other 
serious deficiencies, such as 
the non respect of the 
minimum space allowance 
(Article 5(1)(1) of Directive 
99/74/EC), the inadequacy of 
feed for the purpose of forcing 
moulting (points 14 and 15 of 
the Annex to Directive 98/58/
EC) and the inadequate state 
of cleaning (point 4 of the 
Annex to Directive 99/74/
EC).” (European Commission, 
2006n, p. 9)
The following conclusion led 
to this recommendation being 
repeated:
“Documented procedures have 
been provided as required by 
Article 8.1 of Regulation (EC) 
No 882/2004, and the 
evaluation sheet provided by 
the Animal Welfare 
Department of the CCA was 
useful for inspections. 
However, checks were not 
always carried out following 
this procedure and when 
Inspection Departments carry 
out checks on their own, the 
checklist used did not provide 
a complete list of the EU 
requirements. Neither 
checklist provided sufficient 
guidance on how to assess 
certain requirements, despite a 
recommendation in report 
8053/2006, such as measuring 
the height of cages.” 
(European Commission, 
2007j, p. 13)
1 2 Action taken:




1 above provides 
self-explanatory 






trained on the correct 
completion of the 
inspection form and 
on the methodology 
of reporting on the 























Appendix B: Correspondence Table for Transportation
Table 11: Correspondence table for transportation legislation
Issue Old New
Fitness for transport
Art. 3(b) and (c), Annex 
Chapter I 1., 7., Annex Chapter 
IV
Annex I, Chapter I
Means of transport Annex Chapter I A2(c) and A5 Annex I, Chapter II
Transport practices Annex Chapter I A4, I A6-8 Annex I, Chapter III
Additional provision for livestock vessels Annex Chapter I D Annex I, Chapter IV
Water and feeding intervals, journey times, and 
resting periods
Art. 5A(2)(f-h), and Annex 
Chapter VII Annex I, Chapter V
Additional requirements for long journeys Council Regulation (EC) No 411/98 Annex I, Chapter VI
Space allowances Art. 3(1)(aa), Chapter I 2(a), Chapter VI Annex I, Chapter VII
Route plans/journey logs Art. 5A(2)(b-e) Annex II
Certification NA Annex III
Training courses NA Annex IV
Definitions Art. 2 Art. 2
No undue suffering during transport Art. 5(1)(b) Art. 3
Accompanying documentation Art. 4 Art. 4
Authorization of transporters Art. 5(1)(a) Art. 6
Assembly centers NA Art. 9
Requirements for transporter authorizations NA Art. 10
Long journey transporter authorizations NA Art. 11
Issue of authorizations NA Art. 13
Checks on journey logs Art. 8(1)(c) Art. 14
Checks at any time of journey Art. 8(1) (a-c) Art. 15
Training of competent authority on equipment NA Art. 16
Training of personnel NA Art. 17
Certificate of approval of means of transport by 
road NA Art. 18
Certificate of approval of livestock vessels NA Art. 19
Livestock vessel inspection on loading and 
unloading Art. 8(1) (a) Art. 20









Avoiding unnecessary delay Art. 7 Art. 22
Emergency measures in the event of non-
compliance Art. 9 Art. 23
Mutual assistance Art. 18(4) Art. 24
Penalties Art. 18(2) Art. 25
Infringements and notification of infringements Art. 18(1) (3) Art. 26
Inspections and inspection reports Art. 8 Art. 27
Appendix C: Multinomial Regression Results Tables (Chapter 10) 
Table 12: Multinomial logistic regression, Model 1










































Χ2 (df=6) = 115.02
Pseudo R2 = 0.02
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
† Dichotomous variable for which the discrete change from 0 to 1 is displayed in marginal effects
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Table 13: Multinomial logistic regression, Model 2
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
† Dichotomous variable for which the discrete change from 0 to 1 is displayed in marginal effects
Table 14: Multinomial logistic regression, Model 3
































































Χ2 (df=12) =247.35 
Pseudo R2 = 0.05






































































Χ2 (df=10) = 199.71









Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
† Dichotomous variable for which the discrete change from 0 to 1 is displayed in marginal effects
Table 15: Multinomial logisitic regression, Model 4








































































Χ2 (df=14) = 258.30
Pseudo R2 = 0.05
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
† Dichotomous variable for which the discrete change from 0 to 1 is displayed in marginal effects
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Table 16: Multinomial logistic regression, Model 5
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
† Dichotomous variable for which the discrete change from 0 to 1 is displayed in marginal effects

























































































Χ2 (df=22) = 794.14









Table 17: Multinomial logisitic regression, Model 6









































































Χ2 (df = 12) = 74.84
Pseudo R2 = 0.02
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
† Dichotomous variable for which the discrete change from 0 to 1 is displayed in marginal effects
Table 18: Multinomial logistic regression, Model 7



































































































Χ2 (df = 20) = 180.13
Pseudo R2 = 0.05 
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
† Dichotomous variable for which the discrete change from 0 to 1 is displayed in marginal effects
Table 19: Multinomial logistic regression, Model 8































































































































Χ2 (df = 0.06) = 
Pseudo R2 = 0.06
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
† Dichotomous variable for which the discrete change from 0 to 1 is displayed in marginal effects
Table 20: Multinomial logistic regression, Model 9





























































































































Χ2 (df = 28) = 232.67
Pseudo R2 = 0.07
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
† Dichotomous variable for which the discrete change from 0 to 1 is displayed in marginal effects
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Table 21: Multinomial logistic regression, Model 10



















































































































































Χ2 (df =36) = 311.14
Pseudo R2 = 0.09
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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In deze dissertatie wordt voor 27 EU-lidstaten onderzocht hoe de wetgeving 
over het welzijn van vee wordt toegepast. De zogenoemde ‘transpositieliteratuur’ 
vormt daarbij het vertrekpunt. Van daaruit wordt een theoretisch kader ontwikkeld 
waarin de inzichten uit deze literatuur worden toegepast op de posttranspositiefase 
van het implementatieproces; de fase waarin lidstaten omgezette richtlijnen en 
regelgeving toepassen en uitvoeren. Nadat de transpositieliteratuur en andere 
wetenschappelijke inzichten over implementatie in het algemeen besproken zijn, 
worden hypotheses geformuleerd om verschillen tussen landen in 
implementatiesucces te verklaren. De hypotheses zijn geconcentreerd rondom 
de veronderstelling dat de druk tot aanpassing aan EU-vereisten (welke verschilt 
van eis tot eis en van lidstaat tot lidstaat) de toepassing bemoeilijkt. Bovendien is 
deze aanpassingsdruk dynamisch en dwingt deze landen in de loop van de tijd 
tot aanpassingen wanneer EU-wetgeving verandert. Bij het tegenwicht bieden 
aan adaptatiedruk, helpt de aanwezigheid van vrijheid – waarbij lidstaten enige 
vrijheid hebben om eisen aan te passen aan hun nationale situatie – om de 
problemen die ontstaan door de aanpassingsdruk te verzachten. Aanvullende 
hypotheses die worden afgeleid van de transpositieliteratuur betreffen de 
geografische en bestuurlijke decentralisatie van implementatiebevoegdheden 
en de omvang van vertraging ontstaan voorafgaande aan de toepassing. De 
hypotheses worden getest door middel van een onderzoeksontwerp dat 
verschillende methoden omvat. Hierin wordt een set van case studies op elk van 
de drie belangrijkste onderdelen van het Europese beleid rondom het welzijn van 
vee (te weten het welzijn op de boerderij, tijdens het transport en tijdens de 
slacht) gecombineerd met een kwantitatieve analyse van de implementatie van 
alle belangrijke wetgevingsvereisten op dit beleidsterrein in de 27 lidstaten. De 
resultaten van het onderzoek ondersteunen de hypotheses over aanpassingsdruk 
en vrijheid, terwijl weinig bewijs wordt gevonden voor de hypotheses over de 
decentralisatie van uitvoeringsbevoegdheden. 
In het eerste hoofdstuk wordt het onderzoeksprobleem uiteengezet. Kort 
gezegd is dit de grote variatie in beleidstoepassing die bestaat tussen verschillende 
beleidsterreinen en landen in een beleidsveld waarin de gehele EU onderworpen 
wordt aan dezelfde vereisten. Gegeven dit empirische vraagstuk, luidt de centrale 
onderzoeksvraag van deze dissertatie als volgt: waarom implementeren sommige 
EU-lidstaten regulerend beleid succesvol, terwijl andere daar niet in slagen? De 
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dissertatie past de lessen die geleerd zijn over de transpositiefase toe om zo 
vragen over de toepassing in de posttranspositiefase te beantwoorden. 
In het tweede hoofdstuk wordt de literatuur over EU-implementatie in het 
algemeen in kaart gebracht. Bij de kritische reflectie wordt in het bijzonder 
gekeken naar de brede transpositieliteratuur. De literatuurbespreking die in dit 
hoofdstuk wordt gepresenteerd, richt zich op de (empirische en theoretische) 
ontwikkelingen in het onderzoek over EU-transpositie en posttranspositie 
toepassing en uitvoering. Ik bespreek de geselecteerde literatuur om inzichten te 
verkrijgen voor de theoretische benadering die in het volgende hoofdstuk aan 
bod komt en om hypotheses af te leiden die tegelijkertijd passen binnen de 
empirische studie en de theoretische discussie. Vanaf het begin heeft het 
onderzoek over de implementatie van EU-beleid zich ontwikkeld naar een 
gerichte onderzoeksagenda; een agenda die vele alternatieve verklaringen biedt, 
maar weinig goed onderbouwde generalisaties. Voor de verklaringen wordt 
gebruik gemaakt van een verscheidenheid aan politieke, bestuurlijke, 
landspecifieke en beleidsmatige kenmerken om een verklaring te bieden voor 
implementatiesucces en -falen. In de afgelopen 10 jaar hebben kwantitatieve 
analyses van het omzettingsproces het onderzoeksveld gedomineerd. Ondanks 
de overvloed aan omzettingsanalyses, hebben slechts enkelen posttranspositie 
toepassing als een relevant onderwerp gezien en nog minder hebben een 
connectie gemaakt tussen omzetting en toepassing. 
Het derde hoofdstuk presenteert de theorieën die getoetst worden en leidt 
hieruit de hypotheses af. Ondanks dat het domein van de activiteiten die verklaard 
worden afwijkt van die over transpositie, kunnen verschillende mechanismen 
logisch afgeleid worden van het transpositieonderzoek en kan de posttranspositie 
toepassing zo beter begrepen worden. Het doel van dit hoofdstuk is om die 
factoren eruit te halen die in beide domeinen kunnen worden toegepast. Deze 
factoren zijn de mate van aanpassingsdruk, de omvang van discretionaire 
bevoegdheden gedelegeerd naar de lidstaten en de institutionele kenmerken die 
de uitvoering beïnvloeden. Aan deze drie factoren heb ik het effect van de 
omzetting zelf op de posttranspositie toepassing toegevoegd. De hypotheses die 
vervolgens uit deze factoren herleid zijn, vullen elkaar aan in die zin dat elk een 
effect op de implementatie kan hebben dat onafhankelijk van de anderen is. 
Desondanks kunnen verschillende van de geïdentificeerde factoren de 
implementatie in samenhang met elkaar beïnvloeden. Eén van de theoretische 
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innoviteiten is dan ook de herconceptualisering van aanpassingsdruk als een 
dynamisch in plaats van een statisch concept. 
Het vierde hoofdstuk geeft een overzicht van het beleid over het welzijn van 
vee in de EU in meer algemene zin en beschrijft meer in detail het specifieke 
beleid waarop in dit boek gefocust wordt. Parallel lopende ontwikkelingen in de 
lidstaten, de Raad van Europa en de Europese Economische Gemeenschap (later 
de EU) worden getraceerd. De belangrijkste historische gebeurtenissen in 
beleidsformulering en ontwikkeling worden nagegaan en beschreven om zo de 
lezer bekend te maken met de context van de empirische hoofdstukken die erna 
zullen volgen. In het vijfde hoofdstuk wordt de methodologie geïntroduceerd die 
gebruikt wordt bij de case studies. Ook wordt de strategie uiteengezet die in 
beide empirische delen van deze dissertatie gehanteerd wordt om te meten hoe 
adequaat de uitvoering heeft plaatsgevonden. In dit hoofdstuk presenteer ik de 
voornaamste instrumenten die ik gebruik om de daadwerkelijk plaatsgevonden 
implementatie voor elk van de lidstaten in elk van de drie beleidsonderdelen te 
evalueren. Ik beschouw implementatie als relatief succesvol wanneer de 
wetgevingsvereisten gerespecteerd en naar behoren uitgevoerd worden door 
een lidstaat, haar bevoegde autoriteiten en haar gereguleerde entiteiten. Wanneer 
dit niet zo is, dan beschouw ik de implementatie als niet-succesvol. Voor ieder 
issue evalueer ik de mate waarin de implementatie onvolledig is. Dat doe ik voor 
de gehele 10-jarige periode (2000 – 2010) voor ieder land, gebaseerd op rapporten 
van de Food and Veterinary Office (FVO) van de Europese Commissie die periodiek 
voor alle vereisten met betrekking tot het welzijn van vee de toepassing in elk van 
de lidstaten beoordeelt. Deze evaluaties worden gebruikt voor zowel de case 
selectie als de kwantitatieve analyse, welke samen het empirische deel van de 
dissertatie vormen. 
Het empirische deel van de dissertatie presenteert drie implementatie case 
studies – één voor elk van de drie subsectoren binnen het Europese beleid over 
het welzijn van vee – en twee sets van kwantitatieve analyses. Het doel van de 
case studies is niet om de hypotheses die uit het theoriehoofdstuk zijn 
voortgekomen direct te toetsen, maar om hun plausibiliteit te beoordelen. Dit 
wordt gedaan door de implementatie van elk van de belangrijkste 
beleidsonderdelen in verschillende lidstaten te beschrijven en daarbij het belang 
van de verklarende factoren uit het theoriehoofdstuk naar voren te brengen. De 
volgorde van de cases komt overeen met de opeenvolgende stadia die vee 
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doorloopt van het verblijf op de boerderij (hoofdstuk 6), het transport van de 
boerderij naar de markt en/of het slachthuis (hoofdstuk 7) naar de uiteindelijke 
slacht (hoofdstuk 8). Deze case beschrijvingen belichten verschillende 
mechanismen die ten grondslag liggen aan de hypotheses zoals gepresenteerd in 
het theoretische hoofdstuk en focussen eveneens de aandacht op andere factoren 
die bijdragen aan implementatiesucces of –falen. 
De hoofdstukken 9 en 10 presenteren de kwantitatieve analyses van de variatie 
in toepassing, zoals waargenomen tussen zowel beleidsonderdelen als landen. In 
hoofdstuk 9 onderzoek ik de implementatie van het beleid over het welzijn van 
vee in de EU vanuit het perspectief van het beleidsniveau. Dit heb ik gedaan met 
statistische modellen van zowel het aantal landen per issue dat weinig 
moeilijkheden ondervindt bij de implementatie, als het aantal landen per issue 
dat significante moeilijkheden ondervindt. Voor dit analyseniveau vind ik enige 
onderbouwing voor de twee hypotheses op issueniveau. Ten eerste draagt 
adaptatiedruk bij aan implementatieproblemen, zowel in algemene zin als 
wanneer gekeken wordt naar significante implementatieproblemen. Ten tweede 
speelt vrijheid een rol in het beïnvloeden van implementatie, maar alleen door 
zijn interactie met adaptatiedruk. 
In hoofdstuk 10 ligt de analyse-eenheid een niveau lager. De analyses in dit 
hoofdstuk houden rekening met alle mogelijke evaluaties van issues voor ieder 
land. De resultaten van het vorige hoofdstuk worden bevestigd, ondanks de 
introductie van controlevariabelen op het nationale niveau. De analyses worden 
verder uitgebreid door institutionele factoren mee te nemen. Deze factoren 
variëren zowel van land tot land als van subsector tot subsector binnen één land. 
De analyses tonen enig bewijs voor een klein aantal van deze institutionele 
effecten. 
Het laatste hoofdstuk vat de verkregen inzichten samen en levert conclusies 
voor de studie van EU-implementatie in het algemeen. Eerst brengt het de 
resultaten van de case studies en de kwantitatieve analyses samen. Een eerste 
empirische bijdrage is het aantonen dat het delegeren van bevoegdheden naar 
de lidstaten de kwaliteit van implementatie beïnvloedt, maar dat dit effect 
conditioneel is op aanpassingsdruk. Op een theoretisch niveau heb ik het concept 
aanpassingsdruk in specifiekere termen gedefinieerd, waardoor het apart 
geplaatst wordt van de meer traditionele betekenis van beleids-misfit (oftewel 
het niet doen aansluiten), dat een functie is van zowel beleids- als nationale 
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omstandigheden. Ik heb laten zien dat het een belangrijke factor is om variatie in 
implementatie-uitkomsten te verklaren. De dynamische component van deze 
conceptualisering staat een meer realistische interpretatie toe van de 
moeilijkheden waarvoor landen zich gesteld zien bij het zich aanpassen aan 
ontwikkelend beleid. De tweede belangrijke theoretische bijdrage is het 
toevoegen van aan de lidstaten toegekende discretionaire bevoegdheden als 
een factor die de posttranspositie implementatie beïnvloedt. Tenslotte heb ik 
aangetoond dat terwijl institutionele factoren belangrijk blijven voor 
posttranspositie implementatie, de mechanismen zo verschillend zijn dat 
verklaringen die hun grondslag vinden in het transpositiedomein geen afdoende 
leidraad vormen voor de verschillen die geobserveerd worden tijdens de volgende 
fase. 
Het overtuigende bewijs met betrekking tot adaptatiedruk en de conditionele 
rol van discretionaire bevoegdheden suggereert een belangrijke consequentie 
voor de opzet van beleid. Adaptatiedruk op zichzelf is onvermijdelijk. De 
amendementen, specificaties en geleidelijk geïntroduceerde vereisten die 
obstakels vormen voor implementatie door lidstaten, vormen een noodzakelijk 
deel van beleidsontwikkeling in de EU. Zij reflecteren zowel de realiteit van 
politieke compromissen als de noodzaak vereisten zodanig te introduceren dat 
het lidstaten tijd geeft om te anticiperen en zich aan te passen. Toch laten de hier 
gepresenteerde resultaten zien dat het voor de lidstaten lastig is hier op dezelfde 
wijze mee om te gaan. Aanvullend heeft de conditionele rol van discretionaire 
bevoegdheden laten zien dat wanneer de adaptatiedruk groot is, het toekennen 
van grotere flexibiliteit aan lidstaten deze kan helpen zich makkelijker aan te 
passen aan de nieuwe vereisten. Als zodanig maakt dit het zinvol de aanvullende 
manieren te onderzoeken waarop lidstaten flexibiliteit kan worden toegekend 
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